Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Clinton Brantley was the pastor of St. Matthew Baptist Church. Respondents Ira Banks, James Bell, and Vernon Holmes served as trustees of the Church. At a congregational meeting, Brantley stated that without his knowledge, the Trustees had placed a mortgage upon the Church's property in order to purchase nearby apartment buildings. He further stated the Trustees failed to insure the apartment buildings and that funds were missing because of their mismanagement. He urged the congregation to remove the Trustees from their position, and the congregation subsequently did. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the pastor could use the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause to shield him from tort liability for allegedly defamatory statements he made about the church trustees at the congregational meeting. While the pastor acknowledged the non-religious nature of his statements, he contends the setting in which they were made and their relationship to church governance places the trustees' defamation claim outside the jurisdiction of civil courts under the First Amendment. The circuit court dismissed the claim, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve this defamation claim using neutral principles of law and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Banks v. Brantley" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents in this case. The case was dismissed after respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP. Because the Supreme Court found issues of fact raised by the complaint that needed to be resolved before the constitutionality of 2009 Act No. 99 could be determined, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. "The circuit court and respondents [relied] on a single sentence found in 'Bradley v. Cherokee School Dist. No. One,' [470 S.E.2d 570 (1996)]: A law that is special only in the sense that it imposes a lawful tax limited in application and incidence to persons or property within a certain school district does not contravene the provisions of Article III, section 34(IX)." In this case, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's complaint centered on an impact fee, not a tax, and one that is placed on only some persons and not others. Moreover, since 'Bradley' was decided, the Court clarified that all challenges to education-related special legislation were subject to the test set forth in 'Kizer v. Clark,'(600 S.E.2d 529 (2004)). The Supreme Court found that appellants' complaint alleged facts which, if resolved in their favor, would result in a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The order granting respondents' Rule 12(c) motion was therefore reversed. View "Home Builders Association v. School District No. 2 of Dorchester County" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court was asked to determine if an unsuccessful party in an arbitration proceeding could prevent the confirmation of an award by paying the award prior to the confirmation proceeding. Diane Henderson filed an action against Summerville Ford-Mercury, Inc. alleging the dealer made misrepresentations to her when she purchased a used vehicle. The circuit court granted the dealer's motion to compel arbitration, and an arbitrator found for Henderson on her claims for violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act. Henderson moved to confirm the arbitration award, which was granted by the circuit court. The dealer appealed, arguing the circuit court erred: (1) in rejecting its assertion that payment of the award mooted the request for confirmation, leaving no "justiciable controversy"; and alternatively (2) in applying the provision for confirming awards contained in the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the unsuccessful party could not prevent confirmation of the award by paying it before confirmation. View "Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ervin C. Gamble challenged his conviction for heroin trafficking. The Supreme Court found that record in this case did not demonstrate that probable cause supported Petitioner's arrest. The officer's testimony describes Petitioner's arrival at a certain location, and Petitioner's subsequent arrest, but did not explain why these events triggered the search. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Gamble" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old Child was sexually assaulted and murdered. The Child's father, Billy Wayne Cope was convicted of murder, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), criminal conspiracy, and unlawful conduct towards a child. The court of appeals affirmed Cope's convictions. Cope raised four issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's refusal to admit certain evidence; (2) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's excluding certain evidence; (3) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to allow Cope's false-confessions expert to specifically discuss factually similar cases; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Cope's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of criminal conspiracy. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed Cope's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Cope" on Justia Law

Appellant Justin B. challenged the active electronic monitoring requirements of section 23-3-540 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant argued that because he was a juvenile, the imposition of lifetime monitoring under the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court found that electronic monitoring was not a punishment, and rejected Appellant's claim. However, the Court concluded Appellant must be granted periodic judicial review to determine the necessity of continued monitoring. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Issac appealed a trial court ruling that denied his request for a hearing to determine whether he was immune from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Appellant was indicted for murder, first degree burglary, attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. Appellant contended that he was not afforded a hearing on his immunity issue. The trial court determined the Act did not apply to this case as a matter of law, specifically, that the intent of the Act was not to protect intruders and afford immunity to them or those who might enter the dwelling of another to commit a criminal act. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court's order was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed Appellant's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Isaac" on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed. View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

Five questions of South Carolina law were certified to the State Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) when a plaintiff seeks recovery for a temporary trespass or nuisance, are the damages limited to the lost rental value of the property?; (2) does South Carolina law recognize a cause of action for trespass solely from invisible odors rather than a physical invasion such as dust or water?; (3) is the maximum amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff can receive in any trespass or nuisance action (temporary or permanent) the full market value of the plaintiffs' property where no claim for restoration or cleanup costs has been alleged?; (4) when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, may the plaintiff maintain an independent cause of action for negligence or is the plaintiff limited to remedies under trespass and nuisance?; and (5) if an independent cause of action for negligence exists under South Carolina law when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, does the standard of care for a landfill operator and breach thereof need to be established through expert testimony? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered: (1) damages recoverable for a temporary trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the lost rental value of the property; (2) a trespass exists only when an intrusion is made by a physical, tangible thing; (3) the damages recoverable for a permanent trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the full market value of the property; (4) a negligence claim based on offensive odors is possible, but that such a claim would have to satisfy all the elements of negligence like any other negligence claim; and (5) the Court was unable to make a definitive determination as to whether establishing the standard of care of a landfill operator in regards to offensive odors required expert testimony, but offered guidelines for making such a determination. View "Babb v. Lee County Landfill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that affirmed the convictions and sentence of Karriem Provet for trafficking cocaine and resisting arrest. Petitioner argued the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify extension of a traffic stop and that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Provet" on Justia Law