Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Eric Robert was under a sentence of death entered by a circuit court judge and let the time to file an appeal expire. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in this case was statutorily obligated to review his sentence. The Court subsequently stayed Robert's execution and established a briefing schedule. Robert filed a motion to vacate those orders, arguing that the obligation to review his sentence did not grant the Court additional jurisdiction to stay his execution or to enter a briefing schedule. The Supreme Court denied the motion to vacate, holding that Robert's interpretation of S.D. Codified Laws 23A-27A-21, which included the argument that because Robert had not filed a notice of appeal the stay of proceedings contemplated by the statute was not available, was incorrect, as it would lead to an absurd result, flew in the face of the Court's authority, and was inconsistent with the constitutional analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court.

After a jury trial, Simon Torres was convicted of attempted murder and commission of a felony with a firearm. Torres appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres's motion in limine to exclude a cell phone video of the shooting and photographs of the victim's gunshot wounds, as Torres did not establish that the photographs were unfairly prejudicial or that the trial court incorrectly determined that the photographs' probative value outweighed this potential prejudice; and (2) did not violate Torres's due process rights during arraignment by failing to advise him that he would receive mandatory consecutive sentences if convicted of both attempted murder and commission of a felony with a firearm.

Without obtaining a search warrant, police attached a global positioning system (GPS) device to Elmer Zahn's vehicle. The GPS device enabled officers to track and record the speed, time, direction, and geographic location of Zahn's vehicle within five to ten feet for nearly a month. Police used the information they gathered to obtain a search warrant for two storage units that Zahn frequently visited. Officers subsequently recovered drug paraphernalia and drugs from one of the storage units. Before trial, the trial court denied Zahn's motion to suppress the evidence that the officers discovered during the execution of the search warrant. Zahn was subsequently convicted of several drug possession charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attachment and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual's activities over an extended period of time requires a search warrant; and (2) thus, the warrantless attachment and use of the GPS device to monitor Zahn's activities for nearly a month was unlawful, and the evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device should be suppressed.

After a jury trial, Jeremy Zephier was convicted of aggravated assault for attacking a man who entered the apartment in which Zephier was drinking alcohol with acquaintances. Zephier appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Zephier's proposed instruction regarding when it is lawful to use force in preventing a trespass and instead giving a pattern jury instruction, as Zephier's proposed instruction misstated the law; and (2) denying Zephier's motion for a new trial, as Zephier's trial counsel did not commit misconduct and Zephier did not prove all the necessary factors to warrant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Garry Rosen pleaded guilty to kidnapping. Rosen subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his plea was involuntary because the sentencing court (1) failed to advise him that he would waive his Boykin v. Alabama rights by pleading guilty, and (2) failed to determine whether Rosen understood he was waiving those rights. The heabeas court denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, as (1) Rosen was never advised that by pleading guilty he would waive his right to a trial by jury, he would waive his right to compulsory process, and he would waive his right against self-incrimination; and (2) Rosen was never asked whether he understood he would be waiving those rights. Remanded.

Petitioner Misty Jo Oliver asked the trial court to expunge her record of two misdemeanor convictions pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-26 through 23A-3-33 (collectively, the expungement statutes). The trial court granted her request. The State appealed on the grounds that under both the expungement statutes and the state Constitution the trial court was without jurisdiction to expunge records of Oliver's convictions. After analyzing the statutes and the legislative history, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the expungement statutes to apply to convictions, and therefore, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by expunging the records of Oliver's convictions.

Stacy Brant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. As part of his sentencing, the court ordered that Brant provide a full and honest debrief as to the incident. The state Board of Pardons and Paroles later determined that Brant had violated the terms of his sentence by failing to comply with the court order to honestly debrief the incident and issued an order that partially revoked his suspended sentence. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. Brant appealed, contending that he was not given a fair warning that a failure to honestly debrief would result in the loss of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brant received a prior fair warning that failing to give an honest debrief could result in a revocation of his suspended sentence; and (2) the circuit court and Board did not clearly err in finding that Brant had violated a condition of his suspended sentence.

John Willey was arrested for three DUIs: in 2008, May 2010 and August 8, 2010. Willey pleaded guilty to charges for his May 2010 arrest on August 30, 2010 and was convicted on September 27, 2010. For Willey's August 8, 2010 arrest, the State filed a Part II information that alleged Willey had two prior DUI convictions. Willey argued that the conviction on September 27, 2010 was invalid for enhancement purposes. The circuit court denied the motion. After a stipulated court trial, Wiley was convicted of DUI based on the August 8, 2010 arrest. The next day, a jury convicted him on the Part II information, finding that he had two prior DUI convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-5.2, (1) the Part II information in this case constituted an enhanced penalty, and (2) Willey could not receive an enhanced penalty for a third offense DUI because he had not been convicted or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to the second offense previous in time to committing the third subsequent offense. Remanded.

Under the terms of a plea agreement entered into with the State, Chris Jones agreed to plead guilty to three counts of second-degree rape and one count of kidnapping. After sentencing, Jones filed a motion to reconsider the sentence based upon an alleged violation of the plea agreement by the State. The trial court granted the motion and held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Jones's oral motion for a different sentencing judge. Jones appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jones did not contemporaneously object to the state's violation of the plea agreement, he forfeited his claim; (2) Jones did not demonstrate that the violation of the plea agreement resulted in plain error; and (3) given Jones's conduct and the fact that the sentence was well within the statutory maximums for his crimes, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.

Robert Dahl was convicted for third-offense DUI. Dahl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The arresting officer initiated the investigatory stop to determine whether Dahl violated the statute requiring a vehicle executing a right turn to be driven as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer did not make a mistake of law by concluding that Dahl's vehicle did not stay as close as practicable to the right-hand curb when making the turn; and (2) even if Dahl did not violate any traffic laws, his wide turn and crossing over the dividing line were sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.