Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Glenn Lyons appealed the death sentence he received after a jury convicted him of first-degree and third-degree murder for the 2008 stabbing death of Kathy Leibig. Having addressed and rejected each of Appellant's claims of error, the Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sentencing court properly ordered a convicted defendant, as a condition of probation, to pay amounts representing child support to the children of the victim of the defendant’s crime. The Superior Court held that such a condition was not permitted as a matter of law, vacated the sentencing court’s order, and remanded for resentencing, with a majority holding that the purpose behind the trial court's order was "clearly to support the decedent's children and not to rehabilitate [appellee]." The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order, but for different reasons: "while a probationary condition resembling the equivalent of child support is not prohibited, neither is it specifically approved. What is undeniable is that child support is a separate realm subject to very specific statutory standards and implementing guidelines." View "Pennsylvania v. Hall" on Justia Law

Appellees were teenagers at the time of the offense. They traveled to downtown Philadelphia with two others. When plans fell through, the group decided to “jump” the next person they saw, so their trip downtown would not have been “for nothing.” The young men saw the 36-year-old victim walking alone in a subway concourse and decided to attack him. At the goading of his four friends, one of the young men struck the victim from behind. The others promptly joined the attack; they punched, kicked, and stomped on the victim’s head and chest. As a result of the beating, the victim suffered a fatal asthma attack. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether conspiracy to commit third degree murder was a cognizable offense under Pennsylvania law. Because the Court held conspiracy to commit third degree murder was a cognizable offense, the Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of the sentences. View "Pennsylvania v. Fisher, Stanton and Best" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether certain property in Cumberland County, which was owned by the City of Philadelphia as trustee of the Stephen Girard Trust and leased by the Board of Directors of City Trusts to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, was subject to local real estate taxation in Cumberland County. The trial court held that the property was both immune and exempt from local real estate taxation. The Commonwealth Court reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the trial court’s order on grounds of tax immunity. View "City of Philadelphia v. Cumberland Cty Brd Assess Appeals" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the Superior Court erred in reversing a trial court’s bail forfeiture order. In 2010, police arrested Ricky Hann for assaulting his then-girlfriend. Following an initial bail hearing, he was released on his own recognizance. The girlfriend obtained a protection-from-abuse order contemporaneous with Hann’s release. A month later, police arrested Hann for violating the PA order. He was found guilty, but remained free. A few months later, the girlfriend reported to police that she had been kidnapped and kept against her will for about 24 hours before she could escape. Based on this statement, police arrested Hann. Hann was arraigned, and bail set. Hann executed a surety agreement with a bail bondsman whereby he acknowledged his heirs or assigns could be responsible for forfeiting the bail should Hann fail to appear for court proceedings. Hann was again released on bail. Police were dispatched to the girlfriend’s residence; upon arrival, officers found the dead bodies of Hann and the girlfriend, both shot in a homicide/suicide. The Commonwealth filed a petition for bail forfeiture, contending that by murdering his girlfriend and killing himself, Hann violated the terms of his bail bond, and that the bail bondsman was subject to forfeiture of the bail. The bail bondsman opposed the petition, arguing that “justice did not require the full enforcement” of the order. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order: “[w]e do not portend to render bail bondsmen, or any surety for that matter, the guarantors of a defendant’s conduct while the defendant is released on bail. However, the express language of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning bail, bail bonds, and forfeiture . . . permit forfeiture for any breach of a bail condition. Were we to accept the Superior Court’s holding, however, that ‘justice only require[d]’ forfeiture in circumstances where the Commonwealth has expended money in recapturing or retrying the defendant, the rule-based requirements of non-absconding related conditions and the potential for forfeiture for breaching those conditions would become nullities. To the extent the Superior Court so held, we respectfully find that it erred.” View "Pennsylvania v. Hann (Weachter-Bail Bondsman)" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant, his codefendant, and two accomplices robbed the occupants of a vehicle at gunpoint. In the course of the robbery, Appellant shot and killed the victim. At the time, Appellant was seventeen years of age. In 2002, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and related offenses. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus a term of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Superior Court affirmed; the Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal; and Appellant did not seek discretionary review in the United States Supreme Court. Appellant then timely filed a post-conviction petition claiming, inter alia, that the life-without-parole sentence violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as extended to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case was whether “Miller v. Alabama,” (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)) applied retroactively to Appellant’s 2002 judgment of sentence, which became final in 2005. The United States Supreme Court issued the Miller decision in June 2012, rendering Pennsylvania’s mandatory scheme of life imprisonment for first- and second-degree murder unconstitutional, as applied to offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. Significantly, as pertaining to this case, the Miller majority did not specifically address the question of whether its holding applied to judgments of sentence for prisoners, such as Appellant, which already were final as of the time of the decision. The Pennsylvania Court applied settled principles of appellate review, and found nothing in Appellant’s arguments persuaded it that Miller’s proscription of the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences upon offenders under the age of eighteen at the time their crimes were committed must be extended to those whose judgments of sentence were final as of the time of Miller’s announcement. View "Pennsylvania v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of sexual abuse of children, invasion of privacy, and criminal use of a communications facility for videotaping his 13-year-old step-daughter undressing in the bathroom. Although appellant admitted to the videotaping, he contended his motivation was to embarrass her and correct her behavior for having twice entered his bedroom while he was naked. The trial court did not credit appellant’s testimony concerning his motivation and found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to a probationary term of three and one-half years and ordered to undergo a sex offender evaluation and follow all treatment recommendations as a specific condition of his probation. One such recommendation was a sex offender treatment program. Appellant would later be discharged from the program. Concluding appellant’s discharge from the program was a violation of his probation conditions, appellant’s probation officer filed a petition with the trial court; the trial court found appellant violated his probation requirements, and it revoked his probation. Appellant was sentenced to another probationary term of three years and ordered to complete the sex offender program, including polygraph examinations administered to monitor his compliance. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion he violated his probation, and that the trial court erred in admitting the results of his therapeutic polygraph examination into evidence at his VOP hearing. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial or Superior Courts’ decisions, and affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. A.R. " on Justia Law

Appellant was first convicted of possession of child pornography in 2001. That conviction resulted in a sentence of five years’ intermediate punishment which Appellant completed in September 2006. In January 2007, the police received a cyber-tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that Appellant had sent and received images of child pornography by computer. Appellant was arrested and arraigned on child pornography charges for a second time. The Commonwealth, although not required to do so at that point in the proceedings, informed Appellant that if convicted, he would be subject to a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence under the provisions of the Sentencing Code. At issue in this discretionary appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment imposed for Appellant’s second conviction of possessing child pornography was grossly disproportionate to the crime and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Court determined that the punishment was not grossly disproportionate to the crime and, accordingly, affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Baker" on Justia Law

Appellant George Yohe, II, appealed a Superior Court order that reversed the trial court’s order awarding a new trial on the ground that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that appellant’s constitutional right of confrontation was not violated at trial because the testifying witness was not a “surrogate witness,” as Appellant argued. Rather, the witness was the author of the testimonial statement offered into evidence and, therefore, was an appropriate witness under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, Appellant’s confrontation rights were protected by this testimony. View "Pennsylvania v. Yohe, II" on Justia Law

In 2005, appellee was charged with two counts of criminal use of a communication facility, as well as single counts of delivery of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and simple possession of cocaine. Represented by retained private counsel, appellee proceeded to a jury trial in 2006, and was found guilty of all charges except one of the counts of criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court sentenced appellee to three to six years of imprisonment on the delivery charge and a concurrent sentence of two to four years on the criminal use of a communication facility conviction, both with credit for time served. The other drug convictions were merged for sentencing purposes. In 2007, appellee motioned for appointment of counsel in the trial court, which the trial court granted, appointing the Centre County Public Defender’s Office. Then, through counsel, appellee filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his appeal rights due to trial counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal. In 2008, following an earlier evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court reinstated appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, without addressing the substantive ineffectiveness claims. Appellee subsequently filed a notice of appeal and a statement, identifying eleven issues of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The the PCRA court issued its opinion briefly addressing the merits of those ineffectiveness claims. In his Superior Court brief, appellee pursued only three of the eleven claims of ineffectiveness; he raised no preserved, direct review claims. The Superior Court panel determined that appellee’s merits arguments were “misguided” because he should have argued that the PCRA court, in its opinion reinstating appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, had erred by failing to consider the effect of appellee’s amended PCRA petition raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Following “Pennsylvania v. Liston,” (941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super.2008) (en banc)), the Superior Court remanded to the PCRA court with instructions to permit appellee to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc in which he could raise his ineffectiveness claims. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the reviewability of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on post-verdict motions and direct appeal under “Pennsylvania v. Bomar,” (826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115 (2004)), and “Pennsylvania v. Grant,” (813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)), including the question of whether ineffectiveness claims may be considered if accompanied by a waiver of review as of right under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Holmes" on Justia Law