Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court accepted the petition of Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company (Petitioner) in its Original Jurisdiction to assess constitutional challenges to Act No. 26 of the South Carolina Acts and Joint Resolutions, which regulates coverage provided by commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies for construction-related work. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the retroactivity clause of Act No. 261 violated the Contract Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, and that the statute may only apply prospectively to CGL insurance contracts executed on or after its effective date of May 17, 2011. View "Harleysville Mutual v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Section 1-7-330 of the South Carolina Code (2005), which vested control of the criminal docket in the circuit solicitor, violated the separation of powers principle embodied in Article 1, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution. In 1980, the Court recognized that "[t]he authority of the court to grant continuances and to determine the order in which cases shall be heard is derived from its power to hear and decide cases. . . .This adjudicative power of the court carries with it the inherent power to control the order of its business to safeguard the rights of litigants." The Court concluded that section 1-7-330 was at odds with "this intrinsically judicial power." The Court therefore held that section 1-7-330 violated the separation of powers and therefore was unconstitutional. However, because Appellant K.C. Langford, III suffered no prejudice as a result of section 1-7-330, the Court affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Langford" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' decision invalidating respondent's sentence of life without parole. Respondent was convicted of second-degree arson and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the second-degree arson conviction, but reversed and remanded as to the LWOP sentence finding the use of a 1979 burning conviction was inappropriate for sentence enhancement purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted former section 16-11110(B), though the Court noted that the impact of this erroneous interpretation has been limited by the 2010 amendment to the statute. The portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion reversing respondent's sentence was affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law

William E. Terry, Jr. appealed a family court order holding him in contempt for failing to vacate the parties' marital residence as required under the temporary order. The appeal was manifestly without merit, and the Supreme Court affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR. Because Appellant erroneously believed that the filing and service of a notice of appeal from the family court's temporary order divested the family court of jurisdiction from considering the contempt matter, the Court elected to address and clarify the effect of an attempted appeal from a family court temporary order: "Perceived errors in family court temporary orders are to be redressed as they always have, at the final hearing. For issue preservation purposes, any such challenge must be placed on the record at the commencement of the final hearing. The family court has wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief, including the authority to make adjustments in the equitable distribution and otherwise to remedy an error in the temporary order. If a party desires to challenge the family court's final resolution of the matter, the aggrieved party may appeal from final judgment." View "Terry v. Terry" on Justia Law

Nathan Stallings leased a home in Mt. Pleasant where he lived with his fiancee and a roommate. He used an internet networking site to meet other poker players, and established a regular Sunday night game in his home. Players would buy into the game for a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $20. Respondents Robert Chimento, Scott Richards, Michael Williamson, Jeremy Brestel and John Willis were convicted in municipal court of violating S.C. Code Ann. 16-19-40(a) (2003) which made it unlawful to "play . . . in any house used as a place of gaming . . . any game with cards. . . ." after they were found playing Texas Hold'em and gambling in Stallings' home. On appeal, the circuit court reversed respondents’ convictions finding they were entitled to directed verdicts or, alternatively, that section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional. The municipal judge found, based on expert testimony presented by the respondents, that Texas Hold'em is a game of skill. The municipal judge also held that if a game of skill were without the ambit of gaming, then he would acquit the respondents, but that there was no clear indication whether the legislature intended to criminalize only gambling on games of chance. At the hearing, the municipal judge declined to find section 16-19-40 unconstitutional. The circuit court reversed, and the Town appealed that order. The issues before the Supreme Court were reduced to: (1) whether respondents were entitled to directed verdicts because betting money on a game of skill at a residence is not prohibited by section 16-19-40; and (2) if respondents were not entitled to directed verdicts, should their convictions have been set aside because section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional? The Court found that the circuit court erred in reversing respondents' convictions, and therefore the order on appeal is itself was reversed. View "Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento" on Justia Law

Petitioners Savannah Riverkeeper, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, South Carolina Wildlife Federation, and Conservation Voters of South Carolina (collectively, Conservation Groups) petitioned the Supreme Court Court to hear this matter in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) acted illegally and usurped the authority of the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the Commission) when it negotiated an agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Georgia Ports Authority (GPA) before issuing a 401 Water Quality Certification (the Certification or the 401 Certification) requested for the proposed Savannah Harbor Expansion Project (SHEP). The Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that DHEC's action contravened the plain language of S.C. Code Ann. section 54-6-10 (2007). View "Savannah Riverkeeper v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during a crime of violence and received concurrent sentences of life (murder) and five years (weapon). On appeal, he alleged the trial judge committed reversible error in charging the jury that they were acting "for the community" and that their verdict "will represent truth and justice for all parties that are involved." The Supreme Court agreed that these charges were erroneous, but because appellant did not properly preserve his issues for appeal, the Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jason Ervin Black appealed his convictions for criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the first degree and committing a lewd act upon a minor. Petitioner contended on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to impeach his defense witness with two manslaughter convictions that were more than ten years old because their introduction violated Rules 404 and 609 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE), and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Black" on Justia Law

Petitioner Larry Moore challenged the post-conviction relief (PCR) court's finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's trial counsel waived his right to a jury trial and opted instead for a bench trial as part of the defense strategy. Petitioner asserted that he did not wish to waive this right, and as a result, received ineffective assistance of counsel. The State asserted that Petitioner failed to establish counsel was ineffective in part because he did not recall "telling counsel that he wished to have a jury trial or asking counsel any questions about when a jury would be selected." "However, this argument exhibits a fundamental misunderstanding of what [the Supreme] Court's waiver jurisprudence commands." The validity of a waiver does not turn on his communication with counsel, but rather on the presence of a record supporting the validity of that waiver. The Court concluded that both the trial and PCR courts in this case conducted a deficient analysis of Petitioner's waiver. The waiver in this case case was not supported by a complete record, and PCR court erred in finding that Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moore v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant-Respondent George Tempel and Respondents-Appellants the State Election Commission and South Carolina Republican Party appealed a circuit court order concerning the candidacy of Respondent-Appellant Paul Thurmond for Senate District 41. Thurmond electronically filed a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI). Thirty minutes later, he filed his Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC) for the Republican Party primary for Senate District 41. However, he did not file a paper copy of his SEI along with his SIC as required by section 8-13-1356(B). All of the other Republican contenders for the Senate District 41 seat were decertified for failing to comply with section 8-13-1356(B). However, Thurmond's name remained on the ballot, and he received over 1,700 votes. He was subsequently declared the Republican candidate for the seat. The circuit court found Thurmond was not exempt from the filing requirement of section 8-131356(B) of the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356(B) (Supp. 2011). Thus, Thurmond was disqualified as the Republican nominee for the District 41 seat. The judge ordered the Republican Party to conduct a special primary election pursuant to section 7-11-55. S.C. Code Ann. 7-11-55 (Supp. 2011). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Tempel v. So. Carolina Election Comm'n" on Justia Law