Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Nicola Tarzia was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine. After Tarzia successfully completed a diversion program, the State dismissed the charge. Tarzia later filed a motion to expunge the charge, which the district court granted. Later, however, Tarzia's past criminal activity was subsequently published. Tarzia filed a fifteen-count civil action against several State and City actors, alleging, inter alia, unlawful dissemination of expunged records, negligence, and failure to seal Plaintiff's records. The circuit court dismissed two counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and after a jury trial, granted judgment as a matter of law to the State and City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the remedy of civil liability did not apply to Tarzia's case; (2) there was no reason for the Court to recognize other causes of action based in common law for alleged violations of the sealing statute; (3) the information allegedly provided to a newspaper reporter did not amount to a violation of the state's right-to-privacy statute; and (4) Tarzia waived his right to challenge on appeal the district court's finding that all of the named defendants were sued in their official capacity.

Plaintiff Thomas DePetrillo filed suit against Belo Holdings, Inc. and Citadel Broadcasting Company, challenging the validity of Citadel's right of first refusal to purchase a broadcasting tower and surrounding real estate owned by Belo. The superior court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff, as a stranger to the original lease agreement between Belo and Citadel, had no standing to challenge Citadel's right of first refusal or the effectiveness of its exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff lacked authority to challenge the validity of the right of first refusal; and (2) Citadel's right of first refusal was enforceable as a matter of law.

A justice of the superior court found Defendant guilty of having violated section 16-93 of the Providence Code of Ordinances for allowing the emanation of loud music from his vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 16-93 was not preempted by state law because it was not in direct conflict with state statutes regulating noise and also because it did not constitute an impermissible invasion of a field of regulation that was fully occupied by state law; (2) the statute was not unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague; and (3) the statute was not unconstitutional for being overly broad.

After a jury trial, Defendant Emmanuel Barbosa was found guilty of felony assault, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of a firearm after previous conviction of a crime of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. Defendant subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective. The superior court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice made adequate findings of fact and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in finding that Defendant failed to prove to a reasonable probability that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's purported deficiencies.

Defendant Jeffrey Murray was charged by criminal information with a felony pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-29-5 for violating a no-contact order. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and was sentenced under the terms of section 12-29-5. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that the sentence imposed on him was illegal because, in his view, the provisions of section 12-29-5 applied only to individuals with two prior misdemeanor convictions, and one of his predicate offenses was a felony. The superior court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that the provisions of section 12-29-5 did apply because Defendant had been convicted of two prior domestic violence offenses, and the statute did not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's argument was not an attack on the legality of his sentence, but rather on the propriety of his conviction, and Defendant unequivocally waived all nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal information by virtue of his decision to enter a plea of nolo contendere; and (2) the sentence in this case was not illegal because it was within the prescribed statutory limits.

Plaintiff Robert Watson, together with nine Republican colleagues from the Rhode Island House of Representatives, sought a declaration that the process the General Assembly used to allocate $2.3 million in state money for legislative grants to local and private organizations in the 2008 fiscal year violated the Rhode Island Constitution. Plaintiffs brought the action in their individual capacities as taxpayers, and not in their capacities as elected officials. The superior court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claim because Rhode Island does not recognize so-called "taxpayer standing," and because Plaintiffs were unable to articulate a particularized injury that was distinct from any suffered by the general public. Watson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not have standing under the Court's precedent; and (2) the substantial public interest exception did not apply in this case.

Gary Tassone was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Tassone subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that his constitutional rights had been adversely impacted by the ineffective assistance of counsel and by witness perjury. The superior court denied the application without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, from this point forward, an evidentiary hearing is required in the first application for postconviction relief in all cases involving applicants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant Shurron Washington sought review of an adjudication of a probation violation after a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and the hearing justice revoked the suspension of a ten-year sentence that had previously been meted out. On appeal, Defendant contended that the hearing justice erred in adjudicating him to be a probation violator because, in Defendant's view, the record raised "too many questions" about the reliability of the identification of him as the perpetrator of an alleged attack. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he declared that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

Defendant Esteban Carpio was convicted of first-degree murder of a police officer, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and felony assault with a dangerous weapon. The superior court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment for committing a crime of violence with a firearm resulting in death, and another consecutive twenty-year term for felony assault on an elderly woman. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and affirmed the superior court, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction; (2) the trial justice properly instructed the jury on the question of criminal responsibility; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Kayborn Brown was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to forty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress complainant's out-of-court identification from a photographic array, as the identification was not impermissibly suggestive or improperly tainted; and (2) did not abuse its discretion under R.I. R. Evid. 403 by denying Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a fraudulent charge to the complainant's credit card that occurred shortly after the robbery, as the evidence connected Defendant to the crime.