Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In early 2008, over the course of a lengthy jury trial, the state presented approximately thirty witnesses, including known criminals, against Defendant Michael Ciresi who was once a decorated North Providence police officer. Defendant was charged with multiple counts ranging from the receipt of stolen goods to burglary. Ultimately Defendant was convicted on all but one of the counts with which he was charged. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the trial justice abused his discretion by admitting numerous instances of Defendant's uncharged misconduct under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Defendant also challenges the trial justice's decision to allow the joinder of two separate indictments against him, as well as the trial justice's subsequent denial of his motion to sever the indictments for trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court: "[b]ased on the defendant's failure to demonstrate any basis upon which [the Court] might conclude that he suffered prejudice arising from the consolidation of the indictments against him for trial," the Court held that the trial justice's joinder and denial of Defendant's motion to sever did not prejudice his constitutional right to a fair trial. The Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice and affirmed his rulings.

The controversy at the center of this case arose from a newspaper article written by Defendant Katherine Gregg that sparked an "acrimonious and childish on-air rant" by Defendant Dan Yorke, a well-known radio talk show host, about Plaintiff Robert I. Burke, a local restaurateur. The article described an annual St. Patrick's Day lunch hosted by William Murphy, the then-Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Rhode Island General Assembly, at one of Burke's restaurants. The lunch, a private event, was in large measure a "roast" of local public figures. In a story published by the Providence Journal, Gregg was openly critical of an "off the record" rule that allowed members of the media to attend the event, but banned them from disclosing the jokes made during the lunch. Her article attributed the creation and enforcement of the policy to both Burke and Murphy. Apparently incensed by the article, Yorke used his talk show as a platform to hurl a series of crude and disparaging remarks at Burke. Burke filed a complaint alleging various counts of libel and slander against Gregg, the Providence Journal Company, Yorke, and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation. Two other plaintiffs also joined in the action: BOEA, Inc. and the Food & Beverage Corporation. Food & Beverage Corp., which operated Burke's restaurant and is a parent corporation of BOEA, alleged its own counts of libel, slander, and interference with contractual relations against Yorke and Citadel. BOEA, the entity that operates Federal Reserve Special Events, alleged libel, slander, and breach of contract against Yorke and Citadel. All defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and those motions were granted by a justice of the Superior Court. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. "It is beyond question that Burke was justifiably offended by Yorke's . . . broadcast. Yorke's rambling diatribe would without a doubt ruffle the sensibilities of any listener at whom it was directed. Nevertheless, 'it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste * * *.' Therefore, his opinions unquestionably represented his interpretation of the facts presented in her article. Furthermore, as discussed above, even if Gregg's assertion that Burke was responsible for the 'off the record' rule was false or inaccurate, [the Court] concluded that as a matter of law it was not defamatory. Therefore, Yorke's comments were based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts, and [the Court] affirm[ed] the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing those claims." The Court vacated the decision pertaining to the breach of contract claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue.

Plaintiff John J. Tworog appealed two Family Court orders pertaining to his divorce proceedings with Defendant Dolores M. Tworog. John first appealed an order denying his motion to reopen the final judgment of divorce, alleging that the judgment was based on mistakes of fact and fraud. He also appealed an order finding him in contempt of court for not complying with the final judgment of divorce. Upon review, the Supreme Court deferred to the hearing justice's findings of fact in this case, and with no abuse of discretion, affirmed the justice's decision to deny John's motion to reopen the divorce judgment. Furthermore, the Court found the record supported the hearing justice's finding of contempt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Family Court orders.

Applicant David Higham appealed a superior court judgment that denied his second application for postconviction relief. In 2000, a jury found that Applicant committed two acts of first-degree child molestation against the seven-year-old daughter of his step son. Applicant was sentenced to concurrent terms of forty years on each count with twenty years to serve and twenty suspended with probation. In 2006, Applicant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed to represent him, but counsel later withdrew, noting in his motion that Applicant's application was "wholly frivolous" and without merit. Even though the motion to withdraw was pending, counsel appeared with applicant at a hearing in Superior Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, a stipulation, signed by both applicant and his attorney was entered on December 5, 2008. The stipulation provided that the motion for postconviction relief would be dismissed with prejudice in exchange for a reduction in sentence approved by the hearing justice. In 2009, Applicatn appeared before the parole board seeking early release. The board denied his but because he refused to acknowledge his crime or complete a sex-offender-treatment program. Applicant then filed another pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging that parole had been unlawfully denied; jury misconduct, and that he was actually innocent. Finding that none of the issues raised on appeal had merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's denial of Applicant's application for postconviction relief.

Applicant Randy Anderson appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Applicant contended that the hearing justice erred by (1) deeming his claim of prosecutorial misconduct to be procedurally barred; (2) finding no discovery violation on the part of the state for failing to produce certain medical records; and (3) determining that the medical records would have been “of little or no value to the factfinder in the context of [Anderson’s] trial.” This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on January 24, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. Finding no error with the hearing justice's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

On October 31, 2004, three-year-old Thomas J. Wright died as a result of extensive injuries that tragically had been inflicted upon him by his aunt and her boyfriend after they returned home from a night of drinking. Defendant Katherine Bunnell was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. As a result, she was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) for the murder conviction and ten years to serve at the ACI for the conspiracy conviction. Defendant appealed her conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial justice erred by excluding from evidence certain portions of an interview given by her boyfriend, Gilbert Delestre, at the Woonsocket Police Department the day before TJ died; and (2) the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. Finding no error in the trial justice's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Jeffrey Alston (alias John Doe) appealed his conviction for conspiracy to break and enter, breaking and entering of a dwelling, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He also appealed the denial of his motions for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant contended that his right to confrontation under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions was violated by the evidentiary rulings of the trial justice, that his right to cross-examine one of the state’s witnesses was unduly restricted, and that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

Defendant Hamlet M. Lopez appealed a Superior Court judgment of conviction for first-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred by (1) allowing DNA evidence to be introduced against him through the testimony of a laboratory supervisor and the admission of an allele table documenting the DNA profiles of the defendant and the decedent; (2) admitting evidence of his prior instances of violence; (3) failing to instruct the jury adequately about prior inconsistent statements; and (4) imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

On August 27, 2007, an eighty-seven-year-old woman's purse was stolen in a supermarket parking lot. As a result, Defendant Nelson Rolon was charged with and ultimately convicted of first-degree robbery. Rolon appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence produced at trial was legally insufficient to prove the element of force. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant used force to take the victim's purse; and (2) therefore, sufficient evidence existed that would justify a reasonable juror in finding that Defendant robbed the victim on August 27, 2007.

Plaintiff, an African-American male of Nigerian origin, was hired by Atlantek, Inc. Zebra Technologies later acquired Atlantek. Three years later, Plaintiff was laid off. Plaintiff signed a release document and submitted it to Zebra Atlantek without consulting with his attorney. According to another document received by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's receipt of separation benefits was contingent on the receipt by Zebra Atlantek of a signed copy of the release document wherein Plaintiff released any claims under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) or any state law prohibiting employment discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff later commenced an action against Defendants, Zebra Atlantek and several individuals, alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the FEPA and State Civil Rights Act. Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit constituted a material breach of the release document. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that FEPA did not render the release document void as it applied to Plaintiff's pending FEPA claims.