Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant John Rainey sued the Honorable Nikki Haley, Goveror of South Carolina, seeking a declaration that the Governor violated the State Ethics Act when she was a member of the House of Representatives. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction to hear ethics complaints against its members. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Rainey v. Haley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Edward Sloan and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation filed suit in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for a determination of whether the South Carolina Transportation Infrastructure Bank was constitutional. Plaintiffs alleged the Bank violated both the dual office holding and the separation of powers prohibitions of the South Carolina Constitution. Finding the statute at issue here (11-43-140, So. Car. Code (2011)) was constitutional, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bank. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. SC Transportation Infrastructure Bank" on Justia Law

Suits were filed in Alabama and South Carolina in this divorce case. In 2007, the husband filed for divorce in Alabama, alleging he was a resident of Alabama, and his wife was a resident of South Carolina. Wife accepted service of the complaint, but approximately one month later, sued in South Carolina effectively responding point for point to the husband's Alabama case. After the wife's attempts to serve her husband failed, she was permitted to serve her husband by publication in Alabama. The husband never responded to her pleading. An Alabama attorney filed a limited notice of appearance on the wife's behalf in Alabama, challenging jurisdiction and moving the court to dismiss the husband's complaint. The Alabama court denied the wife's motion and set the matter for trial. Meanwhile, in South Carolina, the court awarded the wife alimony and divided the marital property. The South Carolina court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the division of property, noting the husband's Alabama attorney sought to have the South Carolina action dismissed, but was not admitted pro hac vice in South Carolina, and therefore did not respond to husband's motion. A hearing was held in Alabama; wife's counsel had withdrawn and was not replaced. The Alabama court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and their property, declared the South Carolina judgment null and void, and divided the parties' marital property. With his Alabama judgment, the husband filed a Rule 60(b) motion in South Carolina to have wife's judgment vacated. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded: the Alabama court's grant of divorce should be given full faith and credit; the wife was not entitled to bring her South Carolina action for division of property or attorney's fees; by making a limited appearance in Alabama, wife was bound by Alabama law, and abandoned her opportunity to contest personal jurisdiction there. Since Alabama would have given its order res judicata effect, it was entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore, the husband's Rule 60(b) motion the South Carolina orders should have been granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Ware v. Ware" on Justia Law

Edward William Hunt (Father) appealed a jury verdict in favor of Don Gause which found him liable under the family purpose doctrine for damages caused by the negligence of his son Edward Raymond Hunt. Gause, a police officer for the City of Conway, was on duty when he responded to a call from a highway patrolman who had pulled over a Firebird driven by Son on suspicion of drunk driving. Instead of pulling off the highway into the emergency lane, Son stopped in the left lane of traffic on the four lane highway, and the patrolman stopped behind him with his lights flashing. When Gause arrived, he parked behind the patrolman, who subsequently left the scene, and also activated his blue lights. A second policeman also responded and eventually took Son into custody, leaving only Gause and the abandoned vehicle. Gause was filling out paperwork in his car and waiting for the tow truck to move the Firebird when a pickup truck driven by Nathan Smithers rear-ended him, propelling his cruiser into the Firebird. Gause sued Smithers and Father (assuming Father was the driver of the Firebird because it was registered in his name) for his injuries. Father moved to dismiss on the basis that Son, and not he, had been driving the Firebird that night. Realizing the mistake, Gause filed an amended complaint substituting Son as the defendant for the negligence claim and changing the claims against Father to negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine. Son moved to be dismissed as a party because the amendment occurred after the statute of limitations had run, and the circuit court granted the motion, holding the amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c), SCRCP. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Father argued he could not be found liable under the family purpose doctrine; Son's actions were not a proximate cause of Gause's injuries; he should have been granted a new trial due to prejudicial statements and a defective verdict form; and the punitive damages award should have been overturned as impermissible under the family purpose doctrine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Gause v. Smithers" on Justia Law

In 1988, Respondents the Barnwell County Council passed an ordinance creating the Board of Trustees for the Barnwell County Hospital. The ordinance stated the Board was created "for the purposes of operating and maintaining adequate hospital facilities for the residents of Barnwell County[,]" and delineated the powers and duties of the Board. The ordinance also described the composition of the Board, set term limits, and provided members annual compensation. Over the years, the Council has passed various ordinances related to the Board. Appellants, former Board members, alleged that in 2009, during their time of service on the Board, the Council was developing a strategy in conjunction with Bamberg and Allendale Counties to close the respective county hospitals and create one hospital for all three counties. Appellants asserted the Council embarked upon various detrimental actions against the Hospital in connection with the strategy and maintain these actions financially crippled the Hospital. According to Appellants, when they resisted the Council's plan, which included the Hospital filing for bankruptcy, the Council voted to remove Appellants from the Board and appointed themselves as Board members. The Council, in their new, self-appointed status as Board members, placed the Hospital in bankruptcy. Appellants filed suit seeking a declaration that the Council violated the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding when it assumed positions as Board members. In response, the Council filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claim presented a non-justiciable political question, and the dual office prohibition was not violated by what it termed a "vertical" duality. They cited no authority to support this unique theory. The circuit court granted the Council's motion to dismiss, finding the issue was a non-justiciable political question. Nevertheless, the circuit court addressed and rejected the dual office holding challenge. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss Appellants' declaratory judgment action, and reversed and remanded. View "Alexander v. Houston" on Justia Law

This matter began as a contested case in the administrative law court (ALC) brought by Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., (d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont)). The dispute arose out of Piedmont's contention that an urgent care center operated by a competitor, Carolinas Physicians Network, Inc. (CPN), was required to have a Certificate of Need (CON) or a Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). The ALC granted summary judgment to CHS and CPN on the basis the urgent care center was a licensed private physician's office and, thus, exempt from CON review as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding summary judgment was premature, and remanded to allow Piedmont the opportunity to conduct discovery. The Court of Appeals rejected DHEC's argument that the ALC did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the agency had issued no staff decision subject to a contested case hearing. The Supreme Court granted DHEC's petition for a writ of certiorari as to the issue of jurisdiction and reversed. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding Piedmont has established the existence of a staff decision by DHEC that was properly the subject of a contested case hearing and in remanding the matter for discovery and further proceedings. View "Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

This case was one of two heard by the Court that presented the question of whether a pre-breath test videotape recording was required upon an arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) if the arrestee refused the breath test. At both trials, the trial court dismissed the DUI charges, finding that the arresting officers did not comply with section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) of the South Carolina Code by failing to videotape a twenty-minute pre-test waiting period. The same panel of the court of appeals affirmed defendant Ryan Hercheck's dismissal, but reversed defendant Justin Elwell's dismissal seven months later. Elwell appealed the reversal of the dismissal in his case, and the State appealed the dismissal of Hercheck's case. With respect to Elwell's case, the Supreme Court affirmed. The State argued that section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) does not require a law enforcement officer to videotape the entire twenty-minute pre-test waiting period once the arrestee refuses a breath test. Elwell argued that his case was simple, in that the videotape was produced, it was incomplete and therefore the statute was violated. Moreover, Elwell interpreted the statute's repeated reference to "conduct" to mean that the State was required to videotape all conduct, not just pre-test conduct, for the full twenty minutes. Here the Court disagreed and concluded that the court of appeals correctly and reasonably interpreted the applicable statute, concluding that only when the waiting period is required can the videotape recording also be required. On the other hand, if no test is administered, then the waiting period is rendered unnecessary, and so then is the videotape recording of that waiting period. View "South Carolina v. Elwell" on Justia Law

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order requiring that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her life pursuant to sections 23-3-540(C) and (H) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Supp. 2011). When she was twenty-six years old, Appellant was indicted for lewd act on a minor in violation of Section 16-15-140 of the South Carolina Code (2006) as a result of her sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old female. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three years and five years' probation. Upon her release, Appellant was notified verbally and in writing that pursuant to section 23-3-540(C) she would be placed on satellite monitoring if she were to violate the terms of her probation. Shortly thereafter, Appellant violated her probation. She did not contest any of these violations, though she did offer testimony in mitigation. At her probation revocation hearing, Appellant objected to the constitutionality of mandatory lifetime monitoring. In support of her arguments, Appellant presented expert testimony that she posed a low risk of reoffending and that one's risk of reoffending cannot be determined solely by the offense committed. The State offered no evidence, relying instead on the mandatory, nondiscretionary requirement of the statute. The circuit court found Appellant to be in willful violation of her probation and that she had notice of the potential for satellite monitoring. The court denied Appellant's constitutional challenges and found it was statutorily mandated to impose satellite monitoring without making any findings as to her likelihood of reoffending. The court also revoked Appellant's probation for two years, but it ordered that her probation be terminated upon release. This appeal followed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant asserted that she had a fundamental right to be "let alone." The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the circuit court. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc., employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. At the hearing, Petitioner testified to substantial head pain, loss of cognitive ability, and other brain-function-related symptoms, including inability to read without severe headache, loss of his mathematical abilities, inability to balance while standing or to walk without a cane, hand tremors, anxiety, and more. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed. Because "physical brain damage" as contemplated in S.C. Code Ann. 42-9-10 required "severe and permanent physical brain damage as a result of a compensable injury" and the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Petitioner did not suffer such brain damage was supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law