Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the State violated Joseph Robert Gates's right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. The records, which were obtained after a car accident involving Gates, contained results of blood alcohol content (BAC) tests performed by the hospital where Gates was treated. The State used these records to charge Gates with several offenses, including driving under the influence. Gates filed a motion to suppress his medical records, but the trial court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that Gates's medical records, including the BAC test results, were protected by the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution. The court further concluded that the State's use of an ex parte court order to obtain Gates's medical records was more akin to the use of an ex parte subpoena, which had previously been held to violate the right to privacy, rather than an ex parte search warrant, which had been deemed permissible. The fact that the court order was not based on probable cause, nor did it comply with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, further supported this conclusion. Therefore, the court concluded that the State had violated Gates's right to privacy by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's denial of Gates's motion to suppress. View "GATES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the convictions of Milton Nathaniel Scott for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Jerrica Porter. Scott had appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence one of his custodial statements in which he admitted to shooting Porter but claimed the shooting was an accident. He also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling a hearsay objection to testimony that characterized his initial statement that Porter shot herself as implausible and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to testimony and evidence that suggested he was involved in a gang.The Supreme Court found that even if there was error in the admission of Scott's custodial statement, Scott failed to show harm from the admission because the State introduced into evidence a recording of a jailhouse phone call in which Scott repeated his claim that his shooting of Porter was an accident. The court also found that because Scott's defense was accident and the admission of the hearsay testimony and the evidence to which his trial counsel did not object was not relevant to that defense, these claims did not warrant a reversal.Lastly, the court determined that even if Scott's trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to evidence and testimony suggesting Scott's gang involvement, Scott failed to establish that this alleged deficiency prejudiced him. Therefore, the court affirmed Scott's convictions. View "SCOTT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellants, London Clements and Eric Velazquez, were jointly tried for murder and other offenses connected to the shooting death of Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019. Clements was convicted of felony murder, and Velazquez was convicted of malice murder and other crimes. On appeal, Clements argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary count and the felony murder count predicated thereon and that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to grant his motion for new trial on the general grounds. Velazquez contended on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault on a peace officer, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict as there was insufficient corroboration of his co-conspirators’ testimony, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The court affirmed the convictions in both cases. View "CLEMENTS v. THE STATE (two cases)" on Justia Law

Appellant Larry Thomas appealed his convictions for felony murder in connection with the vehicular deaths of Krystof Krawczynski and Elizbieta Gurtler-Krawczynski. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him for two counts of felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) rather than for two counts of homicide by vehicle (Counts 7 and 8) because both sets of charges were predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and thus the rule of lenity required that he receive the lesser penalty. This argument, however, was foreclosed by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Sosebee v. Georgia, __ Ga. __, __ (1) (__ SE2d __) (2023) As explained in Sosebee, the felony-murder and homicide-by-vehicle statutes “are not ambiguous and do not require different punishments for the same conduct” because “[t]he offense of felony murder . . . criminalizes causing the death of a human being ‘in the commission of a felony,’ but the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) does not.” Accordingly, as in Sosebee, “[t]he rule of lenity simply has no application in this case, and this claim of error fails.” View "Thomas v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Armetrius Neason was convicted of malice murder and a related charge in connection with the shooting death of Teresa Carter. On appeal, Neason contended the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal constitutional due process. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Neason v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Pacer Sebastian Carter appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Aramis O’Brad Peterson. Carter argued the trial court erred in omitting a jury instruction on the statutory requirement of corroboration of accomplice testimony in felony cases, and that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to it. In addition, Carter argued his attorney was ineffective in admitting a document entitled “Proof of Incarceration.” Because both claims of trial court error were subject to review only for plain error, and Carter failed to carry his burden of showing either plain error or the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kiresa Cooper was convicted by jury of malice murder, feticide, and other related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Auriel Callaway, who was pregnant at the time she died. On appeal, Cooper argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her malice murder conviction; and (2) that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to twenty portions of the lead detective’s testimony on various grounds, such as inadmissible hearsay, confrontation violations, improper opinion and speculation, and failure to properly authenticate evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cooper v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Cody Regan appealed his sentence of 20 years in prison, with one year to serve, for one count of felony child molestation, following his non-negotiated guilty plea. Regan argued he improperly received a felony sentence for child molestation, in violation of his rights to equal protection under the United States and Georgia Constitutions, because he was similarly situated to people receiving misdemeanor sentences for aggravated child molestation. Regan also argued his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the federal and state constitutions, because his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the sentencing scheme for child molestation set out at OCGA § 16-6-4 (b), as applied to Regan, violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These sentencing provisions provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 14 years old (among other conditions), but the misdemeanor sentencing provisions for aggravated child molestation provided for a misdemeanor sentence where the victim is at least 13 years old. Because the victim in this case was 13 years old, Regan did not qualify for the misdemeanor sentence he would have received if he had instead committed aggravated child molestation. "There is no rational basis for such disparate treatment." The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying Regan's motion in arrest of judgment, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for Appellant to be resentenced for misdemeanor child molestation under OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (2). Because the Court resolved Regan's challenges to his sentence on federal equal-protection grounds, it did not reach his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims. View "Regan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether Larry Jenkins’ unequivocal statement that he would not talk to law enforcement without a lawyer was a valid invocation of his Miranda rights. The trial court concluded that the statement came at a time that Jenkins was not being interrogated and at which no interrogation was imminent, and thus it was “anticipatory” and invalid under a line of precedent from several federal courts of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by extending that precedent to the circumstances in this case. The Court found that at the time that Jenkins invoked his Miranda rights, he (1) was in custody for the crimes at issue in this case, (2) had been given Miranda warnings, (3) had already been subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement on the way to the jail, and (4) was going through the booking process. "Whether or not the booking process itself was custodial interrogation, the facts of this case show that a reasonable person in Jenkins’s position would have believed that interrogation was at least imminent." Accordingly, the Supreme Court held his unequivocal invocation was valid, the State’s failure to honor it rendered his custodial statements inadmissible, and the State failed to show that the use of that inadmissible evidence was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Jenkins’s convictions; because the evidence against him was constitutionally sufficient, he could be retried. View "Jenkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellants Joshua Rooks and Quatez Clark were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Christopher Dean. Rooks contended the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Clark similarly contended the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on certain counts; he also claimed the court erred by failing to grant his motion for new trial on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 and by admitting under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) evidence showing that he participated in another murder 11 days after Dean’s murder and that he committed marijuana- and firearm-related crimes about two months after Dean’s murder. Finding no reversible error in either case, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed convictions in both cases. View "Rooks v. Georgia" on Justia Law