Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Damien Inman was convicted and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Mary Stutts. Appellant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. On appeal, Appellant challenged his convictions on several grounds, including that the circuit court improperly granted the State's motion pursuant to "Batson v. Kentucky" after Appellant offered a race-neutral explanation for striking a particular juror. The Supreme Court agreed after review and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Inman" on Justia Law

In 2008, at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Saluda County Council, a motion was made and seconded to amend the posted agenda to take up a resolution. Both the motion and the resolution were voted upon and passed unanimously during the meeting, which was open to the public. The nonbinding resolution pertained to water and sewer services, although that subject was not originally listed on County Council's agenda. Dennis Lambries filed this action in the circuit court against the Saluda County Council and its members alleging County Council's amendment of the agenda without notice and in the absence of exigent circumstances and its passage of a resolution that was not on the posted agenda violated FOIA's notice provision in section 30-4-80. Lambries brought the action as a citizen of Saluda County and noted he was also the Chairman of the Saluda County Water and Sewer Authority. Specifically, Lambries asked the circuit court to declare that all resolutions, acts, ordinances, and statements made by County Council in violation of FOIA were null and void, and he sought injunctive relief to prevent future amendments of an agenda in the absence of "truly exigent circumstances." The circuit court noted the purpose of FOIA is for the activities of government "to be in open session and not behind closed doors." The court found that "the amendment of the agenda was performed in open session and in accordance with Saluda County Council rules of order as codified in their ordinances," and S.C. Code Ann. 4-9-110 (1986) authorized counties to establish their own rules and order of business. The circuit court denied Lambries's motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, reiterating that it "d[id] not agree with the plaintiff's fundamental position that a county council cannot amend agendas for regularly scheduled meetings without advance notice or exigent circumstances." The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, the majority finding (1) an agenda is required for regularly scheduled meetings, and (2) County Council's amendment of an agenda less than twenty-four hours before the meeting violated the "spirit" and "purpose" of FOIA's notice requirement. The Supreme Court concluded FOIA's notice statute did not require an agenda to be issued for a regularly scheduled meeting, and FOIA contained no prohibition on the amendment of an agenda for a regularly scheduled meeting. View "Lambries v. Saluda County Council" on Justia Law

This direct appeal involved a constitutional challenge to the Town of Hilton Head Island's business license tax ordinance, which required businesses within the Town to pay an annual license fee based upon a business's classification and gross income. "Kigre has clothed its many arguments in the premise that the Ordinance is not sound policy," but the Supreme Court found that none rose to the level to sufficiently challenge the ordinance's constitutionality. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Town of Hilton Head Island v. Kigre, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). In 2007, respondent was taken to the Spartanburg County Jail following a traffic stop made by a certified Data Master operator. Respondent was placed in the "subject test area" which is a room that adjoins the Data Master room. A deputy retrieved some forms from the Data Master room and then appeared to read respondent his Miranda rights and the implied consent information. Both respondent and the deputy signed the forms. There were separate audio and video recording devices in both the subject test area and in the breathalyzer room. In this case, the audio device in the subject test area did not function. Respondent moved to suppress the evidence relating to the breath test site alleging the videotape did not meet the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A), which required that a person charged with DUI have his conduct at both the incident site and the breath test site videotaped. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-52953(A)(2) (2006). View "South Carolina v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Following his conviction for one count of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), one count of possession of a dangerous animal, and multiple counts of animal fighting, David Tant was remanded to the Department of Corrections. Upon receipt of his sentencing sheets, the Department recorded his sentence as fifteen years' imprisonment. However, the Department later determined the judge intended to sentence Tant to forty years' imprisonment and changed its records without notifying Tant. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Department of Corrections had the authority to alter its initial determination as to the length of an inmate's sentence. The Court held that when the Department decides its original recordation of a sentence was erroneous, it must afford the inmate formal notice of the amended sentence and advise him of his opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedure. Furthermore, "the Department is generally confined to the face of the sentencing sheets in determining the length of a sentence, but may refer to the sentencing transcript if there is an ambiguity in the sentencing sheets." Because the Court found that the sentencing sheets and the transcript in this case were ambiguous, it held Tant's sentences ran concurrently for a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. View "Tant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Libertarian Party sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Equal Access to the Ballot Act was in effect. If the Court determined the Act was effective, the Party requested that the South Carolina State Election Commission be ordered to conduct a Libertarian Party primary on June 10, 2014, and place a referendum question on the primary ballot for approval of the use of the convention method of nominating candidates by petitioner in 2016. The Supreme Court granted the petition for original jurisdiction and declared the Act was in effect. However. The Court denied the Party's request to require the Commission to conduct a primary and place a referendum question on the primary ballot. View "SC Libertarian Party v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law

Ten health care entities, along with the South Carolina Hospital Association and the South Carolina Health Care Association sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHEC) was obligated to enforce the State Certification of Need and Health Facility Licensure Act (the CON Act) and fund the certificate of need (CON) program despite the South Carolina House of Representative's failure to override the Governor's veto of the line item in the state budget providing funding for the program. Upon review of matter in its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court granted the Petitioners' requested relief. View "Amisub v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Appellant Ida Lord appealed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of D & J Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Cash on the Spot ("D & J"). Lord argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in: (1) finding the balancing approach adopted in "Bass v. Gopal, Inc.," (716 S.E.2d 910 (2011) ("Gopal II")), used to determine a business owner's duty to protect a patron based on the foreseeability of violent acts by third parties, applied prospectively; and (2) granting summary judgment as she presented a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her negligence claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for trial because the Court found "Gopal II" applied here and its application warranted the denial of D & J's motion for summary judgment. View "Lord v. D & J Enterprises" on Justia Law

The Catawba Indian Nation brought a declaratory judgment action against the State (and Mark Keel) to determine the effect of the Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, finding: (1) the Tribe's action was precluded by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, and (2) the Gambling Cruise Act does not confer upon the Tribe the right to offer video poker and similar electronic play devices on its Reservation as the Act does not alter the statewide ban on video poker. The Tribe appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part: the circuit court's determination that the Gambling Cruise Act did not authorize the Tribe to offer video poker on its Reservation in contravention of the existing statewide ban on video gambling devices was affirmed; the Tribe's action was not precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata, reversing this finding by the circuit court. View "Catawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Dorris Green, representing his child who was injured while a passenger in his mother's automobile, contended that as a matter of public policy the courts of South Carolina should refuse to recognize the validity of a family member exclusion in a Florida car insurance policy. Further, he contended that the circuit court erred in finding there was no uninsured motorist coverage for his minor child under his Florida policy. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that enforcement of this exclusion, valid under Florida law, did not offend South Carolina public policy, and that there was no underinsured coverage for father's minor child under the father's policy. The Court therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the insurance company. View "Green v. USAA" on Justia Law