Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments.

Petitioner Dale Guthmiller was convicted of criminal pedophilia and sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner subsequently petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, among other things, that the trial judge made improper comments during the trial, violating Petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial. The habeas court granted Petitioner's writ on reconsideration, (1) concluding that the trial judge's comments created a structural error negating Petitioner's requirement to establish prejudice, and (2) retracting its earlier ruling that trial counsel's failure to object was not prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial judge's comments did not constitute a structural error, and (2) despite defense counsel's failure to object to the judge's improper remarks, Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the jury's verdict would reasonably likely have been different absent trial counsel's errors.

The underlying action in this case involved a dispute among a family-owned corporation's shareholders concerning the management and control of the business. The two factions asked circuit court judge John Delaney to determine the corporation's value. Before trial, Delaney entered an order that (1) imposed a gag order on the parties and (2) closed the trial and court records. Several media entities (the Media) petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, asserting that Delaney's gag order unlawfully interfered with Media's First Amendment and common law rights. The Supreme Court granted Media's request for a permanent writ of prohibition, holding (1) although the underlying trial was complete, Media's claims could be considered under an exception to the mootness doctrine because the issue presented was capable of repetition yet evading review; (2) the First Amendment affords the media and public a qualified right of access to civil trials in the state; (3) Delaney abused his discretion in closing the trial proceedings from the media and public because the procedure and reasoning he used was flawed; and (4) Delaney did not have statutory or legal authority to issue the gag order under the facts and circumstances of this case.

Plaintiffs, a group of children who attended public schools in several South Dakota school districts and their parents and natural guardians, asked for a declaratory ruling that the state's present system of funding education was unconstitutional because it did not provide all children with an adequate and quality education. At issue was (1) S.D. Const. art. 8, 1 & 15, which requires the Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools and provide funding to secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state and (2) whether the legislative scheme for funding education met the constitutional requirements. The circuit court issued a judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the resources, curriculum, and facilities currently provided to students were constitutionally sufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the current educational funding system failed to correlate with adequate student achievement to the point of declaring the system unconstitutional.

In 2007, Davison County adopted a county-wide plan to reassess agricultural structures. The County reassessed agricultural structures in four of its twelve townships that year. Donald and Gene Stehly, who owned agricultural structures in the four reassessed townships, initiated a declaratory judgment action, alleging that the plan to reassess four townships each year created an unconstitutional lack of uniform taxation within the county. The trial court concluded that the Stehlys' claim failed because they did not establish lack of uniformity within a single taxing district as required by the South Dakota Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) townships are taxing districts under the Constitution, and (2) a reassessment plan that creates a temporary lack of uniform taxation among townships within a county is constitutional.

Over a period of two years, the City of Sioux Falls issued Daniel Daily four citations for a concrete extension to his driveway. Daily appealed each of the citations, but a hearing was held only on the final two citations received. Daily then initiated a declaratory judgment action against the City. The trial court ultimately concluded that the City's administrative appeals process, both as written and as applied, and the City's enforcement of its zoning ordinances violated Daily's constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the hearing examiner in this case did not hold the City to its burden of proof, the City's administrative appeals process deprived Daily of a protected property interest without due process of law; and (2) the hearing examiner's application of the rules of evidence deprived Daily of a fair hearing.

Defendant William Jensen was charged with fourth offense driving under the influence. He filed a motion to strike one of his three prior driving under the influence convictions, arguing that because the magistrate court relied on a statement of rights form to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea during that prior hearing, that prior conviction was invalid for sentence enhancement purposes. The trial court denied Jensen's motion to strike, concluding that the statement of rights form was an adequate record of voluntariness. Jensen appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jensen did not demonstrate prejudice, his challenge to his prior driving under the influence conviction was not proper for the Court's consideration; and (2) Jensen did not demonstrate that the magistrate court's failure to personally canvass him to establish the voluntariness of his plea violated his due process rights.

Defendant Ivan Good Plume was found guilty of aggravated assault and of being a habitual offender and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. On appeal, defendant asserted (1) that the sentencing judge, in referring to a pattern of drunken violence by Good Plume as "going native," evinced his personal bias against defendant and used race as a sentencing factor, thus violating defendant's federal and state due process rights; and (2) the judge abused his discretion in admitting into evidence a letter defendant wrote without considering the requirements of S.D. R. Evid. 404(b) before admitting it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendant did not meet his burden of making a specific and substantial showing that a racial or personal bias was used as an aggravating factor in his sentence, and (2) the letter was admitted not to prove defendant engaged in other wrongs, crimes, or acts but as res gestae evidence necessary to prove intent.

The South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) obtained title to land once owned by Defendants Philip Clark, P&J Enterprises, LLC and Hansen Manufacturing Corporation by eminent domain. The jury determined the amount of compensation to award for the taking. The trial court subsequently awarded prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees to Defendants. The DOT challenged the award of attorneyâs fees. The Supreme Court found that the plain language of the applicable state law allows for an award of prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees in connection with eminent domain takings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.

Petitioner James Lawrence appealed the circuit courtâs denial of his petition for habeas corpus, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and sentence for âtheft by deception.â In 1996, Petitioner approached the victim four times over the course of several months, offering to perform home repairs that he said would be reimbursed under a federal government program. By the end, Petitioner had received over $5,000 for his âwork.â Petitioner furnished invoices he claimed would be reimbursed and an âofficialâ called the victim to arrange to inspect the work Petitioner had done. When the inspector never showed, the victim called the local branch of the government agency to follow up, and learned that the alleged reimbursement had ended several years earlier. In 2003, a jury found Petitioner guilty of theft by deception and sentenced him to twenty-five yearsâ imprisonment at the state penitentiary. The appellate court affirmed his conviction. In 2006, Petitioner sought the writ of habeas corpus, alleging among other things, that his constitutional rights had been violated because he was convicted on insufficient evidence. The circuit court denied his motion, and Petitioner brought his appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded that there was ample evidence from which the jury could draw its conclusion. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to dismiss Petitionerâs appeals.