Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jaren Sullivan was convicted of malice murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Marques Dockery and the aggravated assault of Najee Murray. On appeal, Appellant contended that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to present evidence of Dockery’s alleged gang affiliation; (2) failing to elicit testimony suggesting that Dockery was armed; and (3) failing to object when an investigator offered his opinions regarding the shooting. Also contending that these errors combined to prejudice him, Appellant sought reversal of his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Sullivan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Paula Kelly was convicted of murder and other crimes in 2015. Through new counsel, Kelly filed a motion for new trial, which was denied in an order entered on September 11, 2018. On October 15, 2018, Kelly filed a notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the denial of the motion for new trial, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. In the dismissal order, the Supreme Court advised Kelly of her right to seek an out-of-time appeal and stated that, if an out-of-time appeal were granted, “appellant will have 30 days from the grant within which to file a notice of appeal.” Kelly thereafter sought an out-of-time appeal, and a trial court granted the motion on March 22, 2019. The court’s order incorrectly stated that “[Kelly’s] counsel did not file a timely motion for new trial” and advised Kelly that she could “file a motion for new trial or notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of this Order.” Kelly then filed a second motion for new trial on Monday, April 22, 2019. In this second motion for new trial, in which Kelly was represented by the same counsel as in her initial motion, Kelly asserted substantially similar claims as those previously raised and rejected. The second motion was denied on September 13, 2019. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, when a trial court has denied a criminal defendant’s motion for new trial and the defendant subsequently seeks and was granted an out-of-time appeal, the defendant was authorized to file a second motion for new trial to raise claims other than those alleging the ineffective assistance of trial counsel that could not have been raised in the initial motion. The Court concluded that a defendant was not authorized to do so. For this reason, this appeal was untimely and had to be dismissed. View "Kelly v. Georgia" on Justia Law

For a brief time period, OCGA 9-3-33.1 allowed time-barred civil claims for childhood sexual abuse to be revived. During that time period, Joy Caroline Harvey Merchan sued her parents, Walter Jackson Harvey, Jr., and Carole Allyn Hill Harvey, under the revival provision of the statute for damages resulting from alleged childhood sexual abuse that occurred decades prior to the filing of the action, principally in Quebec, Canada. The Harveys moved dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing that Merchan’s claims were time-barred and could not be revived. Alternatively, the Harveys argued the revival provision of the Act violated Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court largely denied the Harveys’ motions, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review to decide: (1) whether Georgia or Quebec law applied to Merchan’s claims; (2) whether OCGA 9-3-33.1 could revive a cause of action for acts that did not occur in Georgia; and (3) whether Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions would bar Merchan’s pursuit of such a cause of action against her parents. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) Georgia substantive law applied to those torts committed in state, while Quebec substantive law applied to the torts committed there; (2) Georgia’s limitations period applied to torts committed in state, but for torts committed in Quebec, the trial court had to determine in the first instance which limitations period was shorter, and the shorter period would control. Merchan could pursue a cause of action for acts that occurred in Quebec as well as Georgia, because OCGA 9-3-33.1’s definition of childhood sexual abuse was broad enough to cover acts that occurred outside of Georgia. "And such a result does not violate Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws or the Harveys’ due process or equal protection rights. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, vacate it in part, and remand the case for the trial court to compare the respective limitations periods." View "Harvey et al. v. Merchan" on Justia Law

Appellant Annette Collins Flood was convicted of felony murder and a knife offense in connection with the stabbing death of Bobby Burns, her longtime boyfriend. Appellant contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. She also raised three separate enumerations of error regarding the jury instructions provided at her trial, contending these instructional errors combined to prejudice her. Finally, Appellant contended the State improperly placed her character at issue during closing argument. Appellant sought a new trial, but the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed her convictions. View "Flood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Timothy Wilson, Jr. was convicted by jury of child molestation, statutory rape, and two counts of incest involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter, B. O., and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Wilson petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to consider “[w]hether the trial court erred in concluding that evidence of alleged prior offenses of child molestation was admissible under OCGA 24-4-414.” The Court determined the Court of Appeals' analysis of the trial court's decision to admit Wilson's prior offenses of child molestation was flawed, but concluded the judgment was correct. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Wilson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jereno Kinslow's felony conviction for computer trespass was premised on evidence that Kinslow altered his employer’s computer network settings so that e-mail messages meant for Kinslow’s boss would also be copied and forwarded to Kinslow’s personal e-mail account. The Court of Appeals affirmed Kinslow’s conviction, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted Kinslow’s petition for certiorari, posing the question of whether Kinslow’s conduct constituted a violation of OCGA 16-9-93 (b)(2). The Court found that although the statute in general was extremely broad, the portion of (b)(2) on which the State exclusively relied did not reach Kinslow’s conduct. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at Kinslow’s trial was insufficient to support his conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and thus reversed. View "Kinslow v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Michael and Katherine Gatto filed suit against the City of Statesboro and City Clerk Sue Starling, alleging negligence and maintenance of a nuisance, after their son, Michael, died following an altercation at a bar in the University Plaza area of the City. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, based in part on sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to the City, solely on the ground of sovereign immunity. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to address municipal immunity in the context of a nuisance claim. The Court held that the Citywasis immune from liability for the conduct alleged here, because municipalities never faced liability for a nuisance claim based on alleged conduct related to property they neither owned nor controlled, and "nothing in our Constitution alters that principle." Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Gatto et al. v. City of Statesboro et al." on Justia Law

This case presented the question of whether defendants in criminal cases could have their cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because verdicts were rendered or sentences imposed on less than all counts of an indictment or accusation, or one or more counts were “dead- docketed.” The Georgia Supreme Court concluded it did: dead-docketing, while a common and longstanding practice in Georgia courts, had almost no statutory authority and none that would allow different treatment here. "And precedent from our Court of Appeals has for decades made clear that when a count is dead-docketed, the case remains pending in the trial court." Such a case cannot be appealed as a final judgment under OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (1); instead, it required a certificate of immediate review, which Demarquis Seals did not seek. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal. View "Seals v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Rodney Renia Young was convicted by jury for the murder of Gary Jones and related crimes. The jury declined in its guilt/innocence phase verdict to find him “mentally retarded.” At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the jury found multiple statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Young to death for the murder. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Young’s convictions. View "Young v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Charles Tyler was convicted by jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of David Fulkrod and theft of copper from a recycling facility. On appeal, Tyler challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to all of his convictions. Because the evidence was sufficient to support each conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Tyler v. Georgia" on Justia Law