Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, defendant Edgar Goulet killed his dog by shooting it with a sawed-off shotgun. One year later, the state, by way of criminal information, charged defendant with one count of malicious killing of an animal and one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. At trial, among other motions, defendant filed a motion to sever to the two counts of the information. The motion to sever was denied. After a jury trial defendant was convicted on both counts. The defendant appealed. The issues properly before the Supreme Court were (1) defendant's assertion that the trial justice erred when he denied defendant's motion to sever, and (2) the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims relating to the police officers' searches of the defendant's yard and home. The Court affirmed, concluding (1) the defendant did not make a sufficient showing that he would be prejudiced to the extent that he would not receive a fair trial if the two counts were not severed, and thus the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied defendant's motion; and (2) the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims as to the propriety of the warrantless search were without merit.

Plaintiff Horton appealed from a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of the police department defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's thirteen-count complaint which alleged, among other complaints, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, tortious denial of access to public records, violations of civil rights, and failure to destroy records after exoneration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants possessed probable cause for each instance of prosecution, arrest, and imprisonment, making a grant of summary judgment appropriate; and (2) because Horton failed to provide analysis of the remaining questions in his appeal, those contentions were deemed waived for appellate review.

The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the Town of North Providence complied with the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act of 1991 when it amended the town's zoning ordinance in 1999. The zoning law in question dealt with the notice and hearing requirements for the adoption, repeal, and amendment of zoning ordinances. Plaintiff Generation Realty, LLC and several others owned or were prospective purchasers of land in North Providence. They brought suit against Defendants Kristen Catanzaro and other town officials, alleging that the town did not provide adequate notice of a public hearing on the 1999 amendments. Plaintiffs asserted that lack of such notice rendered the amendments null and void. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance at issue in this case was a "general amendment" under the Act, and as such, required only a public notice. The Court found that the lower court erred in deciding that the ordinance was specific, and therefore erred in ruling in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Memeh Kizekai appealed the conviction and sentence he received for "uttering and publishing" when he and co-Defendant Sonnah Sampson tried to cash a $7500 counterfeit check at a Pawtucket bank. Defendant argued that he should have received a new trial because the evidence presented against him was not credible or sufficient to support his conviction. Defendant and the State agreed that the case turned on whose testimony was more credible: Sampson's or Defendant's. The trial court acknowledged its role as "the 13th juror," and held that its determination was based on "whether or not the evidence placed before the court was sufficient to substantiate and sustain the verdict that the jury achieved." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court "did not shirk his super juror duties." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Defendant Jose Torres appealed the denial of his motion for post conviction relief. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the grand jury indictment wrongly charged him with murder. Although he ultimately pled to a lesser charge of manslaughter, Defendant contended that his conviction should be vacated because of an "inherently flawed indictment"--a defect not waived by his plea agreement. "[B]y voluntarily pleading guilty to a charge that was amended with his consent, [Defendant] waived any argument that the State could not have proven him guilty of murder." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Defendant Gerald Lynch appealed his conviction and sentence on four counts of first-degree sexual assault. At trial after the close of evidence, the state dismissed two counts of Defendantâs indictment, and Defendant moved for an acquittal on the remaining counts. The trial judge waited for the jury to return its verdict before ruling on Defendantâs motion. The jury found Defendant guilty on four counts of sexual assault. The judge then denied Defendantâs motion. On appeal, defendant alleged that, among other things, the trial judge erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the state failed to prove its case against him. The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to reach its conclusions and verdict. Finding no error, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.