Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Without obtaining a search warrant, police attached a global positioning system (GPS) device to Elmer Zahn's vehicle. The GPS device enabled officers to track and record the speed, time, direction, and geographic location of Zahn's vehicle within five to ten feet for nearly a month. Police used the information they gathered to obtain a search warrant for two storage units that Zahn frequently visited. Officers subsequently recovered drug paraphernalia and drugs from one of the storage units. Before trial, the trial court denied Zahn's motion to suppress the evidence that the officers discovered during the execution of the search warrant. Zahn was subsequently convicted of several drug possession charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attachment and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual's activities over an extended period of time requires a search warrant; and (2) thus, the warrantless attachment and use of the GPS device to monitor Zahn's activities for nearly a month was unlawful, and the evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device should be suppressed.

After a jury trial, Jeremy Zephier was convicted of aggravated assault for attacking a man who entered the apartment in which Zephier was drinking alcohol with acquaintances. Zephier appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Zephier's proposed instruction regarding when it is lawful to use force in preventing a trespass and instead giving a pattern jury instruction, as Zephier's proposed instruction misstated the law; and (2) denying Zephier's motion for a new trial, as Zephier's trial counsel did not commit misconduct and Zephier did not prove all the necessary factors to warrant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Garry Rosen pleaded guilty to kidnapping. Rosen subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his plea was involuntary because the sentencing court (1) failed to advise him that he would waive his Boykin v. Alabama rights by pleading guilty, and (2) failed to determine whether Rosen understood he was waiving those rights. The heabeas court denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, as (1) Rosen was never advised that by pleading guilty he would waive his right to a trial by jury, he would waive his right to compulsory process, and he would waive his right against self-incrimination; and (2) Rosen was never asked whether he understood he would be waiving those rights. Remanded.

Petitioner Misty Jo Oliver asked the trial court to expunge her record of two misdemeanor convictions pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-26 through 23A-3-33 (collectively, the expungement statutes). The trial court granted her request. The State appealed on the grounds that under both the expungement statutes and the state Constitution the trial court was without jurisdiction to expunge records of Oliver's convictions. After analyzing the statutes and the legislative history, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the expungement statutes to apply to convictions, and therefore, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by expunging the records of Oliver's convictions.

Stacy Brant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. As part of his sentencing, the court ordered that Brant provide a full and honest debrief as to the incident. The state Board of Pardons and Paroles later determined that Brant had violated the terms of his sentence by failing to comply with the court order to honestly debrief the incident and issued an order that partially revoked his suspended sentence. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. Brant appealed, contending that he was not given a fair warning that a failure to honestly debrief would result in the loss of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brant received a prior fair warning that failing to give an honest debrief could result in a revocation of his suspended sentence; and (2) the circuit court and Board did not clearly err in finding that Brant had violated a condition of his suspended sentence.

John Willey was arrested for three DUIs: in 2008, May 2010 and August 8, 2010. Willey pleaded guilty to charges for his May 2010 arrest on August 30, 2010 and was convicted on September 27, 2010. For Willey's August 8, 2010 arrest, the State filed a Part II information that alleged Willey had two prior DUI convictions. Willey argued that the conviction on September 27, 2010 was invalid for enhancement purposes. The circuit court denied the motion. After a stipulated court trial, Wiley was convicted of DUI based on the August 8, 2010 arrest. The next day, a jury convicted him on the Part II information, finding that he had two prior DUI convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-5.2, (1) the Part II information in this case constituted an enhanced penalty, and (2) Willey could not receive an enhanced penalty for a third offense DUI because he had not been convicted or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to the second offense previous in time to committing the third subsequent offense. Remanded.

Under the terms of a plea agreement entered into with the State, Chris Jones agreed to plead guilty to three counts of second-degree rape and one count of kidnapping. After sentencing, Jones filed a motion to reconsider the sentence based upon an alleged violation of the plea agreement by the State. The trial court granted the motion and held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Jones's oral motion for a different sentencing judge. Jones appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jones did not contemporaneously object to the state's violation of the plea agreement, he forfeited his claim; (2) Jones did not demonstrate that the violation of the plea agreement resulted in plain error; and (3) given Jones's conduct and the fact that the sentence was well within the statutory maximums for his crimes, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.

Robert Dahl was convicted for third-offense DUI. Dahl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The arresting officer initiated the investigatory stop to determine whether Dahl violated the statute requiring a vehicle executing a right turn to be driven as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer did not make a mistake of law by concluding that Dahl's vehicle did not stay as close as practicable to the right-hand curb when making the turn; and (2) even if Dahl did not violate any traffic laws, his wide turn and crossing over the dividing line were sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.

This dispute involved a struggle between two factions in a Hutterite colony. One faction purported to excommunicate members of the other, and eventually the other faction sought court dissolution of the corporation. Denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court (1) concluded the corporation was not functioning as a communal organization in accord with its articles and bylaws, and (2) ordered the appointment of a receiver to collect all the assets and divide the proceeds among the colony members. In determining which members were entitled to distributed assets, the court was obliged to determine which members were eligible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying religious controversies over church leadership so pervaded the dissolution of the religious corporation that the dissolution required an unconstitutional entanglement in a religious dispute and was beyond a secular court's jurisdiction. Remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.

Plaintiff ranchers sued the State because of ongoing damage to their property from incursions of prairie dogs from public lands. Relying on multiple statutes requiring the State to manage and control prairie dog populations, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, abatement, and damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered a trial on damages. When the case was reassigned, the State moved the new judge to reexamine the first judge's ruling. On reconsideration, the court vacated the first summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the second circuit court judge did not err in granting summary judgment for the State where the acts mandated by the statutes cited by Plaintiffs were discretionary and the State was protected from suit by sovereign immunity.