Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a medical malpractice and hospital negligence claim filed by Jami Lynn Golden against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center in July 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Despite a computer-generated sepsis alert, Golden was discharged with instructions to follow up in two to three days. Her condition worsened, and she was later admitted to Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit in septic shock. As a result, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.Floyd Healthcare Management moved to dismiss Golden's claim, arguing that the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose had expired. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the repose statute was tolled by the "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the repose statute was not tolled by the emergency order.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the emergency order did indeed toll the repose statute, and that there was no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled. The court concluded that Golden's claims were not time-barred, and that the application of the emergency order to toll the repose statute did not violate Floyd Healthcare Management's due process rights. View "GOLDEN v. FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC." on Justia Law

In October 2022, Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Gwinnett County, challenging a 2015 county ordinance regulating "Adult Establishments." Starship, which owns two stores in Gwinnett County, had previously filed a similar lawsuit in 2017, which it voluntarily dismissed. The county, however, maintained its counterclaim, and the trial court granted the county a permanent injunction restraining Starship from "regularly making more than 100 sexual devices available for sale" at each of its locations. Starship appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction against Starship.In the second lawsuit, Starship invoked a constitutional amendment that waives sovereign immunity for certain lawsuits, including lawsuits against a county for declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed Starship’s lawsuit, holding that it was barred by sovereign immunity and by res judicata. Starship appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the novel constitutional question involved.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that although the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity applied to Starship’s lawsuit, the suit was barred by res judicata. The court found that Starship's lawsuit sought relief from the county's prospective acts of enforcement, which will occur after January 1, 2021, and therefore the county’s sovereign immunity was waived under the constitutional amendment. However, the court also found that the lawsuit was barred by res judicata because the constitutional matters Starship now sought to raise could have been raised in the previous lawsuit. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuit. View "STARSHIP ENTERPRISES OF ATLANTA, INC. v. GWINNETT COUNTY" on Justia Law

The case involves Nicholas Bernard Head, who was convicted for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Quintavia Wade. Head argued that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated when the State read into evidence prior testimony given about the murder weapon by Emily Bagwell, the State’s firearms expert. He also claimed that the trial court committed plain error in allowing another firearms examiner, Kyle Wheelus, to testify as a “verifier” of Bagwell’s analysis about the bullet recovered in Wade’s autopsy.Head was initially indicted for malice murder and other crimes in connection with Wade’s death in 2018. That indictment was nolle prossed. In 2021, a Clarke County grand jury indicted Head for the same crimes. The jury acquitted Head of the counts involving Williams and found him guilty on all remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Head to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder and consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling fifteen years for two of the weapons charges. Head filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court concluded that even if there was error with regard to the admission of Bagwell’s prior testimony about the murder weapon, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence against Head, including the testimony of two police officers who witnessed the shooting. The court also found no plain error in allowing Wheelus’s testimony as it was based on his own ballistics analysis. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "HEAD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Shanadore Harmon and Jermaz Lawson had an argument that escalated into a physical fight. During the altercation, Harmon fired a gun into the car Lawson was driving, killing Brittany Trantham, a passenger in the vehicle. Harmon was subsequently charged with malice murder of Trantham, aggravated assault of Lawson, and three firearms offenses. A Richmond County grand jury returned an indictment on all counts, and Harmon was found guilty by a jury trial.Harmon's conviction and sentencing were upheld by the trial court, despite multiple amendments to his motion for a new trial. Harmon appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of Trantham’s murder or the related firearms offenses, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict on the aggravated assault and firearm offense related to Lawson, and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not raise a hearsay objection to the admission of Lawson’s recorded statement to police.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Harmon's convictions and sentence. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support each of Harmon’s convictions related to the murder of Trantham and the denial of his motion for directed verdict on the counts related to the assault of Lawson. The court also concluded that Harmon failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the admission of Lawson’s statement to police. The court noted that even without Lawson’s statement, the evidence against Harmon was still very strong, including testimony from two witnesses who saw Harmon stand behind Trantham’s car and then heard gunshots, as well as evidence that Harmon was found soon after the shooting with the gun that fired both the fatal bullet and all the bullets collected from the crime scene. View "HARMON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves three defendants, Saturnino Andre Lopez-Cardona, Wilmer Mendez, and Gerson Suruy, who were charged with crimes related to the stabbing death of Lucas Andres Cruz-Guzman. Each defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress statements they made during separate interviews with the same police officer. The trial court granted their motions, concluding that the defendants did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive their rights under Miranda v. Arizona before they made the statements. The State appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court's conclusion regarding Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements was incorrect and should be reversed. However, the State conceded that the trial court properly suppressed Suruy’s statement.The trial court had found that the defendants did not audibly answer when asked if they understood their rights, and that neither defendant was asked if they waived their rights or wanted to talk to the police. The court also noted that there was evidence of potential mistakes in the translation of the Miranda rights, but did not make specific findings on this point.The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court's orders suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements and remanded the case back to the trial court for further, specific findings. The court held that the trial court's findings were not sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful review of its rulings suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements. However, the court affirmed the trial court's order suppressing Suruy’s statement, deferring to the State’s discretion not to challenge that order. View "THE STATE v. LOPEZ-CARDONA" on Justia Law

Rachel Hostetler was convicted of a misdemeanor count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and sentenced to 12 months in prison with 48 hours to serve. During her probation, she was involved in a single-vehicle collision and was charged with another count of DUI. She was convicted and sentenced to 12 months in prison with 48 hours to serve, but her sentence was suspended pending her appeal. Her motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hostetler then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that her former counsel was constitutionally ineffective. However, before the habeas court ruled on her petition, she completed her sentence and the habeas court dismissed her petition as moot.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Hostetler’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the dismissal of her petition. The court was tasked with determining whether she continues to suffer from adverse collateral consequences of her challenged conviction, notwithstanding the completion of her sentence. The court concluded that Hostetler’s petition is not moot, as she could potentially receive an enhanced recidivist sentence for a subsequent DUI conviction, which constitutes an adverse collateral consequence of her conviction and a restraint on her liberty. The court vacated the order of the habeas court and remanded for further proceedings. View "HOSTETLER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Ricardo Sturkey was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Albert White. The crimes occurred in February 2009, and Sturkey was indicted by a Macon County grand jury in July 2010. In December 2010, a jury found Sturkey guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive terms for other crimes. Sturkey filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in January 2022.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case in 2024. Sturkey raised two claims of trial court error and argued that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The first claim was that the trial judge expressed an opinion on Sturkey's guilt during the questioning of a witness, violating Georgia law. The court found no error, as the judge's questions focused on the witness's methodology and did not express an opinion on the credibility of the witness or the facts of the case.Sturkey's second claim was that the trial court erred in its statements about the potential admissibility of polygraph evidence. The court found no error, as the trial court had not made a definitive ruling on the admissibility of the polygraph evidence, and the evidence was not admitted at trial.Finally, Sturkey argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for discontinuing cross-examination of a principal investigator and for failing to present the testimony of a witness who could provide evidence of additional suspects. The court found no merit in these claims, as Sturkey failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced as a result. The court affirmed Sturkey's conviction. View "STURKEY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves Darious Jones, who was convicted for felony murder in 2016, related to the beating death of Faith Parke. Jones arranged to meet Parke at the location where she was found dead. His DNA and fingerprints were found at the crime scene, including on a doorstop bar near Parke's body. Parke had injuries matching the pattern on the end of the doorstop bar. Jones challenged his conviction, arguing that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient, that the trial court erred by allowing him to decide whether to testify without further inquiry due to his mental condition, and that the trial court erred in refusing to give voluntary manslaughter-related instructions that he requested.Jones was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault by a DeKalb County grand jury in 2015. In 2016, the jury found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder. Jones filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in 2023. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to uphold Jones' conviction. The court also ruled that Georgia law does not require a trial court to advise a defendant concerning his right to testify or to make the type of inquiry that Jones asserts the trial court should have made. The court further held that the trial court properly refused to give Jones' requested instructions regarding voluntary manslaughter because no evidence supported them. Lastly, the court dismissed Jones' argument that the trial court erred in sentencing him to life without parole. View "JONES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Tyler Jarel Thomas was indicted for the murder of Ashley Brown in February 2014. Prior to his indictment, law enforcement obtained Thomas's phone records, including cell site location information (CSLI), through a court order. At the time, no appellate precedent in Georgia required a warrant for such records. However, Thomas moved to suppress the CSLI, arguing it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted his motion, relying partly on an Eleventh Circuit decision that later reversed its stance on the necessity of a warrant for CSLI.The State asked the trial court to reconsider its suppression order in light of the Eleventh Circuit's reconsideration. Thomas argued that the end-of-term rule prohibited the trial court's reconsideration. The trial court agreed with Thomas, stating that the end-of-term rule divested it of the authority to reconsider its own prior interlocutory ruling. Thomas was found guilty of malice murder and related crimes, but a new trial was granted due to a Brady violation by the State.Upon remand to the trial court, the State again moved for reconsideration of the CSLI suppression order. This time, the trial court agreed with the State, vacated the earlier suppression order, and held that the CSLI could be tendered at trial. Thomas appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that when a new trial has been granted, trial courts are not prohibited from reconsidering their previous orders. Therefore, because the final judgment in this case was vacated by the grant of a new trial, the trial court could reconsider rulings from earlier terms. View "THOMAS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

David and Catherine Floam, residents of Cobb County, Georgia, sought a declaratory judgment against the Cobb County Commission, arguing that the Commission had unconstitutionally altered district boundaries that had been established by the General Assembly in 2022. The Floams argued that the Commission's amendment, which changed their voting district, exceeded the County's Home Rule powers under the Georgia Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the Floams, finding that the Commission's amendment did indeed exceed its Home Rule powers.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court found that while the Floams had constitutional standing to challenge the Commission's amendment, they did not demonstrate any uncertainty regarding their future conduct that warranted declaratory relief. The court concluded that the Floams' claim was an attempt to enforce accrued rights and guide the future conduct of the defendants, which is insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, without reaching the merits of the constitutional arguments. View "COBB COUNTY v. FLOAM" on Justia Law