Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Illinois
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In the state of Illinois, a group of active and retired members of local police and firefighter pension funds filed a complaint against the Governor and other officials, challenging the constitutionality of Public Act 101-610. This Act amended the Illinois Pension Code and consolidated all local police and firefighter pension fund assets into two statewide pension investment funds. The plaintiffs claimed the Act violated two provisions of the Illinois Constitution: the pension protection clause and the takings clause. They argued that the Act diminished their pension benefits by diluting their voting power and control over investment decisions, and by imposing costs associated with the Act's implementation, including repayment of any transition loans. The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed with the plaintiffs, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The court ruled that the Act does not violate the pension protection clause because the ability to vote in local pension board elections and control local pension fund investments are not constitutionally protected benefits. They also ruled that the Act does not violate the takings clause because the plaintiffs do not have a private property right in the funds that are to be transferred to the new statewide funds. The Act only changes how local fund assets are managed and invested without affecting the ultimate use of those assets to pay the benefits of local fund members. Thus, the Act remains in effect. View "Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

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Sergeant Albee saw a truck pulling a partially loaded car hauler semitrailer with no driver’s side markings indicating the company name or the DOT number required by federal regulations. The hauler was only partially loaded, which Albee found unusual; no registration was displayed on the trailer. During the subsequent traffic stop, Webb displayed “a state of panic” and had no organized documentation. He volunteered that he had been stopped several times and that the vehicle had been checked for drugs. Albee found that statement “bizarre.” Webb gave Albee a cab card that was Illinois apportioned, but the displayed license plate was from California. Albee performed a free air sniff test with his canine partner. After a positive alert on the trailer, a search revealed an unlicensed firearm and 2736 grams of cannabis–street value $40,000.Webb was convicted of cannabis trafficking, possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and possession of cannabis. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Webb’s argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the cannabis on the basis that the positive canine alert, without more, was not sufficient to establish probable cause following changes to Illinois cannabis legislation. Albee relied on more than the dog sniff. The totality of the facts and circumstances justified a reasonable person in believing that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity. View "People v. Webb" on Justia Law

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Montanez was convicted based on the 2002 murder of Villalobos and Ramirez. The court sentenced him to mandatory natural life for two first-degree murder convictions, a 20-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction, and a 27-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated kidnapping conviction.Montanez challenged the denial of his request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He sought to raise a claim that the prosecution violated “Brady” by failing to disclose evidence relevant to his defense that was stored in a file in the basement of the Chicago Police Department and was discovered after his convictions. Montanez claims that although he became aware of the file during his first postconviction proceedings (which included 46 constitutional claims) he was unable to obtain the file during those proceedings to establish that it contained material that would have been helpful to his defense.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial. In addition to failing to raise a Brady violation claim based on the entirety of the CPD file in his proposed successive petition, Montanez’s attempt to raise this claim on appeal was barred by res judicata. Montanez’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition falls short of demonstrating that the procedural hurdles for filing a successive petition should be lowered in this case. View "People v. Montanez" on Justia Law

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In 2010, Agee strangled his girlfriend, Davis, during a physical altercation. He went directly to the police station and voluntarily made a statement, which was recorded on video. Agee did not realize that Davis had died and expressed concerns that she would be okay. Agee pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years.Agee filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek an expert to testify as to his mental health. Postconviction counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition adding a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Agee that he could pursue a second-degree defense murder at trial. The court dismissed the amended petition. Agee appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel erroneously failed to allege all the elements of a second-degree murder claim. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Rule 651(c), requiring reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, does not require “any level of representation in the presentation of new claims.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The appellate court erred in finding that Rule 651(c) does not require any level of representation in the presentation of added claims in an amended pro se postconviction petition but Agee failed to demonstrate that postconviction counsel failed to make amendments to the pro se petition as necessary for an adequate presentation of his claims. He cannot show deficient performance. The record rebuts Agee’s claims about a second-degree murder defense. View "People v. Agee" on Justia Law

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Roland, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his bench trial for a 2002 attempted murder when his attorney failed to present evidence of his mental health history. After a pre-trial evaluation, Roland had been found fit to stand trial. The expert determined he was legally sane at the time of the offense but that he may have been experiencing symptoms of a depressive mood disorder that was likely exacerbated by alcohol and illegal substances. At trial, Roland testified to having attempted suicide in jail and that he fired a gun while being chased by police because he had wanted police to shoot and kill him.After the petition was advanced to the second stage of proceedings, it was dismissed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. It is not reasonably likely that further evidence of Roland’s mental health history would have changed the trial court’s determination that Roland’s conduct during the shooting did not demonstrate that he wanted to commit suicide by police; the court noted that he fled from the police, taking evasive measures to avoid being shot. Roland’s postconviction petition failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of “Strickland.” View "People v. Roland" on Justia Law

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Lighthart had dated both Buchanan and the victim, who was known to have access to large amounts of money. Lighthart drove the victim to a residence, knowing that Buchanan was there intending to rob the victim. Buchanan beat the victim, demanding money, and eventually shot him to death. Lighthart then injected the victim with a solution that contained Drano or attempted to do so. After cleaning the scene, they disposed of the body by setting it on fire inside the victim’s Jeep in a rural field. In 2004, Lighthart, then 23, entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a sentencing cap of 35 years. Lighthart filed a motion to reduce her 35-year sentence and, subsequently, an untimely pro se motion to withdraw her plea, asserting that she was the victim of domestic violence and ineffective assistance of counsel. After an 11-½ year delay following remand and changes in counsel, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of her 725 ILCS 5/122-1 post-conviction petition as untimely.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. An ineffective notice of appeal from a negotiated guilty plea, which is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction due to failure to follow procedural requirements (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)) triggers a six-month limitations period for bringing a postconviction petition. However, under the circumstances, Lighthart could not have been culpably negligent in the untimely filing of her petition. View "People v. Lighthart" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Givens, Dudley, and Strong burglarized a store and attempted to escape by backing a van out of a closed garage door, striking a police officer. Chicago police officers fired their weapons at the van, resulting in Strong’s death and injuries to Dudley and Givens, who were convicted of felony murder, aggravated battery to a peace officer, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.Dudley, Givens, and Strong’s estate sued the City, alleging the use of excessive force. With respect to Dudley and Givens, the circuit court granted Chicago summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel effect of their prior criminal proceedings. The estate’s lawsuit resulted in a partial verdict for the estate. The circuit court granted Chicago’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) based on the jury’s answers to special interrogatories. The appellate court reversed, holding that collateral estoppel did not bar Dudley and Givens from litigating their claims and the circuit court erred in vacating the verdict.The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that collateral estoppel did not bar the suit by Dudley and Givens. Chicago did not establish with “clarity and certainty” that the identical question was decided in the earlier proceeding The court reinstated the JNOV. The circuit court properly held that the jury’s special finding related to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties depended and was clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the verdict returned. View "Givens v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

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Pacheco was convicted of aggravated assault and other offenses after he tried to hit a Joliet police officer with his car. During the incident, the officer shot and injured Pacheco. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court violated Pacheco’s right to confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the officer who shot Pacheco as to whether the officer believed he could lose his job if the shooting was found to be unjustified and finding the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion in limine to bar defense counsel from asking the officer and his partner why they did not write police reports regarding the incident.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded. The limitation imposed on the officer’s cross-examination was necessary to avoid a highly prejudicial outcome to Pacheco–the admission of testimony that a review panel had found the shooting to be justified. Cross-examination was not otherwise limited. Because of department policy, the officers had no choice about writing reports and their failure to do so was irrelevant to any question of bias or credibility. The question would have distracted the jury from the question of determining the guilt or innocence of Pacheco. View "People v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

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Chicago police arrested Lozano, who was subsequently charged with burglary and possession of burglary tools. Lozano moved to suppress evidence (a car radio, a wallet, and two screwdrivers) arguing that when the officers stopped, detained, and searched him, they neither possessed a warrant nor saw him committing any crimes and could not reasonably suspect that he had committed or was about to commit any crimes or that he was armed and dangerous. Officer Rodriguez testified that he and his partner were driving in an unmarked car, on patrol, and saw Lozano “running at a fast rate of speed” and holding his front pocket. It was raining and wet outside. Rodriguez made a U-turn and approached Lozano, who fled up the stairs of an apparently abandoned building. Rodriguez pursued Lozano and saw a “big bulge” in Lozano’s pocket. Rodriguez handcuffed Lozano, then touched his hooded sweatshirt and felt a rectangular box. He reached inside Lozano’s front pocket and recovered a wallet, two screwdrivers, and a radio. The wallet and radio had been taken from a parked car.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate courts and held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lozano. The act of running in the rain while holding the front of his pocket did not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. View "People v. Lozano" on Justia Law

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The Protect Illinois Communities Act restricts firearms and related items that the Act defines as “an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge” (assault weapons), 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b), and “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s],” section 24-1.10(b)). Certain restrictions do not apply to law enforcement agencies and individuals who complete firearms training as part of their employment in law enforcement, corrections, the military, and private security (trained professionals), and individuals who possessed assault weapons or LCMs (large capacity magazines) before the restrictions became effective.The circuit court of Macon County entered declaratory judgment, finding that the restrictions facially violated the Illinois Constitution because the exemptions deny the “law-abiding public” equal protection and constitute special legislation. On appeal, opponents of the law alleged for the first time that, regardless of the exemptions, the restrictions violate the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violated the three-reading requirement of the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exemptions neither deny equal protection nor constitute special legislation because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they are similarly situated to and treated differently from the exempt classes. The plaintiffs expressly waived in the circuit court any independent claim that the restrictions impermissibly infringe the Second Amendment and are jurisdictionally barred from renewing their three-readings claim. View "Caulkins v. Pritzker" on Justia Law