Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Georgia
by
Appellants Xzavaien Jones and Terrell McFarland were tried jointly and convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Anthony Meredith. Both men appealed, raising numerous alleged trial court errors, including the removal of a dissenting juror during deliberations. Although the record may well have supported findings authorizing the trial court to remove the juror, the Georgia Supreme Court determined the findings that the trial court actually made (and to which the Court’s review was limited) were not sufficient to justify removal. Because the trial court abused its discretion in removing the juror, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Erin McAlister appealed trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to Georgia's equitable caregiver statute. McAlister contended the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver. McAlister also contended the trial court erred in denying her counterclaim for breach of a settlement agreement that the parties signed when they separated. Because Catherine turned 18 years old prior to the docketing of this appeal, McAlister's challenge to the award of visitation rights was moot. Those portions of the trial court's orders addressing the constitutionality of the equitable caregiver statute and the award of visitation, were vacated, and the trial court directed to dismiss Clifton's claim for visitation. However, because the record supported the trial court’s finding that McAlister failed to carry her burden of proving any damages from Clifton’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the court did not err in denying McAlister’s counterclaim. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the court’s judgment. View "McAlister v. Clifton" on Justia Law

by
Quantavious Harris appealed his convictions for felony murder and other charges stemming from the 2009 shooting death of Stephen Anim. The trial court previously granted Harris’ motion for new trial on the ground that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress certain text messages, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. Following remand for consideration of other issues raised in Harris’s motion for new trial, Harris raised additional, new grounds for his motion. The trial court addressed all of the issues presented and denied the motion. Harris appealed, raising a host of alleged errors by the court at trial. The Supreme Court determined none of these claims were properly within the scope of what the trial court was authorized to consider on remand, and thus the trial court should not have considered them. Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of counsel claims were waived. Additionally, Harris’s newly discovered evidence claim was not properly raised before the trial court and thus left the Supreme Court with nothing to review. But Harris’s claims of error by the trial court at trial were not required to have been raised in the motion for new trial in order for the Supreme Court to consider. Addressing those claims, the Court concluded: (1) the claim about the State’s closing argument was not preserved due to Harris’s failure to object at trial; (2) the trial court did not plainly err in instructing jurors about the use of their notes; (3) any abuse of discretion in admitting the text messages was harmless; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the similar-transaction evidence. View "Harris v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Marquayvian Gude was convicted by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Devontavious McClain. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Gude appealed, contending the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an “in-life” photograph of McClain during the testimony of McClain’s mother and denying his motion for mistrial regarding the same, permitting the State to elicit hearsay testimony from McClain’s sister, and overruling his objection to an officer’s testimony and giving an insufficient curative instruction. Gude also argued the trial court erred when it ruled he had not timely moved for immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2 or established his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gude v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Andre Jackson was convicted by jury of the 2010 armed robbery of Joseph Williams. A different jury found Jackson guilty of felony murder predicated on the armed robbery of L. V. Wilson and of the murder of Jquanda Johnson by stabbing her with a knife. On appeal, Jackson contended that, in the Williams robbery trial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine to exclude an out-of-court statement made by Johnson in the days between the robbery and her death. In addition, Jackson contended that in the murder trial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the offenses charged for the Wilson murder from the offenses charged for the Johnson murder. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether a child charged with delinquency based on an alleged violation of Georgia’s Criminal Code could assert an affirmative defense of insanity or delusional compulsion, under OCGA §sections 16-3-2 or 16-3-3, in a juvenile-court proceeding. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the Juvenile Code did not expressly state whether affirmative defenses provided for in the Criminal Code were available in juvenile court. Based on the Juvenile Code’s text and structure, however, the Court concluded that insanity and delusional-compulsion defenses were available in most delinquency proceedings, specifically holding that in a delinquency proceeding, a child could assert an insanity or delusional-compulsion defense under OCGA sections 16-3-2 or 16-3-3 when the child’s delinquency charge is based on an allegation that the child committed “[a]n act . . . designated a crime by the laws of this state.” Because the juvenile court erred in concluding that a child could never raise an insanity or delusional-compulsion defense in a delinquency proceeding, the Supreme Court vacated the court’s order denying the motion of T.B. which sought a forensic psychological evaluation for purposes of raising a defense under OCGA 16-3-2 or 16-3-3. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of T.B." on Justia Law

by
Orlando Jordan appealed his conviction for malice murder arising out of the 2014 shooting death of Antoniyo Wiggins. On appeal, Jordan claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jordan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Bobby Wynn appealed his conviction for malice murder in connection with the 2014 death of Demontae Ware. As grounds for reversal, Wynn: (1) challenged the admission of allegedly improper impeachment evidence; (2) challenged the exclusion of mental-health testimony; (3) argued the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on a lesser-included offense; (4) challenged the admission of allegedly improper legal testimony; (5) challenged an allegedly improper self-defense charge; and (6) argued cumulative error. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wynn v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner Jerry Thomas was convicted in 2010 of one count of child molestation. In 2017, Thomas timely filed an initial petition for habeas corpus challenging the conviction. The habeas court denied relief in May 2018. On July 1, 2019, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed Thomas’s attempt to appeal that denial because both his notice of appeal and application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal were untimely. Meanwhile, on March 8, 2019, during the pendency of Thomas’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal with the Supreme Court, he filed a motion to correct void sentence in the trial court. In May 2019, the trial court granted Thomas relief and entered a new sentence. In August 2020, Thomas filed a second habeas petition challenging, among other things, the sentence imposed in the 2019 re-sentencing on several grounds. On December 22, 2020, the habeas court dismissed Thomas’s second petition as successive, ruling that the claims raised in that petition “could reasonably have been raised” in his initial petition in 2017. In appealing the habeas court’s dismissal, Thomas argued it was improper because his 2017 habeas petition was filed and litigated before his 2019 re-sentencing and before he raised issues related to that re- sentencing in his 2020 habeas petition. The Warden conceded that Thomas could not have raised claims in 2017 and 2018 concerning a re-sentencing that did not happen until 2019, and that the habeas court therefore erred in dismissing Thomas’s 2020 petition on grounds that it was successive. To this, the Supreme Court concurred and reversed the habeas court ruling. View "Thomas v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

by
Bertrand Hounkpatin was convicted of felony murder for the death of his two -year old stepson, Noel Johnson. On appeal, Hounkpatin argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. He also argued the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) admitting other-acts evidence (“Rule 404 (b)”) that he physically assaulted his stepchildren; and (2) preventing him from presenting Rule 404 (b) evidence that two of his stepchildren, who were State’s witnesses, had been violent towards Noel and each other. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain Hounkpatin’s conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence showing that Hounkpatin squeezed Noel and one of his siblings around their ribs; that evidence was relevant to whether Hounkpatin had the intent to commit the predicate felony of cruelty to children in the first degree and otherwise met the requirements of Rule 404 (b). Any error in admitting other evidence that Hounkpatin slapped or hit the children was harmless. View "Hounpatin v. Georgia" on Justia Law