Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Clarence Logan appealed his conviction of attempted criminal sexual misconduct in the first degree. He argued that the trial court erred in providing the circumstantial evidence charge the Supreme Court articulated in "South Carolina v. Grippon" (489 S.E.2d 462 (1997)). The question, the Supreme Court observed, was not whether the circumstantial evidence carried the same probative weight as direct evidence in this case (concluding that it did), but the proper means for evaluating the evidence and how to instruct the jury as to the jury's analytical responsibility. "Trial courts should not be constrained from providing a jury charge encompassing the determinations critical for analyzing circumstantial evidence as it appears in some cases. Additionally, defendants should not be restricted from requesting a jury charge that reflects the requisite connection of collateral facts necessary for a conviction." Thus, the Court articulated language to be used by trial courts pertaining to circumstantial evidence, in addition to a proper reasonable doubt instruction, when so requested by a defendant. View "South Carolina v. Logan" on Justia Law

Respondent Sue Taylor Colson Widenhouse sued Appellant Tammy Batson Colson in North Carolina state court for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Respondent received a judgment for $266,000 plus interest and costs. Respondent filed notice of foreign judgment with the Greenville County clerk of court. South Carolina does not recognize alienation of affection or criminal conversation. Appellant moved for relief, arguing that respondent's judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the causes of action were contrary to South Carolina public policy. Respondent moved to enforce the foreign judgment. The circuit court denied appellant's motion and granted respondent's motion. Finding that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Widenhouse v. Colson" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Association of School Administrators (SCASA) is a non-profit corporation. In 2009, Rocky Disabato sent SCASA a request for information pursuant to the FOIA. The Executive Director of SCASA refused the request, asserting that SCASA is not a public entity subject to the FOIA. Disabato thereafter filed a complaint seeking a declaration that SCASA violated the FOIA by refusing to comply with his request as well as an injunction requiring SCASA to comply with the FOIA. SCASA moved to dismiss, arguing that as a non-profit engaged in political advocacy, the FOIA unconstitutionally infringed on its free speech rights. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the FOIA did not violate SCASA's rights and reversed the circuit court's order granting its motion to dismiss. View "Disabato v. SCASA" on Justia Law

Defendant-Applicant Gregory McHam appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. He contended that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to renew a motion to suppress drug evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR judge erred in finding defendant's trial counsel was not deficient, but that counsel's failure to renew the objection to drug evidence was not deficient performance such that defendant's constitutional rights were violated. However, the Court agreed with the PCR judge's ultimate findings that defendant did not establish prejudice and did not prove his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as his Fourth Amendment claim failed on its merits. Consequently, the decision of the PCR judge was affirmed as modified. View "McHam v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 1999 and 2001, Respondent John Hollman went to Appellants TLC Laser Eye Centers, LLC and the TLC Laser Center (the Centers) for a series of eye surgeries. In the several years following the surgeries, respondent's vision deteriorated. He sued the Centers' doctors and the Centers themselves alleging medical malpractice. Respondent's wife sued for loss of consortium. Respondents requested a patient database the Centers maintained through the discovery process. The Centers resisted, but was eventually ordered to produce the database under a protective order. While this case was still pending, respondents joined a class action against appellants. Before the database was produced, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which they settled all their personal state and federal claims. The Centers were subsequently dismissed from the litigation. Respondents' claims against the doctors continued. As a result of the settlement, respondents withdrew as lead plaintiffs in the class action, and a new plaintiff took their place. The class action plaintiff requested the database. Appellants filed a notice of motion and motion for rule to show cause, motion to modify the protective order, and motion for sanctions in the class action although they were no longer parties in that action. The class action court issued an order denying the motion. Appellants moved for reconsideration. Respondents then settled their individual claims against the remaining state court defendants. Appellants moved the court to order respondents' counsel to prepare an order denying appellants' Rule 59(e) motion or, in the alternative, that the court prepare such an order. The trial court held a hearing on the motion denied it in part and granted it in part. It denied appellants' motion for reconsideration, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' request as a result of the dismissal of the case. Notwithstanding this finding, it also held that settlement and dismissal of the case operated as a final adjudication, barring further litigation of pre-settlement violations of the protective order. It held appellants waived their right to a written order denying the Rule 59(e) motion by failing to respond to respondents' counsel's letter advising of the impending dismissal of the case without an order on appellants' Rule 59(e) motion. With respect to the protective order, the court held it retained jurisdiction to hear appellants' request for return of the database and granted their motion for its return. Upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was the denial of a motion for entry of a ruling on a motion for reconsideration and the motion for rule to show cause, for sanctions, and for modification of a protective order. The Court concluded that the trial court erred when it held it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order ruling on appellants' motion for reconsideration after the action had been dismissed when a protective order governed disclosure of certain materials discovered in that action. View "TLC Laser Eye Centers v. Woolfson" on Justia Law

Appellant Thalma Barton appealed an Administrative Law Court's order that affirmed the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services' (DPPPS) decision to deny her parole. Although two-thirds of the members of the Parole Board voted in favor, the Board ultimately denied parole, citing the seriousness of Appellant's offense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Law Court erred in interpreting the two-thirds provision requiring Appellant to obtain five Parole Board votes instead of four, and that retroactive application of that provision constituted an ex post facto violation. Because Appellant received the necessary number of votes, she should have been granted parole. The Court therefore reversed the Administrative Law Court's decision. View "Barton v. SCDPPP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure to complete a mediation conference in a timely manner does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction, and dismissal is not mandated. South Carolina Code 15-79-125 requires a pre-suit mediation process for medical malpractice claims, and that the conference be completed within a 120-day period, which may be extended. The issue before the Court centered on whether the failure to complete the mediation conference in a timely manner divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and required dismissal. The contrary decision of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for the pre-suit mediation process to be completed. View "Ross v. Waccamaw Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Lawton Limehouse, Sr. ("Father") and Lawton Limehouse, Jr. ("Son") each sued attorney Paul Hulsey, and his law practice (collectively, "Hulsey") for defamation arising out of statements Hulsey made about L&L Services, LLC ("L&L"), a staffing agency they owned. Local newspapers published articles concerning housing raids performed on homes rented by L&L and fines assessed for overcrowding, inadequate heating and plumbing, and running illegal boarding houses. Hulsey filed a class action lawsuit in federal court on behalf of former employees of L&L, alleging violations of the RICO Act and other state and federal laws. One article quoted Hulsey as stating that L&L engaged in a "classic racketeering scheme . . . just like Tony Soprano." Neither Father nor Son was mentioned by name in the article. The case was moved to federal court based on the RICO claim; the federal court remanded the case back to the state court on the ground it lacked federal question jurisdiction over the issues presented. After the remand, the state court clerk of court entered a default against Hulsey. Following a damages hearing, a jury awarded Father $2.39 million in actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages. While the appeal in Father's case was pending, a damages hearing was held for Son's case. A jury awarded Son $1 million in actual damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages. Hulsey appealed both judgments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the state court proceedings were void as the lack of a certified remand order precluded the state court from resuming jurisdiction over the cases. The cases were remanded back to the circuit court to start over from the procedural point at which the state court received a certified remand order from the federal court. View "Limehouse v. Hulsey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Taylor appealed the post-conviction relief court's denial of relief on the grounds that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel though his plea counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of a guilty plea. He also argued that counsel failed to fully investigate one of the charges prior to his plea. Finding that Petitioner did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner James Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under sixteen, and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature. He was sentenced for the lewd act to fifteen years in prison, suspended upon ten years of service and five years' probation. Petitioner was also to undergo counseling and have no contact with children while on probation. Probation began in 2005; however Petitioner was not immediately released, but referred for review as to whether he should be deemed a sexually violent predator (SVP) and subjected to civil commitment. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the question of whether Petitioner's probation for a criminal offense should have been tolled during his civil commitment as a SVP. The lower courts affirmed the tolling, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Miller" on Justia Law