Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Ervin C. Gamble challenged his conviction for heroin trafficking. The Supreme Court found that record in this case did not demonstrate that probable cause supported Petitioner's arrest. The officer's testimony describes Petitioner's arrival at a certain location, and Petitioner's subsequent arrest, but did not explain why these events triggered the search. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Gamble" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old Child was sexually assaulted and murdered. The Child's father, Billy Wayne Cope was convicted of murder, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), criminal conspiracy, and unlawful conduct towards a child. The court of appeals affirmed Cope's convictions. Cope raised four issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's refusal to admit certain evidence; (2) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's excluding certain evidence; (3) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to allow Cope's false-confessions expert to specifically discuss factually similar cases; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Cope's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of criminal conspiracy. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed Cope's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Cope" on Justia Law

Appellant Justin B. challenged the active electronic monitoring requirements of section 23-3-540 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant argued that because he was a juvenile, the imposition of lifetime monitoring under the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court found that electronic monitoring was not a punishment, and rejected Appellant's claim. However, the Court concluded Appellant must be granted periodic judicial review to determine the necessity of continued monitoring. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Issac appealed a trial court ruling that denied his request for a hearing to determine whether he was immune from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Appellant was indicted for murder, first degree burglary, attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. Appellant contended that he was not afforded a hearing on his immunity issue. The trial court determined the Act did not apply to this case as a matter of law, specifically, that the intent of the Act was not to protect intruders and afford immunity to them or those who might enter the dwelling of another to commit a criminal act. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court's order was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed Appellant's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Isaac" on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed. View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

Five questions of South Carolina law were certified to the State Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) when a plaintiff seeks recovery for a temporary trespass or nuisance, are the damages limited to the lost rental value of the property?; (2) does South Carolina law recognize a cause of action for trespass solely from invisible odors rather than a physical invasion such as dust or water?; (3) is the maximum amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff can receive in any trespass or nuisance action (temporary or permanent) the full market value of the plaintiffs' property where no claim for restoration or cleanup costs has been alleged?; (4) when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, may the plaintiff maintain an independent cause of action for negligence or is the plaintiff limited to remedies under trespass and nuisance?; and (5) if an independent cause of action for negligence exists under South Carolina law when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, does the standard of care for a landfill operator and breach thereof need to be established through expert testimony? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered: (1) damages recoverable for a temporary trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the lost rental value of the property; (2) a trespass exists only when an intrusion is made by a physical, tangible thing; (3) the damages recoverable for a permanent trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the full market value of the property; (4) a negligence claim based on offensive odors is possible, but that such a claim would have to satisfy all the elements of negligence like any other negligence claim; and (5) the Court was unable to make a definitive determination as to whether establishing the standard of care of a landfill operator in regards to offensive odors required expert testimony, but offered guidelines for making such a determination. View "Babb v. Lee County Landfill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that affirmed the convictions and sentence of Karriem Provet for trafficking cocaine and resisting arrest. Petitioner argued the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify extension of a traffic stop and that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Provet" on Justia Law

Clarence Logan appealed his conviction of attempted criminal sexual misconduct in the first degree. He argued that the trial court erred in providing the circumstantial evidence charge the Supreme Court articulated in "South Carolina v. Grippon" (489 S.E.2d 462 (1997)). The question, the Supreme Court observed, was not whether the circumstantial evidence carried the same probative weight as direct evidence in this case (concluding that it did), but the proper means for evaluating the evidence and how to instruct the jury as to the jury's analytical responsibility. "Trial courts should not be constrained from providing a jury charge encompassing the determinations critical for analyzing circumstantial evidence as it appears in some cases. Additionally, defendants should not be restricted from requesting a jury charge that reflects the requisite connection of collateral facts necessary for a conviction." Thus, the Court articulated language to be used by trial courts pertaining to circumstantial evidence, in addition to a proper reasonable doubt instruction, when so requested by a defendant. View "South Carolina v. Logan" on Justia Law

Respondent Sue Taylor Colson Widenhouse sued Appellant Tammy Batson Colson in North Carolina state court for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Respondent received a judgment for $266,000 plus interest and costs. Respondent filed notice of foreign judgment with the Greenville County clerk of court. South Carolina does not recognize alienation of affection or criminal conversation. Appellant moved for relief, arguing that respondent's judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the causes of action were contrary to South Carolina public policy. Respondent moved to enforce the foreign judgment. The circuit court denied appellant's motion and granted respondent's motion. Finding that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Widenhouse v. Colson" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Association of School Administrators (SCASA) is a non-profit corporation. In 2009, Rocky Disabato sent SCASA a request for information pursuant to the FOIA. The Executive Director of SCASA refused the request, asserting that SCASA is not a public entity subject to the FOIA. Disabato thereafter filed a complaint seeking a declaration that SCASA violated the FOIA by refusing to comply with his request as well as an injunction requiring SCASA to comply with the FOIA. SCASA moved to dismiss, arguing that as a non-profit engaged in political advocacy, the FOIA unconstitutionally infringed on its free speech rights. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the FOIA did not violate SCASA's rights and reversed the circuit court's order granting its motion to dismiss. View "Disabato v. SCASA" on Justia Law