Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The South Carolina Supreme Court certified the following question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "In the case of a partial failure of title which is covered by an owner's title insurance policy, where the title defect cannot be removed, should the actual loss suffered by the insured as a result of that partial failure of title be measured by the diminution in value of the insured property as a result of the title defect as of the date of the purchase of the insured property, or as of the date of the discovery of the title defect?" The Court answered the question: consult the contract. "[W]here the insurance contract unambiguously identifies a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provides for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such date or method is controlling. Where, as here, the insurance contract does not unambiguously identify a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provide for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such ambiguity requires a construction allowing for the measure of damages most favorable to the insured. . . .In sum, although [the Court acknowledged] the apparent inequity in [its] answer to the certified question, the resolution of this question [was] not a matter of equity. Rather, [the] Court [was] faced with the task of construing an insurance policy, and in the presence of an ambiguity [it was] constrained to interpret it most favorably to the insured."

Appellant Stacy Howard, an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), appealed the Administrative Law Court's ("ALC's") summary dismissal of his appeal from a prison disciplinary conviction. Appellant contended the SCDC's actions implicated a state-created liberty interest and, thus, the ALC erred in summarily dismissing his appeal pursuant to section 1-23-600(D) of the South Carolina Code. Additionally, Appellant challenged: (1) the enforcement of the policy that formed the basis for the disciplinary conviction; (2) the procedure employed to procure the conviction; and (3) the factual basis underlying the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed: because the plain language of section 1-23-600(D) would prohibit an ALC from hearing all inmate appeals involving the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits, the Court clarified that the ALC may not summarily dismiss an appeal solely on the basis that it involves the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits. Instead, the ALC must also consider whether the appeal implicates a state-created liberty or property interest. Furthermore, the Court found that the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits did not implicate a state-created liberty interest. The Court affirmed the ALC's dismissal of Appellant's appeal finding that Appellant failed to establish a legal basis on which to challenge the enforcement of the disciplinary policy underlying his conviction.

Appellant Anthony Gracely appealed his conviction for conspiracy to traffic four hundred grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of section 44-53-375 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant argued that the circuit court improperly limited his cross-examination of the State's witnesses, thereby violating his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. Appellant also argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[i]n a case built on circumstantial evidence, including testimony from witnesses with such suspect credibility, a ruling preventing a full picture of the possible bias of those witnesses cannot be harmless. Based on the Record before [the] Court, it is impossible to conclude that the trial court's error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."

Margaret Mims (Mims), as guardian ad litem for her son Edward, filed a complaint against the Babcock Center and others alleging Edward sustained physical injuries and was mistreated while under their care. The circuit court dismissed the complaint based on issues related to timeliness of service and the application of S.C. Code Ann. 15-3-20(B) (2005). Mims appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Mims's amended complaint should have been dismissed for failure to serve it within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Moreover, the Court agreed with Mims that, contrary to Defendants' assertion, Rule 15(a), SCRCP does allow the filing and service of an amended complaint without leave of court, even if the original complaint has not been served, because a party may amend her pleadings once without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served, and no responsive pleading had been served by Defendants prior to Mims's service of the amended complaint. To the extent the trial court found an alleged absence of proper service resulted in a lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and a failure to prosecute, the Court reversed these findings as they were premised on the perceived error regarding service.

Appellant Samuel Whitner was convicted and sentenced for the offense of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree. The victim of the sexual abuse was Appellant's then five- or six-year-old daughter. Appellant challenged two evidentiary rulings: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress a tape recording of his telephone conversation with the victim wherein he admitted the abuse; and (2) the denial of his motion to exclude evidence in connection with a forensic interview of the minor victim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the admission of the challenged evidence and affirmed.

Appellant Richard Freemantle challenged the legality of a severance agreement between Anderson County and Respondent Joey Preston, a former Anderson County administrator. Respondent was hired as County Administrator in 1998. His contract with the County provided for an initial employment term of three years, with an annual renewal in the absence of written notice not to renew the contract. The November 2008 election changed the "balance of power" on the Anderson County Council. One of the final acts of the outgoing Council was to execute a severance agreement for Respondent that provided him over one million dollars in benefits which was "well in excess of that provided in his employment contract." The severance agreement also included a release provision stating that the County would never seek legal redress against Respondent for any claims relating to his employment with the County. Appellant filed a complaint against Respondents on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated seeking monetary relief and various declaratory judgments. Specifically, Appellant alleged that Council's vote approving the severance agreement was invalid. In addition, Appellant contended the successor Anderson County Council was not bound by the severance agreement. Relief was sought pursuant to various causes of action, including covin and collusion, breach of fiduciary duties, illegal gift of county funds, misfeasance, malfeasance, conspiracy, violations of public policy, and violations of FOIA, The trial court dismissed the action finding that Appellant's status as a taxpayer did not confer standing to challenge the severance agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court in most respects concerning Appellant's lack of standing. However, the Court disagreed with the trial court "only insofar as the FOIA claim is concerned, for traditional standing principles do not apply under FOIA because the legislature has conferred standing on any citizen to enforce the Act's provisions." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Kathy Salley was found guilty of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, suspendable upon eight years' service. Appellant claims the circuit judge committed reversible error by allowing into evidence a photograph of the child taken while she was alive and well, and two pieces of wood found at the home of the child. Although the Supreme Court believed that the admission of the pieces of wood was an abuse of discretion, the Court nevertheless found the error to be harmless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction.

Petitioner Bobbie Manigo challenged his civil commitment to the Department of Mental Health for long-term control, care, and treatment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA"). Specifically, Petitioner contended that, although he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, he was exempt from the SVPA evaluation procedure simply because his most recent offense was not explicitly designated as sexually violent. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's commitment, finding the language of the SVPA unambiguous and applicable to Petitioner. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.

Petitioner Chris Anthony Liverman was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner sought certiorari with respect to the claim that the trial court refused to conduct a "full" in camera hearing pursuant to "Neil v. Biggers," (409 U.S. 188 (1972)). Petitioner contended the eyewitness's identification of him as the shooter at a police-orchestrated show-up was unduly suggestive and therefore tainted the in-court identification. The trial court, relying on "McLeod v. State," (196 S.E.2d 645 (1973)), did conduct an in camera hearing and found the pretrial identification was reliable, based primarily on the witness's previous knowledge of Petitioner. Following the court of appeals' decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Perry v. New Hampshire," (565 U.S. ___ (2012)). The issue in this case for the Supreme Court concerned "the intersection of a suggestive police show-up identification procedure and an eyewitness who knows the accused." The Court concluded that "McLeod" could not stand in light of "Perry" and overruled "McLeod" insofar as it created a bright-line rule excusing a "Neil v. Biggers" hearing where the eyewitness knows the accused. The Court nevertheless affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence because any error in failing to conduct a "Neil v. Biggers" hearing was harmless.

Respondent Jarod Wayne Tapp was convicted of murdering and sexually assaulting his upstairs neighbor, Julie Jett (victim), and of burglarizing her apartment. Respondent received a life sentence for murder and two thirty-year sentences for the first degree criminal sexual conduct and burglary charges. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision to overturn and remand Respondent's convictions and sentences for a new trial. The court of appeals found that the record in this case was insufficient for determining whether the circuit judge properly considered the reliability of a special agent's testimony prior to introducing that testimony to the jury. The Supreme Court agreed that its decision in "State v. White,"(676 S.E.2d684 (2009) governed Respondent's case, but took the opportunity to clarify "White" in light of the court of appeals' misreading of "White" in the opinion below. The Supreme Court's reading of the record convinced the Court that the circuit judge stopped short of determining the reliability of the agent's testimony prior to admitting it into evidence, and therefore the trial court erred. However, the Court found that the error in admitting the testimony at issue was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Respondent's convictions.