Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Steven Barnes was convicted of throwing urine on a jailor and received a fifteen-year sentence consecutive to the sentence he was then serving. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's decision to have a twice deadlocked jury continue to deliberate in petitioner's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the trial court's decision violated the mandate of S.C. Code Ann. 14-7-1330 (1976) and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court reversed lower courts and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Brown challenged his conviction for grand larceny of two motor vehicles. On appeal, he argued: (1) whether the amendment to section 16-13-30 of the South Carolina Code should be applied retroactively to Appellant's case; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the amendment to the applicable statute in this case, 16-13-30, should not be applied retroactively: "Appellant's argument regarding the absence of a savings clause is merely an attempt to confuse the issues. . . Appellant clearly incurred liability for grand larceny at the time he committed the crime." Furthermore, the Court found that the stolen vehicles met the statutory monetary threshold for grand larceny. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether former foster parents had standing to petition to adopt a child placed for adoption by the Department of Social Services (DSS) with a different family. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the former foster parents possessed neither statutory or constitutional standing, and therefore vacated the order that granted the parents' petition, and remanded custody of the child to DSS for adoptive placement. "[R]ecognizing that children develop rapidly, and that stability and attachment are important components in their growth and development, [the Court directed] DSS to consider [the] child's present best interests in placing her for adoption." View "Youngblood v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

Appellant Stephen Christopher Stanko appealed his conviction and death sentence for murder and armed robbery. A grant jury indicted him for the death of Henry Turner in 2005. At trial, he relied on an insanity defense, specifically, that he suffered from central nervous system dysfunction, and at the time of the Victim's murder he did not understand "legal right from wrong." Appellant argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon where Appellant presented an insanity defense. Though the Supreme Court agreed that the instruction was given in error, it was not reversible error entitling appellant to the relief he requested. Accordingly the Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Stanko" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrew Lee Harrison contended on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the penalty portion of section 56-5-1210 violated the Eighth Amendment. In 2009, appellant was traveling along the highway in the same direction as victim Gary Tims and Daniel Gantt. The victim and Gantt were both riding motorcycles. Gantt rode approximately one "bike length" behind the Victim. Appellant entered the highway, but instead of utilizing the right lane, pulled his vehicle into the left lane. The victim lost temporary control of his motorcycle and shifted to the right lane to avoid appellant's vehicle. However, Appellant simultaneously switched to the right lane and the victim struck the rear of appellant's truck. The victim's motorcycle "flipped over" and landed in the highway. Appellant did not stop, but continued driving. Gantt followed appellant until appellant pulled over approximately one-half mile from the accident. Gantt informed appellant that the victim was "laying [sic] down in the highway," and that Gantt did not know whether the victim was "dead or alive." Appellant inspected the damage to the truck and stated that he did not possess a valid driver's license, because his driver's license had been suspended. Appellant agreed to return to the scene of the accident. However, once Gantt departed to return to the scene, appellant travelled in the opposite direction. He was ultimately charged with driving under suspension and leaving the scene with death, a violation of section 56-5-1210. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment for leaving the scene with death, and a concurrent sentence of six months' imprisonment for driving under suspension. "When the proportionality principle jurisprudence is applied to section 56-51210 it is not evident that its repugnance to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that section 56-5-1210 of the South Carolina Code was constitutional. View "South Carolina v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an administrative law court's (ALC) decision authorizing Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam's Spit (the Spit) on Kiawah Island. In 1999, the Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) established a baseline and building set back line twenty feet landward based on information that the Spit had accreted, and had not been subject to any significant, measurable erosion between 1959 and 1999. The movement of the baseline prompted Respondent to consider development of the Spit. On February 29, 2008, Respondent submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a combination bulkhead and revetment in the area. On December 18, 2008, DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 feet. DHEC refused the permit request for a remaining 2,513 feet based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers. DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP). Respondent requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board, but the Board declined to hold a review conference. Respondent then requested a contested case hearing before the ALC, and challenged the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 feet. The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) opposed the construction of any bulkhead or revetment on the Spit, and also requested a contested case hearing challenging the decision to authorize the 270 foot structure, but supporting denial of the remainder. The cases were consolidated. The ALC granted Respondent's permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment, subject to certain conditions reducing and altering its size. DHEC and CCL (collectively, Appellants) appealed the ALC's order. The Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in a decision published in late 2011. The Court subsequently granted Respondent's petition for rehearing, and accepted an amicus brief from the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the SRMC). The Court then withdrew its initial opinion, and issue this opinion, affirmed the decision of the ALC. "The essence of Appellants' argument is rooted in dissatisfaction with the verbiage and structure of the ALC's order, and not in actual errors of law or the absence of substantial evidence. The ALC acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit to include a structure no larger than that requested by Respondent or initially reviewed by DHEC. On appeal of a contested case, we must affirm the ALC if the findings are supported by substantial evidence." View "Kiawah Development v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Respondent James Farmer operated a retail store in Florence County. In 2007, Petitioner Florence County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant and seized the store's inventory, consisting of clothing, shoes, movie DVDs, and music CDs. Respondent was subsequently indicted in January 2008 for one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods and one count of illegal distribution of recordings. He pled guilty to illegally distributing not more than 25 audiotapes or more than 10 videos and the counterfeit goods indictment was dismissed. In early February 2008, respondent's attorney wrote a letter to petitioner seeking return of the allegedly counterfeit goods. In March 2008, counsel sent a second letter. Respondent sued petitioner on May 30, 2008, approximately nine months after the goods were seized and approximately four months after respondent pled guilty to piracy and the counterfeit goods charge was dismissed. The trial court dismissed respondent's suit, and he appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that respondent's remedy under these circumstances was found in South Carolina Code section 39-15-1195(H). Instead of exercising that option, he chose instead to bring this replevin action, a remedy specifically forbidden by section 39-15-1195(D). The circuit court erred in not dismissing respondent's suit, and the Court of Appeals compounded the error. The Court was informed that petitioner no longer had custody of the seized property, and it expressed its "disappointment" that the property was not safeguarded during the pendency of this matter. Since respondent's attorney acknowledged at oral argument that respondent could not establish that the seized goods were not counterfeit within the meaning of 39-15-1190, the Court did not address whether he would otherwise have a remedy against petitioner. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the decision of the circuit court reversed. View "Farmer v. Florence County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Appellant Raymondeze Rivera directly appealed his death sentence to the Supreme Court. Although Appellant raised multiple challenges, the Court was "constrained to reverse and grant a new trial based on one - the trial court's error in refusing to allow Appellant to testify during the guilt phase of his trial." View "South Carolina v. Rivera" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the question of when tax liability for property is determined. Appellant Hampton Friends of the Arts challenged the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) finding that real property it acquired in March 2008 was subject to 2008 property taxes because the property was subject to taxes on December 31, 2007. Appellant contended that, as a non-profit corporation, it was entitled to a property tax exemption for the 2008 tax year. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the ALC: "pursuant to settled law, the 2008 tax status of the Hampton County property was determined on December 31, 2007. Because the property was subject to property taxes as of December 31, 2007, the property is subject to 2008 property taxes." View "Hampton Friends v. So. Carolina Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law