Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Subject to the trial court’s discretion to permit late filing, a defendant must move to strike a cause of action under Cal. Code Civ. P. 425.16 - California’s anti-SLAPP statute - within sixty days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action.Within sixty days of the filing of a third amended complaint but not within sixty days of any earlier complaint, Defendants moved to strike that complaint under section 425.16. Specifically, Defendants sought to strike Plaintiffs’ claim alleged in the first and subsequent complaints that Defendants fraudulently settled an unlawful detainer action. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. The court of appeal affirmed, ruling that a defendant must file an anti-SLAPP motion within sixty days of service of the first complaint that pleads a cause of action coming within section 425.16(b)(1) unless the trial court in its discretion permits the motion to be filed at a later time. The court also concluded that Defendants’ motion was timely as to the new causes of action pleaded for the first time in the third amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeal property interpreted section 425.16(f). View "Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to murder Dean Noyes for lack of territorial jurisdiction and affirmed in all other respects the judgment convicting Defendant of first degree murder and conspiracy to murder his wife, Carole Garton, and her fetus. The Supreme Court held (1) any error in the trial court’s ruling prohibiting Defendant from wearing his wedding ring during trial was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution’s investigating officers to bypass metal detectors while entering the courthouse; (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of hearsay statements by the county coroner concerning the state of Carole’s body and her cause of death; (4) the trial court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction over the charge that Defendant conspired to murder Dean in Oregon; (5) any error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury was harmless; (6) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for entry of judgment of acquittal; and (7) there was no cumulative error requiring reversal of Defendant’s convictions. View "People v. Garton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder, residential robbery, residential burglary, and vehicle theft and Defendant’s sentence of death for the murder, holding that any potential error was harmless and that none of the potential errors were cumulatively prejudicial.On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant failed to establish that any conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance; (2) any error resulting from Defendant’s absence from two discussions about counsel’s supposed conflict of interest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) any challenged comments made by the judge did not disqualify the judge from presiding over the trial; (4) the trial judge’s choice to limit counsel’s time to question jurors during voir dire was not an abuse of discretion; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to remove a seated juror during the guilt phase proceedings; (6) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct; (7) any error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (8) any error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury was harmless; and (8) Defendant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of proportionate sentencing. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder, residential robbery, residential burglary, and vehicle theft and Defendant’s sentence of death for the murder, holding that any potential error was harmless and that none of the potential errors were cumulatively prejudicial.On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant failed to establish that any conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance; (2) any error resulting from Defendant’s absence from two discussions about counsel’s supposed conflict of interest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) any challenged comments made by the judge did not disqualify the judge from presiding over the trial; (4) the trial judge’s choice to limit counsel’s time to question jurors during voir dire was not an abuse of discretion; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to remove a seated juror during the guilt phase proceedings; (6) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct; (7) any error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (8) any error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury was harmless; and (8) Defendant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of proportionate sentencing. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

The sentences imposed on Defendants, two juvenile nohomicide offenders, violated the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (2012) and Graham v. Florida, 460 U.S. 48 (2010).Defendants, Leonel Contreras and William Rodriguez, were convicted in a joint trial of kidnapping and sexual offenses that they committed when they were sixteen years old. Contreras was sentenced to a term of fifty-eight years to life, and Rodriguez was sentenced to a term of fifty years to life. The Court of Appeal affirmed Defendants’ convictions but reversed their sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that Defendants’ sentences fell short of giving them a realistic chance for release, as contemplated by Graham. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants’ sentences violated the Eighth Amendment under the standards articulated in Graham. The court directed the sentencing court, upon resentencing, any mitigating circumstances of Defendants’ lives and crimes and the impact of any new legislation and regulations on appropriate sentencing. View "People v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Chatman, convicted of robbery in 2001, was sentenced to five years of felony probation plus 180 days in jail. Two years later, Chatman was convicted of misdemeanor reckless driving with alcohol. In 2006-2007 both convictions were dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. In 2008, Chatman was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence and was sentenced to three years of probation plus 10 days of imprisonment. In 2014, Chatman was offered a job that required a community care license from the Department of Social Services. Although Chatman’s robbery conviction bars him from obtaining that license, the Department may grant an exemption if a prospective employee has a Section 4852.01 certificate of rehabilitation (Health & Saf. Code 1522(g)(1)(A)(ii)). Once former probationers have their convictions dismissed under section 1203.4, section 4852.01 renders them ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation if they are subsequently incarcerated. Former prisoners –– whether subsequently incarcerated or not –– face no such restriction. Chatman claimed that the unequal treatment was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of California rejected that argument. Section 4852.01’s eligibility criteria survive rational basis review. Former probationers, as opposed to former prisoners, can seek some relief from the effects of their convictions through section 1203.4, and so have less relative need for certificate of rehabilitation relief. Instead of choosing an arbitrary means of limiting access to certificates, legislators used subsequent incarceration as a means of determining which former probationers show the most promise for rehabilitation. View "People v. Chatman" on Justia Law

The trial court violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when it found a disputed fact about the conduct underlying Defendant’s assault conviction that had not been established by virtue of the conviction itself.Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery and transportation of a controlled substances, among other offenses. The prosecution sought an increased sentence from the maximum term of imprisonment on the ground that Defendant had previously been convicted of a “serious felony” under Cal. Penal Code 667(a) that was also a strike for purposes of the Three Strikes law. That conviction was for assault with a deadly weapon or with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court determined that Defendant did commit the assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced her to a term of eleven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that her increased sentence rested upon an exercise in judicial fact-finding that violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court disapproved of People v. McGee, 38 Cal.4th 682 (Cal. 2006) insofar as it suggested that the trial court’s factfinding was constitutionally permissible and held that Defendant’s increased sentence rested on an exercise in judicial fact-finding that violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant’s automatic motion to modify the jury’s verdict of death and imposing a judgment of death in this case in which Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree murder under the special circumstances of multiple murder and murder in the course of a robbery.In affirming, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance; (2) the trial court did not prejudicially err in denying Defendant’s motion to change venue; (3) no prejudicial error occurred during jury selection; (4) Defendant’s challenges to the admission of certain testimony were unavailing; (5) reliance on evidence in aggravation of two crimes of violence Defendant committed when he was seventeen years old and of his conviction for one of those crimes did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Eighth Amendment; (6) there was no error in excluding evidence of the impact of Defendant’s execution on his family; and (7) none of Defendant’s remaining arguments warranted relief from the judgment. View "People v. Rices" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder and sentencing him to death. The court held (1) Defendant was not deprived of the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; (2) the trial court did not err in ruling that evidence of an uncharged murder would be admissible to impeach Defendant’s witness under certain circumstances; (3) the trial court did not err in ruling that the prosecution could admit evidence that Defendant had attempted to escape from jail; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting the victim’s statement that Defendant was into “heavy stuff” or in admitting victim impact evidence; (4) there was no prejudicial error in the jury instruction; (5) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s requests for a separate penalty phase jury and sequestered voir dire; (6) Defendant was not prejudiced by any improper argument by the prosecutor; (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the victims or evidence that Defendant will kill a guard to escape; and (8) Defendant’s sentence was constitutional. View "People v. Henriquez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the court of appeal in this case concerning the application of constitutional limitations to a statutorily authorized ground water charge imposed on well operators by a local water conservation district to fund certain conservation activities. The City of San Buenaventura argued (1) the charges violate article XIII D of the California Constitution; and (2) alternatively, the charges violate article XIII C of the California Constitution, as amended by Proposition 26. The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeal properly concluded that article XIII C, as amended by Proposition 26, rather than article XIII D, supplies the proper framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the groundwater pumping charges at issue in this case; but (2) because the court of appeal did not address the City’s argument that the charges do not bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens or on benefits from the United Water Conservation District’s conservation activities, as required by article XIII C, this case must be remanded for consideration of that question. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation District" on Justia Law