Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following a reversal of his convictions on appeal and a retrial, Appellant Phillip Kennebrew was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2011 beating and stabbing death of Breyon Alexander. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence testimony from a witness who testified at Appellant’s first trial but was unavailable to testify at his second trial. Appellant contended the witness’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within the prior testimony hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (1), and that violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant further argued that, even if the witness’s prior testimony was not altogether inadmissible, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude double hearsay within that testimony. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s admission of hearsay statements made by the victim, which were admitted under the residual hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-807. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kennebrew v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Walter Salvesen, III was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Johnathan Martin. On appeal, Salvesen contended: (1) the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial photographs from Martin’s autopsy and the scene where Martin’s body was found; (2) the trial court erred by failing to recharge the jury on the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter when it recharged on malice murder and felony murder; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the extent the foregoing alleged errors were not preserved for appellate review. The Georgia Supreme Court was not persuaded: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs; (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in solely recharging the jury on the definitions it requested and not the lesser offenses; and (3) Salvesen has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was deficient. The Court therefore affirmed Salvesen’s convictions. View "Salvesen v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rafael Carter appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea stemming from the murder of Terrance Fields during an armed robbery. The January 2016 term of court in which Carter entered his guilty plea expired on Friday, March 4, 2016, and a new term of court commenced on Monday, March 7, 2016. So both his March 11, 2016 and his October 11, 2021 motions to withdraw were filed after the expiration of the term of court in which he entered his plea. Nonetheless, Carter maintains that his convictions and sentences are void and illegal due to merger errors, thus providing the trial court with jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The Georgia Supreme Court found Carter’s sentence was not void because his felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law despite the trial court’s purported merger of those counts; the trial court has properly merged Carter’s conviction for the aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9) into his malice murder conviction (Count 1); no other merger error appeared; and each sentence imposed was within the range that the law allows. Therefore, the Court found the trial court properly dismissed Carter's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Wise Business Forms, Inc. (“Wise”) was the nation’s fourth largest printer of business forms, and was headquartered in Forsyth County, Georgia. A 36-inch metal pipe (“Subject Pipe”) ran underneath Wise’s property and had been in place since 1985. Approximately twenty-five feet of the drainage pipe extended into a two-acre tract of land west of Wise’s property (“Corner Tract”). The Corner Tract was undeveloped and forms a natural detention basin into which a large vertical concrete drainage structure with a large stormwater outlet pipe (“Feeder Structure”) was constructed. Wise asserted in its complaint that water from the Feeder Structure on the Corner Tract was designed to flow through the Subject Pipe underneath Wise’s property. The McFarland Parkway Widening Project extended McFarland Road from two lanes to four lanes and was completed in 2000. Wise alleged in its complaint that this project resulted in a substantial increase of the surface and stormwater runoff flowing underneath its property. In 2020, Wise filed a complaint against Forsyth County and the Georgia Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) raising claims for per se taking of Wise’s property, inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance, attorney fees. Wise amended its complaint to add a claim for inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to clarify the standards for determining when a claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance accrues for purposes of applying the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). The Court concluded that, although the Court of Appeals articulated one of the correct standards to apply in determining when the applicable statute of limitation begins to run on a permanent nuisance claim, the Court of Appeals failed to construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party; erred in concluding there was only one harm in this case that was “immediately observable” to the plaintiff when the nuisance at issue was completed; and erred in concluding that the statute of limitation had run on the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. View "Wise Business Forms, Inc. v. Forsyth County, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Kentavous Wilkerson challenged his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Bradley Green and the non-fatal shooting of Rodney Greene. On appeal, Appellant contended: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motions for mistrial that he made following the prosecutor’s statements to the jury indicating that Appellant had been in jail for more than two years before trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilkerson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Tarus Green was convicted of felony murder in connection with the 2012 shooting death of Gregory Bivin. On appeal, Green argued: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jury during deliberations to review cell phone records that were admitted as evidence but were neither published nor explained to the jury during the trial; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing admission of a witness’s alleged prior inconsistent statement without first affording the witness the opportunity to explain or deny the substance of the statement pursuant to OCGA § 24-6-613 (b). The Georgia Supreme Court found each of these claims failed and affirmed Green's conviction. View "Green v. Georgia" on Justia Law

After the Georgia Board of Public Safety (“the Board”) denied Rick Kuhlman’s application for relief from the prohibition on the possession of firearms by convicted felons in OCGA § 16-11-131, Kuhlman sued the State of Georgia seeking a declaratory judgment “that he qualifies for relief” from that prohibition pursuant to subsection (d) of the statute. His complaint also included claims that the statute, as applied to him, violated his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State on all claims. In its order, the court ruled that Kuhlman’s statutory claim was barred by sovereign immunity, that he could not maintain his federal constitutional claim, and that OCGA § 16-11-131 did not violate the state constitution. Nevertheless, the superior court went on to rule in the alternative on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim, but it failed to reach the merits of his federal constitutional claim. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the portion of the superior court’s judgment that was based on sovereign immunity, affirmed the court’s alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim, vacated the portion of the judgment that related to Kuhlman’s constitutional claims, and remanded the case to the superior court for reconsideration of Kuhlman’s constitutional claims. View "Kuhlman v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Kaylynn Ruthenberg was convicted of malice murder and other crimes arising from the shooting death of James Jones and the robbery of Samuel Gallardo. Appellant contended the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his three prior misdemeanor convictions for simple battery under OCGA § 24- 4-418 and that the admission of this evidence violated OCGA § 24- 4-403. Because Appellant failed to carry his burden to show plain error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ruthenberg v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Diontye Scott was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Antonio Veal. On appeal, Scott contended his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) request an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the stipulations to Scott’s prior felony convictions as proof of his status as a convicted felon; (2) request an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of Scott’s prior felony convictions to only impeachment; and (3) object to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly misstated the burden of proof. He also argued (4) these errors, taken together, deprived him of a fair trial. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded Scott’s ineffective-assistance claims had no merit. "Even assuming that his counsel erred by failing to object to the State’s closing argument, Scott failed to show more than one error, so we need not assess any cumulative prejudice. So we affirm his convictions." View "Scott v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding whether a state entity could continue asserting claims against opioid manufacturers and distributors after the State of Georgia entered into a settlement with the pharmaceutical companies, and as part of the settlement, the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 10-13B-1, et seq. (the “Settlement Act”) in 2022, which included a litigation preemption provision that “bar[s] any and all past, present or future claims on behalf of any governmental entity seeking to recover against any business or person that is a released entity under the terms of the relevant settlement.” OCGA § 10-13B-3 (a) (the “preemption provision”). In April 2019, before Georgia entered into the state-wide settlement with the pharmaceutical companies, the Hospital Authority of Wayne County, Georgia (“HAWC”) filed suit against a number of such entities, seeking to recover unreimbursed amounts it claims to have expended in treating opioid-dependent patients. HAWC subsequently chose not to participate in the state-wide settlement and did not individually release any of its claims. At some point, HAWC’s litigation was consolidated, along with over 3,000 other cases, into a federal multidistrict litigation in the District Court. See In re Natl. Prescription Opiate Litigation, (MDL No. 2804). Seven defendants named in HAWC’s complaint filed a motion to dismiss HAWC’s claims against them (the “Motion”), contending that the suit was barred by the preemption provision. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the Georgia General Assembly's passage of the preemption provision took away any power HAWC otherwise might have had under OCGA § 31-7-75 to pursue claims that the preemption provision and the Settlement Act were unconstitutional, and the answer to the first question certified by the District Court was no. In light of this answer, the Supreme Court did not need to answer the second certified question. View "Hospital Authority of Wayne County v. AmeriSourceBergen Drug Corp, et al." on Justia Law