Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to ten counts of grand theft. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty but mentally ill pleas prior to sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw her pleas of guilty but mentally ill; (2) Defendant's due process rights were not violated when she was denied the opportunity to review and comment on the entire presentence investigation report prior to sentencing; (3) Defendant's claim that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel was not ripe for review on direct appeal; and (4) Defendant's sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of malicious intimidation or harassment, first-degree burglary, disorderly conduct, and commission of a felony while armed with a firearm for an incident in which Defendant and Robert Anderson entered the home of Summer Neuman and caused a ruckus. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on his conviction of commission of a felony while armed with a firearm; but (2) the trial court committed a prejudicial error by precluding Defendant from introducing evidence regarding Anderson's suspicion that individuals residing in Neuman's house had stolen tires from Anderson and committed other thefts, as the court's ruling excluded relevant evidence of Defendant and Anderson's intent. View "State v. Jucht" on Justia Law

George J. Caruso was convicted of simple assault and sentenced to 360 days in the Meade County Jail. He sought bail pending appeal, but the motion was denied. Caruso appealed the denial of bond asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court discussed the statutory factors, made findings of fact regarding each factor, and provided reasons for denying the motion. In particular, the court found that as a resident of Massachusetts, Caruso was more of a flight risk following sentencing because he was convicted and sentenced to 360 days in jail. Thus, the court reasoned, Caruso was no longer holding out hope for a lighter sentence and would be less inclined to appear for sentencing. The trial court’s findings of fact were supported by the record and accordingly were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing bail pending the outcome of the appeal.

Defendant Eric Robert pled guilty to first-degree murder for the death of penitentiary guard Ronald Johnson, a 23-year veteran correctional officer at the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls. Defendant waived his right to a jury’s determination of whether the death sentence would be imposed. The circuit court conducted a pre-sentence hearing and imposed the death penalty. Subsequent to pleading guilty, Defendant consistently sought imposition of the death penalty and that the execution be expedited. Even though he waived his right to appeal the death sentence, the Supreme Court was statutorily mandated to conduct a review of the sentence. Upon review, the Court found that the circuit court did not base its sentencing decision on any passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The evidence supported the aggravating circumstances found by the circuit court, and the death sentence was neither disproportionate nor excessive when compared to other South Dakota cases in which a capital sentencing phase was conducted. The death sentence was affirmed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for entry of a warrant of execution.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Wayne and Sandra Masloskie sued real estate agent G. Pat Baldwin and Century 21 American Real Estate Inc. on a number of causes of action including actual fraud. Baldwin and Century 21 moved for summary judgment, arguing that all causes of action were barred by statutes of limitation governing realtor malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cause of action for fraud. Because that cause of action was subject to a longer statute of limitations, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded that portion of the judgment.

Defendant Courtney Koch was arrested for DUI on February 27, 2011. The magistrate judge entered an order suppressing all evidence obtained from the initial traffic stop. The State appealed to the circuit court. Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for intermediate appeal. The issue was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal from the magistrate's order suppressing the evidence. Because the magistrate's order did not finally dispose of the case, it was not a final order appealable to the circuit court.

A neighbor's complaint about marijuana directed Spearfish police officers to an apartment unit, where the officers smelled the odor of burnt marijuana outside the door. One tenant let the officers inside, but when the officers observed raw marijuana in plain view, another tenant demanded that the officers obtain a search warrant before they conducted any search. While the officers sought a warrant, they secured the apartment and detained all the tenants at the police station. On a motion to suppress, the circuit court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest two of the three tenants and search their apartment, but the detention at the station was unreasonable and violated their constitutional rights. The court suppressed all evidence. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for intermediate appeal to consider whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it suppressed defendants' statements and the evidence seized under the search warrant. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search was not at issue as it was "indisputably" based on a valid warrant. Further, none of the information police used to secure the warrant related in any way to the seizure of the apartment. Had the officers never seized the apartment, "but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from entering the apartment and destroying evidence, the contraband now challenged would have been discovered and seized precisely as it was here." The Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Kramer initiated a breach of contract action against Mike D. Murphy and the William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust (Trust). Tri-State Ethanol, LLC owned an ethanol plant in Rosholt, South Dakota. Kramer was one of the members and managers of Tri-State Ethanol. Kramer was also a member of White Rock Pipeline, LLC, which owned a pipeline that supplied natural gas to Tri-State Ethanol. In order to comply with various federal regulations, Tri-State Ethanol determined it was necessary to purchase the membership interests of Kramer, Murphy, Woods, and the Trust. To accomplish this, Tri-State Ethanol entered into a loan agreement (Loan Agreement) with Murphy and the Trust. Tri-State Ethanol was unable to meet its financial obligations and eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Murphy and the Trust reached a settlement agreement regarding payment of the Loan Agreement and the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy and the Trust, through its trustee, represented to the bankruptcy court that they would use the settlement proceeds to pay Kramer the amounts owed under the Disbursement Agreement. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement. After the settlement proceeds from Tri-State Ethanol’s bankruptcy estate were distributed, Murphy and the Trust refused to pay Kramer the full amount listed in the Disbursement Agreement. Kramer then filed a complaint against Murphy and the Trust for breach of the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. He claimed that the forum-selection clauses contained in the Loan Agreement, the Balloon Note, and the Promissory Note controlled for any suit brought on the Disbursement Agreement. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. It found that while the Disbursement Agreement itself had no forum-selection clause, the other three agreements contained forum-selection clauses providing that the Fourteenth Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois was the proper forum. The circuit court reasoned that the agreements must be considered as a whole. After examining each of documents collectively as one contract, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the parties intended the venue for any suit on the Disbursement Agreement to be the Fourteenth (14th) Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois. The circuit court’s dismissal of this case was affirmed.

Allison Marie and James (Jim) Joseph Marko married on September 26, 1998. Three children were born of the marriage. Allison was granted a divorce from Jim on grounds of extreme mental cruelty. Jim's visitation with his children was conditioned on his having absolutely no contact with his mistress "Emmy" when the children were in his presence. Allison received sole custody of the children. In this divorce appeal, Jim asserted that the trial judge (1) should have disqualified himself because the judge presided over another case in which Emmy had been "enmeshed"; (2) abused his discretion in restricting visitation; and (3) erred in granting the Allison Marie a divorce on grounds of extreme mental cruelty. Finding no merit to any of Jim's issues on appeal and that the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment.