Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the Sunshine Act and whether meetings between an agency and outside entities, including those involved in ongoing litigation with that agency, were “deliberations” that should have been open to the public where the subject of the meetings was the same as that of the litigation. The agency claimed the meetings were held for information-gathering purposes only. The court of common pleas ruled in favor of the agency. After review of that court's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Smith v. Richmond Township" on Justia Law

PPM Atlantic Renewable (“PPM”) unsuccessfully requested that the Fayette County Zoning Board grant it numerous special exceptions and variances for it to build 24 windmill turbines on leased land. This matter involved whether an objector must comply with a county court order to post bond as a condition of appealing to the Commonwealth Court, where the developer was the appellant in the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court should not have quashed the objector's merits appeal based on the the objector's failure to post bond. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of Section 602 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, which concerned the notice requirements for an upset tax sale for non-payment of delinquent taxes. Specifically, the issue centered on whether the Commonwealth Court correctly held that “proof of mailing” in subsection 602(e)(2) referred exclusively to United States Postal Service Form 3817 (a Certificate of Mailing). Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that although the Washington County Tax Claim Bureau did not obtain a Certificate of Mailing, it did proffer other documents from the USPS as evidence to establish “proof of mailing.” The Court held that these USPS documents satisfied the statutory mandate for “proof of mailing” in subsection 602(e)(2). View "Horton v. Washington County Tax Claim Bureau" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Act 152 of 2004 (“Act 152”) violated the “single subject” rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,3 and, if so, whether the portions of Act 152 amending Pennsylvania’s “Megan’s Law” could be severed from the other provisions of the Act and remain in force. The Court concluded that Act 152 did violate Article III, Section 3, since its various provisions do not all relate to a single unifying subject. Furthermore, the Court struck Act 152 in its entirety. View "Pennsylvania v. Neiman" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder for the shooting deaths of Mendez Thomas and Lisa Diaz. On appeal, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support appellant's murder convictions. View "Pennsylvania v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Appellant Alexander Keaton appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed the PCRA court erroneously denied the underlying claim that his invoking a Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogations on a rape charge invalidated his uncounseled, incriminating statements given weeks later in an unrelated murder and rape case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found appellant never invoked his right to counsel in the initial rape case, and as such, the PCRA court did not err in denying appellant relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Keaton" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the manifestation of an occupational disease outside of the 300-week period prescribed by Section 301(c)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act removes the claim from the purview of the Act, such that the exclusivity provision of Section 303(a) does not apply. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that claims for occupational disease which manifest outside of the 300-week period prescribed by the Act do not fall within the purview of the Act, and, therefore, that the exclusivity provision of Section 303(a) does not apply to preclude an employee from filing a common law claim against an employer. Accordingly, in these cases, the Court reversed the Superior Court's decision. View "Tooey v. AK Steel" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the proper scope of the “illegal sentence” doctrine. The Superior Court held that the claim at the heart of this appeal, implicated the legality of appellee’s sentence; found that the claim was meritorious; vacated appellee’s aggravated assault conviction; and then directed that the principle of double jeopardy precluded appellee from being recharged in connection with the assault. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the claim was subject to waiver. The Court found that appellee’s claim concerning her underlying conviction for aggravated assault did not implicate the legality of the sentence for purposes of issue preservation. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case back to to that court for consideration of appellee’s remaining appellate claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Spruill" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a court of common pleas order that declared Section 9543(a)(1)(i) of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) was unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner Emma Turner. The PCRA court held that barring Petitioner from obtaining collateral relief on her timely claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness because she had completed serving her sentence, as Section 9543(a)(1)(i) requires, would violate Petitioner’s constitutional due process right to be heard on this issue. The PCRA court, therefore, permitted Petitioner to proceed with her PCRA petition, despite her ineligibility under Section 9543(a)(1)(i), granted an evidentiary hearing, and ultimately awarded her a new trial. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner had no due process right to be heard outside of the limits imposed by Section 9543(a)(1)(i) of the PCRA, and that she had the opportunity to attempt to vindicate her claim on direct appeal under "Commonwealth v. Bomar," (826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003)), or within the time frame permitted by the PCRA, the Court reversed the PCRA court's decision and held that this section was constitutional as applied to Petitioner. View "Pennsylvania v. Turner" on Justia Law

In 1994, Appellee Joseph Elliott was convicted of the first degree murder of Kimberly Griffith, and sentenced to death. Following the denial of relief on direct appeal, appellee filed a petition for collateral relief. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (the PCRA court) granted appellee a new trial on the following grounds: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare for trial or interview appellee in person prior to trial; and (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the estimated time of the victim’s death. The PCRA court denied appellant relief on his remaining claims. The Commonwealth appealed the PCRA court’s grant of a new trial, and appellee filed a cross-appeal from the denial of relief on his other issues. After careful consideration of the PCRA Court record, the Supreme Court found appellee did not meet his burden to prove he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that it was an error for the lower court to grant a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. Therefore the Supreme Court reversed the grant of a new trial, and affirmed the denial of relief on appellee's remaining claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Elliott" on Justia Law