Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joey Ellis appealed a circuit court order that revoked and terminated his probation. He argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the probation violation warrant was not issued during the term of his probation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant's sentence of probation for his attempted burglary in the second degree conviction began after his parole concluded for his conviction for burglary in the second degree, and not following his release from incarceration. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation.

Petitioner Michael Goins pled guilty to a second possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within the proximity of a school. He received a negotiated ten-year sentence for both convictions, to run concurrently.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief (PCR).  Petitioner argued the PCR court erred in failing to find plea counsel ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty when the drugs obtained were found pursuant to an illegal search.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Petitioner on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Petitioner failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice.

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her natural life pursuant to Section 23-3-540(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010). She raised five constitutional challenges to this statute: (1) it violates her substantive due process rights; (2) violates her right to procedural due process; (3) violates the Ex Post Facto clause; (4) violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (5) violates her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of lifetime satellite monitoring indeed violates Appellant's substantive due process rights and reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Zeb Eron Binnarr was convicted by a jury for failing to timely register as a sex offender. He appealed his conviction primarily on the ground that he did not receive actioal notice of a change of the law regarding sex offender registration. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, and Petitioner again appealed. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in "South Carolina v. Latimore" (Op. 27102, Mar. 14, 2012), the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to find that actual notice of the re-registration requirement was necessary to sustain a conviction. Because the State failed to provide any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could determine that Petitioner had actual notice of the change in the law, the Court found the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court reversed Petitioner's conviction.

A circuit court found Appellant David Cannon in contempt of court for violating (1) an order mandating that Appellant give up all authority and cease all activities relating to the James Brown estate, the Brown trusts, and all Brown entities (which he violated by filing amended tax returns without authority); and (2) an order requiring Cannon to pay back money he had misappropriated from Brown's estate. The circuit court ordered Appellant to be incarcerated for six months for contempt. However, the circuit court stated Appellant could purge himself of the contempt "by the payment of the aforementioned [money, with a portion] to be applied towards the payment of attorneys' fees incurred by the various parties, and the payment of a fine." The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings; upholding all of the circuit court's findings regarding the contempt except for the amount awarded towards attorneys' fees and the imposition of the fine. The Court of Appeals found the circuit court abused its discretion as to attorneys' fees because it did not make the necessary factual findings to support the amount awarded, so it "reverse[d] and remand[ed] the issue of attorneys' fees to the circuit court for findings of fact as to the proper amount. On remand, the circuit court held a hearing for the sole purpose of making findings of fact regarding the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for reimbursing the parties for attorneys' time related to the issue of Appellant's contemptuous conduct, and held that Appellant should pay. Appellant appealed this order, arguing payment of fees was mooted by his serving his jail sentence. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant pay attorneys' fees. Further, the Court held that the issue of attorneys' fees was not mooted by Appellant serving his jail sentence.

Willie James Fee died while in the care of Respondent AMISUB of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont). Petitioner Evelyn Grier, as the personal representative of his estate, subsequently brought this medical malpractice claim against Piedmont. The circuit court dismissed Petitioner's claim on the ground that the expert witness affidavit she was required to submit pursuant to Sections 15-36-100 and 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) did not contain a competent opinion on proximate cause. Respondent appealed, arguing the court erred in finding these statutes require the affidavit contain such an opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellants, who are current and former certified educators employed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) in the Palmetto Unified School District (PUSD), collectively appealed the Administrative Law Court's (ALC's) order that affirmed the State Employee Grievance Committee's decision denying their grievances regarding the SCDC's Reduction-in-Force (RIF) implemented in 2003. On appeal, Appellants contended the ALC erred in failing to enforce: (1) the plain language of the RIF policy; (2) the controlling legislation applicable to the PUSD and the RIF policy; (3) Appellants' constitutional rights with respect to employment; and (4) Appellants' rights as "covered employees" with respect to the RIF policy. Based on these alleged errors, Appellants asserted they were entitled to reinstatement to employment as well as back pay and benefits. Because the RIF was deemed "procedurally correct," the Supreme Court concluded the ALC correctly affirmed the Committee's decision regarding the inclusion of the PUSD in the RIF. However the Court concluded that the SCDC violated statutory law in precluding Appellants from exercising their priority right to recall as to the positions vacated by retirees. Because the "Retirement Opportunity" offered by the SCDC required a fifteen-day break in service before rehiring, the Court found that "window" constituted a vacancy for which Appellants should have been offered the opportunity for employment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the Committee to determine the appropriate relief.

Respondent Robert Bayly was issued a uniform traffic ticket for simple possession of marijuana. Prior to trial, Respondent paid the required fine and did not appear in court on the trial date. Respondent did not appeal his conviction but, instead, filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application in which he alleged the magistrate court was without subject matter jurisdiction to convict him as no arrest warrant had been issued. The PCR judge granted the petition and vacated Respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR judge's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the PCR judge erred in relying on "Town of Honea Path v. Wright," (9 S.E.2d 924 (1940)), and reversed the PCR judge's order because it was controlled by an error of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) conducted a sting operation on the Blue Moon Sports Bar, a private club operated by Petitioner Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc. After SLED's investigation, Respondent Department of Revenue concluded Blue Moon's guest policy violated Section 7-401.4(J) through (K) of the South Carolina Code of Regulations and revoked Blue Moon's liquor license. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reinstated Blue Moon's license, and the court of appeals reversed. To test Blue Moon's compliance with these regulations, SLED conducted an operation wherein and agent went undercover and attempted to gain access to Blue Moon as a guest. The agent's first attempt was rebuffed by Blue Moon's bouncer when the agent admitted he was not a member of the organization. However, the bouncer directed the agent's attention to a sign which contained a telephone number and told him that he would be allowed to enter if he called that number. The agent called the number as directed, which was the telephone number for Blue Moon, and Steve Malone who is both a member and employee of Blue Moon, answered the call. It is undisputed that the agent did not know Malone or have any prior relationship with him whatsoever. However, Denise Polifrone, who is Blue Moon's owner and license holder, had given Malone authority to admit people who called as his guests. Approximately two to three minutes after he spoke with Malone and gave Malone his name, the agent returned, showed the bouncer his civilian identification and said he had called the number on the sign. The bouncer then let the agent enter the bar after he paid a small cover charge. Once inside, the agent ordered an alcoholic beverage, paid for it, and consumed a small portion of it. He subsequently called the SLED agent in charge of the operation. That agent arrived and issued Polifrone a citation for permitting someone who was not a bona fide member or guest to consume alcohol on-premises. As a result, the Department revoked Blue Moon's liquor license. Finding that Blue Moon complied with the plain language of Regulation Regulation 7-401.4(K), the Supreme Court denied the Department's request to revoke Blue Moon's license.

Appellant Benjamin P. Green appealed his convictions for criminal solicitation of a minor and attempted criminal sexual conduct ("CSC") with a minor in the second-degree. In challenging his convictions, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of criminal solicitation of a minor on the ground the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; (2) denying his motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted CSC with a minor in the second-degree; (3) admitting certain photographs; and (4) denying his request for a jury charge on attempted assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature ("ABHAN"). Finding no merit to Appellant's issues on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.