Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Ashley Eugene Moore was convicted of trafficking in cocaine base and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, Moore argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the admission of a large quantity of crack cocaine and a firearm, both of which were seized during a traffic stop. A majority of the court of appeals' panel reversed, finding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Moore once the initial purpose of the traffic stop was concluded. State v. Moore, 404 S.C. 634, 746 S.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. 2013). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. In light of the standard of review, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Moore's convictions and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Moore" on Justia Law

Kevin Tyrone Bennett was convicted of petit larceny, malicious injury to property, and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently. The court of appeals reversed his convictions, finding the trial court erred in denying Bennett's motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, and took the opportunity of its opinion here to more clearly articulate the standard governing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for directed verdict. View "South Carolina v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Officers from the North Charleston South Carolina Police Department (NCPD),believed Petitioner Alfred Adams was a drug dealer. Acting without a warrant, officers placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on petitioner's vehicle. After monitoring petitioner's travel to Atlanta, Georgia, and upon his return to South Carolina, law enforcement stationed a drug canine unit on the interstate within the NCPD's jurisdiction, with instructions to conduct a traffic stop on petitioner's vehicle. An officer conducted the requested traffic stop and discovered cocaine in petitioner's possession, which resulted in his arrest. Petitioner moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioner's motion, finding no constitutional violation. The court of appeals found the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment but determined that the exclusionary rule did not apply because "Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the [GPS] device and monitoring the vehicle." Petitioner contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the court of appeals erred in finding that his traffic violations were intervening criminal acts that dissipated the taint from the unlawful search and concluding the facts did not warrant suppression. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A)(2) (2006). View "South Carolina v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Respondent Bentley Collins was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and three counts of owning a dangerous animal causing injury to a person after a ten-year-old boy was killed and partially eaten by his dogs, most of whom were pitbull mixes. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing and remanding the case for a new trial based solely on the trial court's admission of seven pre-autopsy photos of the victim. The State argued that the Court of Appeals: (1) failed to give due deference to the trial court's decision; (2) erred in finding that photos entered into evidence were more prejudicial than probative; (3) erred in finding the photos were not material to the elements of the offenses charged and corroborative of other evidence; and (4) erred in making a purely emotional decision to reverse and remand for a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the appellate court's decision. View "South Carolina v. Collins" on Justia Law

Delores Williams, the personal representative of the Estate of Edward Murry, and Matthew Whitaker, Jr., the personal representative of the Estate of Annie Mae Murry (PRs), brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a GEICO motor vehicle insurance policy issued to the Murrys provided $15,000 or $100,000 in liability proceeds for bodily injury for an accident in which both of the Murrys were killed. The circuit court concluded coverage was limited to the statutory minimum of $15,000 based on a family step-down provision in the policy that reduced coverage for bodily injury to family members from the stated policy coverage of $100,000 to the statutory minimum amount mandated by South Carolina law during the policy period. The PRs appealed, contending the step-down provision was ambiguous and/or violative of public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the circuit court that GEICO's policy is not ambiguous, but concluded the family step-down provision, which reduced the coverage under the liability policy from the stated policy amount to the statutory minimum, was violative of public policy and was, therefore, void. "The provision not only conflicte[d] with the mandates set forth in section 38-77-142, but its enforcement would be injurious to the public welfare." View "Williams v. GEICO" on Justia Law

The State charged appellant "Kevin R." with possessing a weapon on school grounds. Prior to his adjudicatory hearing before a family court judge, Appellant moved for a jury trial on the grounds the federal and state Constitutions guaranteed him the right to a jury trial. The judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear Appellant's case in a bench trial. Ultimately, the judge adjudicated Appellant delinquent and deferred sentencing until an evaluation of Appellant was completed. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a second family court judge, who sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty- first birthday. The judge then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation until his eighteenth birthday. On appeal, Appellant contended the family court judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a juvenile did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. However, the Court's decision in that case was not dispositive as it was presented with additional arguments raised by Appellant and the Amici Curiae. After consideration of these issues, the Court adhered to its decision in the earlier case, and affirmed the family court. View "In the Interest of Kevin R." on Justia Law

"The Record in this case is voluminous, and illustrates the complex and, at times, contentious nature of these proceedings. The circuit judge presided over numerous motion hearings and issued numerous orders over the course of this litigation." However, this appeal concerned a final order in which the circuit judge dismissed all of the cases and awarded fees and costs to Respondents as sanctions for Appellants' continued refusal to comply with his previous discovery rulings. In addition, Appellants appealed the judge's failure to disqualify himself at the outset of this litigation and late refusal to recuse himself. Appellants were limited partners in five separate limited partnerships and asserted legal claims in five separate actions against Respondents, their general partners. The limited partnerships were formed in the 1960s to construct and operate the properties at issue, affordable housing projects for low-income citizens in three counties. Respondents became general partners around 1975, and from that point forward, Appellants took no part in the management or business affairs of the complexes. In 1984, Respondents notified Appellants that they had contracted to sell the properties to Boston Financial Group (BFG). The terms of the sale called for a small amount to be paid upfront but the majority would be paid in 1999 in a "balloon" payment with accruing interest. However, BFG defaulted on the payment, and sold the properties without intervention from the partnerships. All of the claims stemmed from Respondents' roles in selling the properties and their actions in the aftermath of BFG's default. Appellants argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the circuit abused its discretion by dismissing these cases under the facts, particularly because" (1) less "draconian" punishments were available to the court; (2) Appellants agreed to receive a less harsh sanction and "took extraordinary steps to avoid dismissal"; (3) the judge consistently espoused Respondents' arguments as evidence constituting a factual basis to support his decisions; and (4) the judge deviated from South Carolina law to effect dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court in all respects: the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the rulings it made, and Appellants failed to prove that they suffered any prejudice as a result of the judge's refusal to recuse himself in this case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Parkview Apartments" on Justia Law

John Weik was convicted of murdering his former girlfriend following an argument over the couple's child. He confessed to the shooting and cooperated with law enforcement. There was never any dispute regarding guilt. During the sentencing phase, the State proceeded on two aggravating circumstances: burglary and torture. Regarding Weik's mental status, the defense relied on three mental health experts, who all of whom testified that Weik suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, including auditory and visual hallucinations, suicidal ideations, and paranoid delusions. The defense, however, failed to present readily available evidence concerning Weik's chaotic upbringing and dysfunctional family. It was the absence of the social history mitigation evidence that compelled the South Carolina Supreme Court, "under controlling United States Supreme Court precedents, to grant Weik a new sentencing hearing." View "Weik v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In early 2006, Deputy Chris Farrell responded to a domestic call at the home of defendant James Ramsey's estranged wife (Wife). Farrell interviewed both parties and noticed a bruise on Wife's hand, which she indicated was the result of Ramsey attempting to grab a phone from her. Based on his observations, Deputy Farrell issued Ramsey a uniform traffic ticket for criminal domestic violence (CDV). Ramsey moved to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that because the CDV was not committed in the presence of the officer, Deputy Farrell could not issue him a uniform traffic ticket under section 56-7-15(A), and absent a valid uniform traffic ticket, the magistrate lacked authority to hear the case. The magistrate agreed and dismissed the charges. The circuit court affirmed the dismissal on the alternative basis that only offenses listed under Section 56-710 of the South Carolina Code (2006), amended by 56-7-10 (Supp. 2013), allowed for prosecution solely based on a uniform traffic ticket and at the time the alleged crime was committed, CDV was not listed in section 56-7-10. Therefore, the circuit court concluded the magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear the CDV charge until an arrest warrant was issued. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Although the court disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion that CDV could never be prosecuted in magistrate court absent an arrest warrant, it found that pursuant to section 56-7-15, an officer could only issue a uniform traffic ticket for CDV if the crime was committed in his presence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Ramsey" on Justia Law