Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Lomba was charged with three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault. After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of the three felony counts but convicted of simple assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of simple assault where there were ample facts from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with malice or wantonness; and (2) did not improperly exclude evidence relating to Defendant's claim of self-defense or unfairly limit his cross-examination of both complaining witnesses.

Defendant Heriberto Rosario was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial because the evidence was too contradictory and incredible to sufficiently support the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for a new trial because the record showed that the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material and relevant evidence, nor was he clearly mistaken in choosing which testimony to accept and reject.

George Bouffard pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering associated for an incident occurring in 2000 and was adjudged a violator of his suspended and probationary sentences associated with two earlier cases, in 1991 and 1997. After Bouffard was released from incarceration, he faced another breaking-and-entering charge in 2006. The superior court determined that Bouffard violated his probation imposed in the 1997 and the 2000 case. Meanwhile, the State dismissed the underlying breaking-and-entering charge set forth in the 2006 case. Two days later, Bouffard filed a motion to correct what he alleged to be an illegal sentence imposed in the 1997 case. After a hearing, the hearing justice (1) deemed the challenged sentence as illegal or illegally imposed; but (2) restructured Bouffard's sentencing package to maintain the sentence levied for the 2006 violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice appropriately modified the original sentence despite any dispute about its illegality or illegal imposition; and (2) Bouffard's modified sentence fit "both crime and criminal" as required by State v. Goncalves at the time of re-bundling given the state's ultimate dismissal of the underlying breaking-and-entering charge in the 2006 case.

Defendant was convicted of domestic first-degree sexual assault and domestic assault with intent to commit sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by (1) refusing to pass the case after the complainant testified that the police issued to her a no-contact order against Defendant because (i) the testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately considering the evidence, (ii) the trial justice's cautionary instructions alleviated any prejudicial impact of the testimony, and (iii) the jury's final verdict suggested that the testimony did not inflame the passions of the jurors to the point where they were unable to pass impartially upon the issues in the case; and (2) denying a second motion to pass the case when a police officer, while testifying, improperly bolstered the complainant's credibility because the improper bolstering was not sufficiently prejudicial to Defendant.

Police officers applied for and obtained a search warrant for Defendant Edward Gordon's apartment after a woman reported that Defendant had sexually assaulted her. A jury convicted Defendant of second-degree sexual assault and deadlocked on Defendant's kidnapping charge. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the superior court magistrate had no authority issue the search warrant, and (2) retrial on the charge of kidnapping would violate his rights with respect to the double-jeopardy provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate had the authority to issue the search warrant, and (2) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he determined that the jury was genuinely deadlocked, and therefore, retrial on the charge of kidnapping did not violate double jeopardy.

Defendant Windell McRae was convicted for simple domestic assault. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that a remark by complainant that Defendant had been drinking on the day of the assault was sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately considering the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, holding (1) considering the full testimonial evidence and the trial justice's specific and cautionary instruction to the jury, the trial justice did not clearly err by denying Defendant's motion to pass the case after the complainant testified about Defendant's drinking; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting, for impeachment purposes, evidence of Defendant's prior convictions.

Twelve-year old Frances G. told a law enforcement officer that she threw a rock or brick against the windshield of a vehicle and carved something into the side of the vehicle. After a trial before a justice of the family court, Frances was adjudicated to be wayward. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she allowed the vehicle's owner to testify about what her daughter told her she saw Frances do to the car because the statement qualified as an "excited utterance" under R.I. R. Evid. 803(2); and (2) Frances knowingly and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights before speaking to the law enforcement officer, and therefore, the trial justice did not err in admitting the statement into evidence.

After a jury trial, Timothy Scanlon was found guilty on six counts related to the sexual assault of a woman. The trial justice sentenced Scanlon to fifty years to serve concurrently on each of the first four counts and a suspended sentence of twenty years, with twenty years of probation on the remaining two counts. Scanlon subsequently filed a timely motion to reduce sentence. The hearing justice entered an order denying Scanlon's motion to reduce. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court, holding that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion (1) in refusing to consider sentences that had been meted out to persons who Scanlon contended were similarly situation to him, and (2) by failing to afford Scanlon leniency in view of his family situation.

A superior court jury found Defendant Chhoy Hak guilty of four counts of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree child molestation. The trial justice sentenced Defendant to forty years imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence under the provisions of rule 35 of the superior court rules of criminal procedure, which allows a trial justice to grant leniency if he or she finds the sentence originally imposed was, for any reason, unduly severe. The trial justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial justice abused his discretion when he denied Appellant's motion to reduce his sentence.

Appellant Craig Quigley was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust. In 2003, the trustees filed a petition in the superior court to reform the trust. The court entered an order granting the petition. In 2009, Quigley filed a motion to vacate the order, arguing (1) that the superior court had never obtained jurisdiction over Quigley because there was no service of process with respect to the petition and, therefore, any judgment against Quigley was void; and (2) the order should be vacated pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 60(b)(6), which provides for vacation of any order for "any other reason justifying relief." The hearing justice denied the motion. Quigley appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Quigley was not a defendant in the proceeding with respect to the petition for reformation of the trust, service of process was not required; (2) because Quigley had actual notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel at the proceeding, Quigley's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not made within a reasonable time in violation of the rule.