Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Burns, lives in unit 10 on the third floor of a 12-unit three-story Urbana apartment building that is secured by locked entrances. The common areas are not accessible to the public. In November 2012, the police department’s Crimestoppers hotline received an anonymous tip that Burns was selling marijuana and ecstasy. Investigating, detective Mecum discovered that in October 2008, Burns was issued a notice to appear for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia; she had been arrested in 2003, for possession of marijuana. Mecum also observed “images for the legalization of marijuana,” “a picture containing actual marijuana,” and “a picture containing large amounts of U.S. currency” on defendant’s social media page. Mecum went to the building in plain clothes to “confirm her address.” After several visits, an unidentified tenant let him in. Walking through the building, Mecum observed a package addressed to Burns. At approximately 3:20 a.m., Officer Cervantes entered the building, without a warrant, with his drug-detection dog, and went to the third floor. The dog alerted to narcotics at Burns’s apartment door. Mecum obtained a search warrant. The ensuing search of Burns’s apartment resulted in the discovery of marijuana. Burns, charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver between 500 and 2,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(e),, successfully moved to suppress the evidence, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Jardines (2013). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the search warrant was issued on the basis of an unconstitutional warrantless dog sniff. View "People v. Burns" on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiff, a Carbondale police officer, struck the top of his head on the door of his squad car, causing him to “see stars” and experience a sharp pain in his arm, with no abrasions or blood loss. Plaintiff never returned to work. In 2007, plaintiff sought a line-of-duty disability pension (40 ILCS 5/3-114.1). The Board found that plaintiff’s disability was not the result of an on-duty injury and that plaintiff was not unable to return to work. The trial court reversed. The appellate court affirmed. In 2012, the city began providing plaintiff and his family with health insurance coverage. After a 2012 examination, the physician concluded that plaintiff was able to return to work. The Board terminated plaintiff’s disability pension. Plaintiff responded that he had not received notice of the meeting where the Board had voted to terminate his benefits. The circuit court affirmed, without addressing plaintiff’s due process claim. The city notified plaintiff that his insurance coverage would be terminated. The circuit court denied plaintiff a permanent injunction with respect to the insurance. The appellate court reversed that denial and the pension termination, finding that the Board had violated plaintiff’s due process rights by voting without notice or a proper hearing, but did not address whether the determination that plaintiff was no longer disabled was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial of an injunction with respect to insurance coverage. Plaintiff’s injury did not result from one of the conditions in the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/10), such as responding to an emergency; he did not demonstrate a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection and was not entitled to a permanent injunction View "Vaughn v. City of Carbondale" on Justia Law

At approximately 1:15 a.m. on Saturday, December 17, 2011, defendant was driving from Iowa to Illinois on U.S. Highway 136, a four-lane road. Just across the border, Illinois State Police had erected a safety roadblock, marked by an orange sign with black lettering. Defendant saw the roadblock and made a U-turn at a railroad crossing approximately 50 feet from the roadblock. Hancock County Deputy Duffy stopped defendant as he proceeded westbound. Illinois State Police Officer Miller, at the roadblock, saw Duffy pull over defendant’s vehicle and went to assist. Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and was cited for driving “to the left of center of roadway.” Officers conducted an inventory search incident to arrest and recovered a metal pipe and less than one gram of marijuana. Defendant’s passenger was arrested based on an active warrant.The circuit court denied a motion to suppress, finding that defendant’s U-turn provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the stop. The court found defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ conditional discharge and 90 days in the county jail. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the location, day and time of the roadblock. View "People v. Timmsen" on Justia Law

Illinois has four public pension plans for Chicago city employees; all subject to the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution: “Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” The funds provide traditional defined benefit plans. As with state-funded pensions, for employees hired before 2011, annuity payments were subject to 3% automatic annual increases beginning after the member’s first full year of retirement, and compounded annually. For later-hires, the annuity adjustments were tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Before Public Act 98-641, employees contributed 8.5% of their salary toward their pension. The city contributed based on a fixed multiplier, paid largely from property tax proceeds.The pensions were inadequate to cover benefits. The funds are on “a path of insolvency.” Public Act 98-641, effective in 2014, was based on a finding that financial crisis could not be addressed by increased funding alone. Under the Act, the city’s contribution progressively increases beginning in 2021; employee contributions are also increased. For two city funds, the Act: reduces the annual benefit increase to the lesser of three percent or half the annual unadjusted percentage increase in the CPI; removes the compounding component; eliminates increases in specific years, and postpones the initial increase. The Illinois Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional. Nothing in the legislative process that led to its enactment constituted a waiver of members’ rights under the pension protection clause.Whether members may be “better off” under the Act is not for the General Assembly to decide unilaterally. View "Jones v. Mun. Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

In 1997, Pipes was found dead, with stab wounds to her neck and head; semen was discovered with vaginal swabs. There was no evidence of rape. Above the bathtub in which she was found, there was a palm print left in Pipes’s blood. In 2004, the state obtained a grand jury subpoena for the Illinois Department of Corrections to take palm and fingerprints of Boston, then incarcerated on a life sentence, who was Pipes' ex-boyfriend. After prints were taken, a warrant issued for defendant’s DNA. A test showed that the DNA profile extracted from the semen was consistent with having originated from Boston. In 2005, the state obtained an indictment. Boston unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena and suppress the palm print evidence, arguing that the state improperly used the grand jury to obtain the subpoena and to supplement a police investigation in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and violated grand jury procedures by failing to return the fingerprint card to the grand jury. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis to conclude that this was a “rogue police investigation.” The information provided to the grand jury was sufficiently tied to Boston to hold that there was individualized suspicion to warrant the subpoena. View "People v. Boston" on Justia Law

Ligon, convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm (AVH/DW), a Class X felony, under 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3), (b), was adjudged to be an habitual criminal and sentenced to a term of mandatory life imprisonment under 720 ILCS 5/33B-1(a), (e). He filed a petition for relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401), contending that the sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition sua sponte. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state leave to appeal and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, rejecting the proportional it claim because AVH/DW and armed violence while armed with a category III weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-1(c)(3)). Ligon was properly convicted of AVH/DW while using a BB gun as a common-law dangerous weapon of the third type. It is irrelevant that the indictment used the term “bludgeon” instead of BB gun; the two are interchangeable under the statute. View "People v. Ligon" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a van registered to a woman named Chattic in the city of Sterling. Sterling police officer Bland pulled the van over because there was a warrant out for Chattic’s arrest. Bland was unable to see the driver of the van until after he had pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching, Bland saw defendant was a man and could not have been Chattic. Bland asked defendant for a driver’s license and proof of insurance before explaining the reason for the stop. Defendant responded that he did not have a driver’s license and Bland cited him for driving while his license was suspended. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed suppression of the evidence, finding that Bland’s license request impermissibly prolonged the seizure of defendant and the van. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Rodriguez makes clear that a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective of whether that request directly relates to the purpose for the stop. As a result, Officer Bland’s request for defendant’s license did not violate the fourth amendment by prolonging the stop. View "People v. Cummings" on Justia Law

A search warrant was served at a home belonging to Chambers’ mother. He was found inside, along with a large quantity of cocaine, cash, weapons, and ammunition. The Cook County circuit court denied his repeated requests for a Franks hearing. He was convicted of armed violence and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 and 45 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court held that the trial court should have conducted a Franks hearing and remanded for determination of whether the search warrant was properly issued, stating that the informant’s appearance and testimony before an issuing judge is “but one factor to consider in determining whether to grant a Franks hearing, but it does not categorically preclude the court from holding a Franks hearing.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Chambers made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly included in the warrant affidavit; it is irrelevant that the officer’s suspicions about the presence of guns and drugs at the address turned out to be well-founded. View "People v. Chambers" on Justia Law

Sanders was convicted of the 1992 first-degree murder and aggravated kidnapping of Cooks. Sanders was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 and 15 years. Bingham, May, and Barfield were convicted in separate trials. In 2010, Sanders filed a second successive postconviction petition, alleging actual innocence. Despite the absence of any motion for leave to file the successive petition, the circuit court allowed it and advanced it to the second stage of proceedings. The court then dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding purported new evidence and a recantation “not so conclusive in character as would probably change the result on retrial.” View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the deaths of Coleman, a 68-year-old man shot multiple times at his Chicago home in a botched robbery in 2005, and Stanley, defendant’s alleged coconspirator, gunned down in an alley the next day. Defendant’s statements in taped police interrogation were admitted as evidence against him at trial, after he sought suppression of those statements, arguing they were involuntary due to police questioning him off-camera and without Miranda rights, and due to physical coercion from handcuffs kept on him an excessively long time. The appellate court concluded the confession should have been suppressed, due to doubts it was voluntary, based on defendant’s age (then 19), educational level, sleep and food deprivation, prior substance abuse, deceptive conduct by police, length of interrogation, coercive atmosphere, lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and use of marijuana while in custody. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded. While defendant adequately preserved the broad issue of voluntariness of his confession, his arguments on appeal were almost entirely distinct from his arguments before the trial court. The drastic shift in factual theories deprived the state of the opportunity to present evidence. A court of review could not be confident in the adequacy of this record to address those arguments. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law