Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Beulah Butler appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm her convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm or a knife during the commission of a violent crime. She claimed appellate court erred in affirming the denial of her motion for a directed verdict on self-defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Butler" on Justia Law

"Appellant and the Respondents are neighbors who obviously do not get along." Appellant Ursula Pallares brought suit alleging five claims against two of her neighbors, respondents Sharon Seinar and Lisa Maseng. Pallares claimed respondents had "mounted a campaign to harass and humiliate" her and to "drive her from her home." Pallares outlined four areas of conduct by one or both Respondents involving: (1) code violations; (2) nuisance animals; (3) a petition for a mental evaluation; and (4) requests for restraining orders, which Pallares averred gave rise to civil tort liability. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. Pallares appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case for review. Based on careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claim for malicious prosecution. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on Pallares's claim for abuse of process. View "Pallares v. Seinar" on Justia Law

Brian Hover, son of decedent Margaret Dever Hover Gurnham and the Personal Representative of her Estate, appealed the circuit court's order confirming the probate court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Beach First National Bank to enforce a deficiency judgment against the Estate. Hover argued the Bank's claim (which arose following a foreclosure action) was untimely and, thus, barred by section 62-3-8031 of the South Carolina Probate Code (Probate Code). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Bank's claim was barred because it was presented outside the time limits of the applicable statute. View "Beach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham" on Justia Law

Appellant Quashon Middleton was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon while committing a violent crime. Appellant pulled alongside his victims' stopped car one day in 2010 on his moped. He fired 5-7 times into the car, but none struck the car's occupants. But for the driver's hitting appellant as he sped away, the driver and passenger would have been killed. On appeal, appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree, and this error required reversal. The Supreme Court agreed the trial court's failing to include the lesser-included charge was made in error, however, the Court concluded this error was harmless. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clarence Robinson appealed his conviction for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. He claimed the trial court erred in finding the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and search the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's convictions. View "Robinson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the admission of appellant Davontay Henson's codefendant's redacted confession during a joint trial violated appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the admission of the redacted confession indeed violated the Confrontation Clause because the jury could infer from the face of the confession that it referred to and incriminated Henson. View "South Carolina v. Henson" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Giles was convicted of first-degree burglary, strong arm robbery, and kidnapping. He was sentenced to thirty years', thirty years', and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the appellate court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences on the basis that the trial court improperly sustained the solicitor's "Batson" motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolinav. Giles" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Barnes was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Samuel Sturrup, for which he received the death sentence. The judge sentenced appellant to death for the murder, but imposed no sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, appellant contended the trial court erred: (1) in permitting his attorney to call a defense psychiatrist to testify regarding his right to represent himself and in denying his "Faretta" request; (2) in limiting voir dire and in qualifying Juror #203; and (3) in refusing to dismiss the indictments because of the State's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) Act. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the trial judge applied the incorrect competency standard in denying appellant's Faretta request. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court to review two municipal courts' rulings addressing whether the Attorney General has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in magistrate and municipal courts. The first case involved Defendant Paul Gwinn who was charged with Criminal Domestic Violence (CDV). When the case was called for trial, Gwinn made a motion that the Attorney General could not prosecute the case because the municipal court was not a court of record, citing S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 24 (2009). The municipal court found that the Attorney General could prosecute the case. The second case involved the prosecution of Defendant Michael Long, also charged with CDV. Long moved to disqualify the Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case, arguing that the Attorney General is authorized to prosecute cases only in courts of record. The court granted the motion, ruling that the Attorney General did not have the authority to prosecute the case under art. V, sec. 24. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that art. V, sec. 24 does not prevent the Attorney General from prosecuting cases in summary courts. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in Gwinn's case, and reversed the trial court in Long's case. View "South Carolina v. Gwinn" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Petitioner Phillip Brown's driver's license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Hearing Officer for the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicles Hearings ("OMVH") rescinded the suspension on the ground that the arresting officer failed to present reliable evidence that the breathalyzer test was administered and the sample obtained in accordance with the provisions of section 56-5-2950. Specifically, the OMVH found that the required "simulator test" was not conducted prior to the actual test. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed and reinstated Petitioner's license suspension. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the ALC's order, finding Petitioner's failure to contemporaneously object to the arresting officer's testimony with respect to the functioning of the breathalyzer precluded the review of the issue on appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's driver's license suspension. View "SCDMV v. Brown" on Justia Law