Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

These cases arose out of an on-going South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") investigation into the past conduct of certain members of the General Assembly (the "redacted legislators"), and was filed in the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Petitioner David Pascoe ("Pascoe"), Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, asked the Supreme Court to require "the Attorney General" to recuse himself and his Office from the redacted legislators matter, and vest Pascoe with the legal authority to act autonomously as the designee of the Attorney General with the powers of that Office. Pascoe further asked that respondent James Parks ("Parks"), clerk of the state grand jury, be ordered to cooperate with Pascoe's initiation of the state grand jury investigation. Attorney General Alan Wilson appointed Pascoe as the "designated prosecutor" in the investigation. Wilson acknowledged that there might have been "inherent conflicts" between himself and certain members of the house. Chief Deputy General John McIntosh was thereafter made supervising prosecutor. On March 28, 2016, McIntosh sent a letter to Pascoe purportedly terminating all authority delegated to Pascoe "on July 17 and July 24, 2015," because of Pascoe's attempt to "unlawfully" initiate a state grand jury investigation. Pascoe petitioned for a declaration that he was imbued with the powers of the office of Attorney General, which included convening a state grand jury. After review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for declaratory relief and declared that respondent Attorney General Wilson and the Attorney General's Office were recused from the redacted legislators investigation; Pascoe lawfully sought to initiate a state grand jury investigation; and the Attorney General's Office's purported termination of Pascoe's designation was not valid. Recognizing the integrity of the parties involved, the Court declined to formally issue relief in a related mandamus action, "confident that our resolution of the declaratory judgment action makes clear the responsibilities and roles of the parties." View "Pascoe v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Didier Van Sellner pled guilty to armed robbery and later applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting his counsel was ineffective for advising him to take a plea deal when the State could not demonstrate all of the elements of armed robbery. The PCR court denied him relief, finding he received effective assistance of counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR court erred in its finding. The Supreme Court reversed the PCR court's denial of relief, and granted Van Sellner a new trial. View "Van Sellner v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Simmons was convicted and sentenced for the "brutal and horrific" 1996 murder and criminal sexual assault of an 89-year-old Summerville woman. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (PCR), which was granted in part. Because Petitioner was intellectually disabled, the PCR court vacated Petitioner's death sentence and imposed a sentence of life without parole. Petitioner additionally sought a new trial on newly discovered evidence and due process grounds, which the PCR court denied without discussion. The essence of Petitioner's new-trial claims centered on the allegation that the State misrepresented at trial the strength of the DNA evidence linking Petitioner to the crimes. The State urged the South Carolina Supreme Court to not reach the merits of Petitioner's certiorari petition on issue-preservation grounds. Alternatively, the State recommended the case be remanded to the PCR court for the issuance of a proper order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court concluded the compelling nature of the dispute and the interests of justice warranted the "extraordinary action" of remanding the case to the PCR court for issuance of a proper order. View "Simmons v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

South Carolina Code Ann. 57-1-410 (Supp. 2015) provided for the appointment of an administrative official denominated the Secretary of Transportation. Proviso 84.18 purported to suspend the 2015 termination/devolution provision of 2007 Act No. 114, section 6, for the fiscal year (i.e., until June 30, 2016), thus leaving intact the appointment authority given to the Governor in section 5. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed to hear this constitutional challenge to the 2015-16 Appropriations Act in its original jurisdiction. Petitioners contended, and the Court agreed, that the inclusion of Proviso 84.18 in that act violated the "one subject" requirement found in S.C. Const. art. III, section 17. The Court held that where the general appropriations act contains a section that is not germane to the purpose of that act (i.e., one that does not "reasonably and inherently relate to the raising and spending of tax monies"), that section may be excised by a court. In so doing, the Court modified its holding in "Am. Petroleum Inst. v. South Carolina Dep't of Rev.," (677 S.E.2d 16 (2009)). View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Whitlee Jones was indicted for the murder of her boyfriend after she fatally stabbed him at the home they shared. In a pretrial motion, Jones asserted immunity from prosecution under the "Protection of Persons and Property Act." The circuit court judge granted the motion, finding Jones established by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to immunity. The State appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in finding section 16-11-440(C) of the Act was inapplicable because the stabbing happened in Jones' house rather in "another place where [s]he ha[d] the right to be," or alternatively, Jones failed to establish she was acting in self-defense when she stabbed her boyfriend. Finding no error in the circuit court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jacques Gibson was convicted of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a person under age 21. He sought the Supreme Court's review of his case when a trial court denied his application for post-conviction relief (PCR). These charges stemmed from a fight between two groups at a bar. Shortly after petitioner arrived to pick up his brother Adams, a dispute that began inside the bar spilled out into the parking lot and became a physical altercation between numerous members of each group. During the melee, several gunshots were heard, and the victim was killed by a single nine-millimeter shot to the back of his shoulder. There was evidence, including a statement petitioner gave to police, that petitioner retrieved his gun from his car, pointed his gun at another person he suspected was going to hit Adams, and subsequently fired his gun into the air three to four times as he drove away from the scene. When asked whether he believed he may have shot the victim, petitioner responded, "I think that I did, because I was doing some shooting, but I didn't just look at him and shoot him. . . . the gun could have dropped down because I was driving. I promise I don't remember seeing him and aiming." Trial counsel objected to the charge as a comment on the facts, but did not object to the trial judge's failure to use the permissive inference language approved in "Georgia v. Elmore." Petitioner contended in his PCR application that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the charge. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the PCR judge erred in finding there was evidence of malice other than the use of a deadly weapon. View "Gibson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Susan Tappeiner was convicted by jury of second degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. Tappeiner withdrew her direct appeal and filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting, inter alia, that her trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the State's improper remarks during closing arguments. Tappeiner argued her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the numerous instances in the State's closing argument in which the solicitor vouched for Victim's credibility by implying the police and rape crisis counselor believed Victim, and not Tappeiner. Tappeiner further contended trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the solicitor appealed to the jurors' emotions by asking them if they would want Tappeiner babysitting their own children and relatives. The PCR court denied relief, finding that although trial counsel was deficient in failing to object, Tappeiner was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. The Supreme Court found no evidence in the record to support the PCR court's conclusion that Tappeiner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failures to object during the State's closing arguments. "To the contrary, the solicitor's repeated vouching for Victim's credibility and her emotional plea to the jurors was incredibly prejudicial to Tappeiner because there was no other evidence beyond Victim's testimony of the events that allegedly occurred that August evening." The Court therefore reversed the PCR court's finding that trial counsel's failure to object during closing arguments was not prejudicial, and granted Tappeiner a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Tappeiner v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Melvin Stukes appealed his conviction for criminal sexual conduct (CSC) and first degree burglary, arguing the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's jury instruction that Victim's testimony need not be corroborated by additional evidence or testimony pursuant to Section 16-3-657 of the South Carolina Code (2003). After review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that instructing the jury on this statute was an impermissible charge on the facts and therefore unconstitutional. The Court further overruled its precedent condoning this instruction. View "South Carolina v. Stukes" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jarvis Gibbs of kidnapping, entering a bank with the intent to steal, and using a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced Gibbs to an aggregate eighteen years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Gibbs subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed his application with prejudice. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Gibbs' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR court's finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to claims of witness intimidation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gibbs v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Donna Phillips was convicted of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment in the death of her grandson (Child). The court of appeals affirmed her conviction. On appeal, Phillips argued the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of her motion for directed verdict because it considered the testimony offered by a co-defendant as well as Phillips' own testimony in its analysis. Although the Supreme Court agreed the court of appeals erred in disregarding "South Carolina v. Hepburn," (753 S.E.2d 402 (2013)), it ultimately found the denial of Phillips' directed verdict motion was proper. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law