Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In March of 2007, Mother gave birth to Child. Five months later, the Pickens County Department of Social Services (DSS) received a report of neglect from a sheriff's deputy. Three families (six adults and eleven children) resided in Child's home, trash was overflowing, moldy dishes and food were strewn about, Mother and Father admitted to using cocaine, and Child had a visibly flat head which Mother explained resulted from her being left in a car seat for extended periods. Mother also admitted that Child had received her immunizations from the health department, but had not seen a doctor since birth. DSS filed a complaint for removal of Child and her older half-sister (Sister) due to abuse and neglect. The following day, Child tested positive for cocaine. Child and Sister were removed from the home and placed in emergency protective custody. A week later, Child was placed with the Appellants the Brooms for foster care. Following a hearing, the family court found probable cause for removal of Child based on the positive drug test and Mother's admission of substance abuse. The court also gave legal custody of Child to DSS and directed the appointment of counsel for Mother. At some point thereafter an attorney was appointed to represent Mother. "This would [have been] a straightforward appeal in a termination of parental rights action but for the fact that the mother whose rights were terminated was erroneously denied counsel." Because, after its review, the Supreme Court held that the Mother was not prejudiced by the error, the grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence, and termination was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Broom v. Derrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order that upheld an arbitration award. The underlying dispute arose from a construction contract whereby general contractor respondent C-Sculptures, LLC agreed to build a home for Petitioners Gregory and Kerry Brown. The contract price was in excess of $800,000. However, Respondent only possessed what is referred to as a Group II license, limiting Respondent to construction projects that did not exceed $100,000. A dispute arose between the parties, and Respondent filed an action in circuit court seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against Petitioners. Upon Petitioners' motion and pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract, the circuit court matter was stayed pending arbitration. Petitioners sought to have the matter dismissed after they learned Respondent held only a Group II license. The arbitrator was apprised of the applicable law, but nevertheless denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss "after due consideration of all the evidence and authorities presented by the parties in this Arbitration." Respondent prevailed at arbitration, receiving an award of damages and an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 29-5-10(b) (Supp. 2012). Petitioners challenged the arbitration award, contending the arbitrator's denial of their motion to dismiss amounted to a manifest disregard of the law. Following adverse decisions in the circuit court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioners argue the court of appeals erred in refusing to find the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in declining to dismiss the action. Upon review, the Court agreed, and reversed the appellate court and directed that judgment be entered for Petitioners. View "C-Sculptures v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court was presented with policy dispute: whose policy choice concerning health insurance premiums for State employees controlled, the General Assembly's or the Budget and Control Board's? The Court found that under the South Carolina Constitution, the General Assembly had and exercised the power to determine the contribution rates of enrollees for the State's health insurance plan in 2013. The Court hold the Budget and Control Board violated the separation of powers provision by substituting its own policy for that of the General Assembly, entered judgment for the petitioners, and directed the Board to use the appropriated funds for premium increases and return the premium increases previously collected from enrollees. View "Hampton v. Haley" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Brad Keith Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's dismissal of Sigmon's application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Sigmon contended he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Sigmon did not present evidence that trial counsel was deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of Sigmon's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant John Herndon appealed a circuit court's order imposing lifetime sex offender registration for his failure to complete sex abuse counseling required by the terms of his probation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]he Record demonstrate[d] that Appellant maintained his innocence, but made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent Alford plea to conclude the proceedings and place the matter behind him. Appellant simply failed to satisfy a condition of his probation, and the circuit court properly ordered him to register as sex offender for life as would have been appropriate for a defendant sentenced pursuant to a standard guilty plea. . . . the defendant entering an Alford plea is still treated as guilty for the purposes of punishment, and simply put, is not owed anything merely because the State and the court have agreed to deviate from the standard guilty plea." Appellant received notice that he would need to admit guilt through his participation in the program, and the circuit court re-ordered Appellant to complete the counseling prior to the probation revocation. However, Appellant failed to comply. View "South Carolina v. Herndon" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment action, the Tourism Expenditure Review Committee (TERC) appealed a circuit court's declaration of the meaning of section 6-4-10 of the South Carolina Code. At issue was the South Carolina Accommodations Tax Act (Act), which sets forth the administration of the state sales tax of seven percent imposed on all sleeping accommodations provided to overnight guests. That tax is composed of several components, including a two percent "local accommodations tax" (A-Tax), remitted to the counties and municipalities where it was collected. Counties and municipalities receiving A-Tax revenues must expend those funds in accordance with the statutory provisions governing the allocation of A-Tax revenues. Section 6-4-10 provides for the expenditure of A-Tax funds generally referred to as "65% Funds." These funds are allocated for "tourism-related expenditures." The legislature granted TERC the authority to challenge a local government's expenditure of 65% Funds. Over the years, the City of Myrtle Beach and TERC have occasionally disputed the meaning of various provisions of section 6-4-10. No particular expenditure or allocation was at issue here, nor were any A-Tax revenues being held by the State Treasurer in connection with this appeal. The City first filed an action in the Administrative Law Court, which granted TERC's motion to dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction. TERC then filed this action in circuit court as a declaratory judgment action seeking to have section 6-4-10 construed. The City did not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court adopted the City's view of section 6-4-10, from which TERC has appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, "since the parties cannot by consent or agreement confer jurisdiction on the court to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual justiciable controversy." The Court vacated the circuit court's order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Tourism Expenditure Review Committee v. City of Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

"At its most basic level, this case presents a policy dispute: whose policy choice concerning health insurance premiums for State employees controls—the General Assembly's or the Budget and Control Board's?" The issue before the Supreme Court centered on "maintaining and enforcing the constitutional and statutory framework through which such issues must be resolved. " Upon review of the arguments of the parties and the applicable case law, the Supreme Court found that the General Assembly had and exercised the power to determine the contribution rates of enrollees for the State's health insurance plan in 2013. The Court held that the Budget and Control Board violated the separation of powers provision by substituting its own policy for that of the General Assembly, entered judgment for the petitioners, and directed the Board to use the appropriated funds for premium increases and return the premium increases previously collected from enrollees. View "Hampton v. Haley" on Justia Law

In 2004, petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on charges of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and disturbing the schools,1 and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals which held that trial court did not err in permitting a witness to give an opinion. The Court agreed with petitioner and found that the lay witness was improperly allowed to offer expert opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Thomas S." on Justia Law

Sarah W. (Mother) is the biological mother of a minor boy and a minor girl. In 2007, Mother and the children's father, Vaughn S. (Father; parents collectively, defendants), and the children resided in a home without heat, electricity, or running water. Mother arranged for her brother and sister-in-law, Thomas W. and Brittney W., to take primary responsibility for the children. The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) requested that the family court issue an ex parte order granting DSS emergency protective custody of Boy. DSS alleged it had probable cause to believe that Boy faced imminent and substantial danger to his health or physical safety. The family court agreed, basing its determination on the fact that Defendants were "unable to provided[sic] even marginally suitable housing" for Boy, and finding that Thomas W. and Brittney W. "apparently abused a sibling" of Boy. The family court awarded emergency protective custody to DSS. The family court held a probable cause hearing and found sufficient probable cause to issue the ex parte order. The family court also found that Thomas W. and Brittney W. were no longer willing to maintain custody of Girl, and the court ordered DSS to take emergency protective custody of Girl. Ultimately DSS moved to terminate Mother's rights to both children; the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and reversed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights, and reversed the appellate court. View "SCDSS v. Sarah W." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Brad Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Upon review of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), the Supreme Court found that defendant did not present evidence that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the second prong of prejudice in analyzing Defendant's entitlement to PCR. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of defendant's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law