Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Association of Club Executives (GACE), representing adult entertainment clubs, challenged the constitutionality of a 1% tax on gross revenue imposed on adult entertainment establishments that offer nude dancing and serve alcohol. The tax was intended to fund the Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Children Fund, aimed at helping child victims of sexual exploitation. GACE argued that the tax was a content-based regulation of speech, failing both strict and intermediate scrutiny, and that the definition of "adult entertainment establishments" was overbroad.The trial court upheld the tax, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding that the tax was content-neutral, aimed at addressing the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, such as prostitution and child exploitation. The court concluded that the tax furthered an important governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest without unnecessarily burdening protected expression. GACE appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the tax was content-neutral and satisfied intermediate scrutiny. It found that the tax was aimed at addressing the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments, rather than suppressing the content of the expression. The court also concluded that the tax was narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in combating child exploitation and that the burden on speech was minimal. Additionally, the court rejected GACE's overbreadth challenge, finding that the definition of "adult entertainment establishments" was not substantially overbroad relative to the statute's legitimate sweep. View "Georgia Association of Club Executives, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The appellants, including Congresswoman Nikema Williams, were arrested and charged under OCGA § 16-11-34.1 for allegedly disrupting official business of the Georgia General Assembly. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the statute is overbroad and vague, violating free speech protections under the Georgia Constitution. The appellants limited their challenges to subsections (a), (f), and (g) of the statute, which criminalize acts likely to disrupt legislative sessions or meetings, entering certain areas with intent to disrupt, and parading or demonstrating with intent to disrupt.The trial court dismissed the appellants' facial challenges and one appellant's as-applied challenge, and denied their motion for a permanent injunction. The court found the statute not facially overbroad or vague and ruled that the allegations did not support the as-applied challenge.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is not facially overbroad or vague. It distinguished this case from State v. Fielden, noting that the statute in question is more narrowly tailored to legislative contexts and does not substantially infringe on protected speech. The court also found that the statute provides sufficient clarity to avoid arbitrary enforcement.Regarding the as-applied challenge by State Representative Park Cannon, the court concluded that her conduct, as alleged, did not fall under the prohibited acts of the statute. Therefore, her as-applied challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the facial and as-applied challenges and the denial of the motion for a permanent injunction. View "Williams v. Powell" on Justia Law

David Dajuanta Wallace was convicted of felony murder and a firearm offense related to the shooting death of Darius Bottoms. Wallace argued that the evidence was insufficient, that his due process rights were violated by being required to wear a leg iron and prison clothing during the trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Wallace and two co-defendants for various crimes, including felony murder and gang activity. Wallace pled guilty to some charges and went to trial on others. The jury found him guilty of felony murder and a firearm offense. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. Wallace's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Wallace's convictions. The court held that the testimony of an accomplice was corroborated by other evidence, satisfying Georgia statutory law. Constitutionally, the evidence allowed the jury to find Wallace guilty as a party to the crimes rather than merely an accessory after the fact. The court also determined that any error related to Wallace wearing a leg iron was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the jury could not see the leg iron, Wallace used it strategically, and the strong evidence of his guilt.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that Wallace failed to show either deficiency or prejudice. The court affirmed Wallace's convictions and the trial court's rulings. View "WALLACE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Derek Burns was convicted of aggravated assault and other crimes following a jury trial in 2019. During his detention, Burns made three recorded phone calls to his attorney, Daniel Daugherty, on the jail’s phone line. Each call began with a recorded message stating that the call was being recorded. Despite Daugherty’s requests to stop the recording, the calls continued. The conversations primarily involved procedural matters about obtaining a bond and personal topics. At trial, Detective Lisa Wells testified that she had listened to these calls, leading Burns to move for a mistrial, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, finding no harm to Burns as the calls did not contain privileged information. Burns filed a motion for a new trial, which was also denied. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for further consideration of the Sixth Amendment issue. On remand, the trial court again denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that the calls were not protected by attorney-client privilege and did not contain any prejudicial information.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the jail calls were not protected by attorney-client privilege because they did not involve the giving or receiving of legal advice. The court concluded that the procedural and personal nature of the calls did not warrant privilege protection. Consequently, there was no violation of Burns’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "BURNS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In 2018, Merrick Redding was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of Joseph Davis. The incident occurred during a barbecue where Redding, uninvited, approached Davis and struck him in the head, causing fatal injuries. Redding claimed self-defense, stating Davis provoked him, but witnesses testified that Davis did not physically provoke Redding before the fatal blow.Redding's case has been reviewed multiple times by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Initially, the trial court denied Redding's motion to dismiss based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court's judgment three times, each time remanding the case for proper factual findings and legal analysis regarding the speedy-trial claim. The trial court repeatedly denied the motion, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the trial court's denial of Redding's speedy-trial motion and found no abuse of discretion. The court applied the Barker-Doggett framework, considering the length of delay, reasons for delay, Redding's assertion of his right, and prejudice to Redding. The court concluded that the trial court correctly weighed these factors and did not err in its decision.Additionally, Redding challenged the trial court's admission of prior convictions for impeachment under Rule 609 and other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not err in admitting the 2015 and 2009 convictions but assumed any error in admitting the 2007 conviction was harmless. The court also found that any error in admitting the other-acts evidence was harmless given the strong evidence against Redding. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "REDDING v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves Jesus Olvera Gonzalez, who was convicted of malice murder for the stabbing death of Jesus Arizaga. The incident occurred on September 8, 2019, when a 911 call reported a stabbing at a residence. Gonzalez and Arizaga had been drinking and arguing, leading to Gonzalez stabbing Arizaga. When officers arrived, they found Gonzalez with blood on his hands and shirt. He was handcuffed and asked about the location of the knife, which he indicated was inside the house. Arizaga was found with multiple stab wounds and later died. Gonzalez was arrested, and evidence, including photographs and DNA swabs, was collected.A Forsyth County grand jury indicted Gonzalez on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. In May 2022, a jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Gonzalez filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in March 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Gonzalez argued that his statement to police about the knife should have been suppressed because it was made before he received Miranda warnings. The court held that the public safety exception to Miranda applied, as the officer's question was necessary to secure the scene and ensure safety. Gonzalez also challenged the admission of photographs and DNA evidence, claiming they were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and his right against self-incrimination. The court found no error, ruling that the evidence was lawfully obtained as part of a search incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate his rights.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decisions, upholding Gonzalez's conviction and sentence. View "GONZALEZ v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves family members of drug abusers suing wholesale distributors of prescription medications. The plaintiffs alleged that the distributors violated state and federal laws by failing to report suspicious orders of controlled substances, which led to the drug abusers' addictions and subsequent harm to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Georgia Drug Dealer Liability Act (DDLA) and other legal theories.The case was initially tried in a lower court, where a jury returned a verdict in favor of the distributors. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, arguing that a juror was dishonest during the selection process and introduced extraneous prejudicial information during deliberations. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial and in refusing to instruct the jury on willful blindness. The distributors cross-appealed, arguing that if the judgment was vacated, the DDLA should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The court held that the trial court was authorized to credit the juror's testimony over the plaintiffs' evidence and that the jury was properly instructed on the relevant legal issues. The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "CARDINAL HEALTH INC. v. POPPELL" on Justia Law

A Georgia State Patrol trooper observed Christopher James Newsom making an illegal left turn into the right lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. Following the traffic stop, the trooper determined that Newsom was driving under the influence of alcohol. The State charged Newsom with DUI less safe, DUI per se, and improper turn at an intersection. Newsom filed a motion to suppress, arguing that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making the traffic stop unlawful.The trial court agreed with Newsom, ruling that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague when read in conjunction with OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). The court found that the statutes provided conflicting directions to drivers, making it unclear whether Newsom had to complete his turn in the left lane. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the charges against Newsom, concluding that the traffic stop lacked probable cause.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom. The statute provides clear notice that a driver making a left turn must complete the turn in the far-left lane. The court found that the trial court erred in interpreting Georgia Highway 61 as a single roadway, which led to the incorrect application of OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the statute's language was clear and did not conflict with other statutory provisions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice and hospital negligence claim filed by Jami Lynn Golden against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center in July 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Despite a computer-generated sepsis alert, Golden was discharged with instructions to follow up in two to three days. Her condition worsened, and she was later admitted to Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit in septic shock. As a result, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.Floyd Healthcare Management moved to dismiss Golden's claim, arguing that the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose had expired. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the repose statute was tolled by the "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the repose statute was not tolled by the emergency order.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the emergency order did indeed toll the repose statute, and that there was no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled. The court concluded that Golden's claims were not time-barred, and that the application of the emergency order to toll the repose statute did not violate Floyd Healthcare Management's due process rights. View "GOLDEN v. FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC." on Justia Law