Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Yoneiry Delarosa appealed from a superior court judgment adjudicating him a violator of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the hearing justice did not err (1) by crediting the testimony of a witness after she was offered a favorable plea disposition by the State to testify against Defendant; (2) in overruling defense counsel's objection to certain testimony by the witness about which Defendant alleged he had not been apprised prior to the hearing because the witness revealed the information for the first time at the hearing and no written or recorded statement existed on this particular issue; and (3) by failing to allow defense counsel or Defendant the opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing, as the hearing justice correctly followed precedent in so ruling.

Defendant Christopher Smith was found guilty of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and second-degree child molestation sexual assault arising from a series of assaults upon a thirteen-year-old girl. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by (1) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict; and (2) permitting the State, over Defendant's objection, to cross-examine Defendant about weapons training he received while in the military, as the trial justice properly weighed the probative value of the evidence against any potential prejudicial effect in overruling Defendant's objection.

Defendant Isabel Traveras was convicted of possession of an enumerated quantity of cocaine, for which she received a ten-year suspended sentence, with probation. On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of her motion to suppress, alleging that the arresting police officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they (1) detained her unlawfully at a traffic stop and conducted a pat-down search without a reasonable articulable suspicion that she might be armed and dangerous, and (2) exceeded the scope of a permissible pat-down search by directing her to unzip and open her jacket. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, (1) the officers acquired the requisite reasonable suspicion to approach Defendant in the vehicle in which she was sitting as a passenger; and (2) the credible evidence was sufficient to establish that an officer's request to Defendant to open her jacket was reasonable and was a less-intrusive search designed to ensure officer safety.

Defendant Robert Payette was convicted of first-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Payette appealed, contending that the trial justice erred (1) by instructing the jury that malice may be inferred where there is a disparity in the size or strength between the victim and the defendant; and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the instruction at issue was a correct statement of law and was not improper; and (2) the trial justice properly denied Payette's motion for a new trial, as there was nothing in the record that would indicate that the justice overlooked or misconceived any material evidence or otherwise clearly erred.

Defendant Allen Wray was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree robbery after robbing two women at gunpoint. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in (1) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, as the eyewitness identifications that led to his conviction were unreliable and not substantial enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the robberies in question; and (2) allowing another witness to vouch for the credibility of the two witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, as the justice sufficiently articulated his rationale for denying Defendant's motion and did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence; and (2) allowing certain testimony into evidence, as the testimony did not constitute impermissible bolstering.

After failing two field sobriety tests, Respondent Lewis Quattrucci was arrested for DUI and later charged with refusing to submit to a chemical test. The charge was subsequently dismissed by a traffic tribunal magistrate on the ground that Respondent had not been afforded a confidential telephone call, as required by R.I. Gen. Laws 12-7-20. The traffic tribunal upheld the magistrate's order dismissing the refusal charge, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the district court and vacated the dismissal of the refusal charge, holding (1) Respondent was entitled to the use of a telephone to call an attorney under section 12-7-20; but (2) because there was no evidence that Respondent made or wished to make a telephone call for the purpose of securing an attorney, nor any showing that Respondent suffered substantial and extreme prejudice because he did not receive a private telephone call, the magistrate erred in ruling that Respondent's rights were violated under section 12-7-20.

A jury found Defendant Jose Vieira guilty on five counts of second-degree child molestation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial justice did not err when she denied Defendant's motion to pass the case because of the prosecutor's remarks during final argument, as the jury received an appropriate curative instruction and the remarks did not inflame the passions of the jurors to the point they were unable to pass impartially upon the issues in this case; and (2) any objection based on hearsay regarding testimony of the complainant's mother about statements the complainant made to her was waived.

After a jury trial, Defendant Kimberly St. Michel was convicted for embezzlement of funds in excess of $100 and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial justice did not err when he (1) prevented defense counsel from eliciting Defendant's out-of-court statement that "she didn't do any of this" through the testimony of a witness after finding that the statement was hearsay; and (2) denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, as the trial justice performed the proper analysis and committed neither clear error nor overlooked or misconceived evidence in making his ruling.

Following a jury trial, Kenneth Rice was convicted of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, second-degree child molestation sexual assault, and solicitation with the intent to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Rice subsequently filed a pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court determined that certain actions on the part of Rice's trial counsel did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance but instead constituted tactical decisions made during trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court hearing justice did not err in his denial of Rice's postconviction-relief application, as the tactical decisions Rice challenged were reasonably competent and did not rise to a level of constitutionally inadequate performance by trial counsel.

Defendant David Dubois was convicted of five counts of second-degree child molestation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) properly weighed the potential impact of potentially inflammatory statements from witnesses and did not exceed the bounds of his discretion in denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial; (2) did not abuse his discretion in limiting defense counsel's direct examination of two witnesses as the disallowed evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible; and (3) erred in listing lewd disposition as one of the grounds for which the jury could consider testimony concerning uncharged incidents of sexual assault, but did not err in instructing the jury that the testimony was admissible for the limited purpose of demonstrating Defendant's sexual intent.