Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Kankakee County State’s Attorney authorized the secret recording of a controlled drug purchase between a confidential informant and another individual. Davis was not the person to be recorded. When the informant went to the target’s home, he could not locate him. The informant walked to the porch of a different home and conducted a drug transaction with Davis, which was recorded by a hidden device. At the hearing on Davis’s motion to suppress, the parties agreed that the audio portion of the recording violated the eavesdropping statute. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that there was an illegal overhear conversation between Davis and the informant that took place before the drugs were seen in the video so that the video recording was the fruit of the poisonous tree that must be suppressed and the informant could not testify concerning the drug transaction.The Appellate Court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The informant was a participant in the conversation, so his knowledge of that conversation was not derived from the illegal audio recording; the video recording was made simultaneously with the audio recording and could not have been derived from the audio recording. Because neither the informant’s testimony nor the video recording was obtained as a result of the illegal audio recording, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply. The evidence was admissible. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Illinois State Police obtained warrants to search a personal computer owned by Peoria Police Officer McCavitt, for digital evidence of two unrelated incidents: an aggravated criminal sexual assault and the unauthorized video recording and live video transmission of an unnamed victim. McCavitt was tried and acquitted of the alleged sexual assault before the unauthorized video recording was investigated. Following his acquittal, without seeking a new warrant, the Peoria Police Department searched a copy of the computer’s hard drive, uncovering evidence of the unauthorized video recording. The digital search also uncovered child pornography, which was not mentioned in the warrant. Based on the images, McCavitt was convicted of several counts of child pornography.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the denial of McCavitt’s motion to suppress. Under the unique facts of this case, the search that uncovered child pornography did not violate McCavitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. The warrant at issue diminished McCavitt’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the images and videos he stored on his computer. When he was acquitted of the sexual assault, his reasonable expectation of privacy in his data relating to that offense was restored. However, the acquittal did not resolve the portion of the warrant that authorized a search for digital evidence of the unauthorized video recording. The post-acquittal computer examination was reasonably directed at obtaining that evidence and the child pornography found during the search was admissible because it was found in plain view. View "People v. McCavitt" on Justia Law

Taliani was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (12-4.2(a)(1)) in relation to the 1994 shooting death of his girlfriend and the shooting and injury of her mother. His direct appeal, two postconviction petitions, and a motion for relief from judgment were all unsuccessful. Taliani sought leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, in which he asserted that he has set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence based on “a change in the law that allows for a new affirmative defense [which] constitutes newly discovered evidence for purposes of an actual innocence claim.” An actual innocence claim must be supported by “newly discovered evidence” and evidence that Taliani took prescription medications that could cause serotonin syndrome was not “newly discovered.” Taliani argued that the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication based on unwarned side effects from prescription medication was not recognized in Illinois until 2006 and that this newly available affirmative defense constituted “newly discovered evidence.”The circuit court, appellate court, and Illinois Supreme Court denied relief. A new defense is a new theory; it is not new evidence. Taliani presented no newly discovered evidence, such as witness affidavits or other contemporary documentation, that would persuasively show that, at the time of the shootings, he was involuntarily intoxicated and, therefore, lacked the substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law. View "People v. Taliani" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of armed robbery. The evidence at trial established that a 9-millimeter pistol and a BB pistol were discovered on the premises where he was arrested after the offense. The 9-millimeter was swabbed but the swabs were never tested for DNA. Johnson argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the swabs be tested. The appellate court panel granted him a new trial.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, affirming Johnson’s conviction. Johnson was unable to demonstrate prejudice for purposes of “Strickland” to establish ineffective assistance. It is unknown whether the swabs contain DNA sufficient for testing, let alone whether the results would be exculpatory. Because there is no exculpatory evidence to consider, any opinion that could be made with respect to prejudice would be advisory. Prejudice under Strickland cannot be based on “mere conjecture or speculation.” View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1994, Evans was convicted of Class 2 felony manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and Class X felony manufacture or delivery of more than 15 grams of cocaine. In 2018, Evans applied to the Illinois State Police for a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. The Police denied the request, explaining that in Illinois, felons are prohibited from owning firearms under section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code. The circuit court rejected Evans’s petition to have his firearm rights restored under section 10(c) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, reasoning that federal law, the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), barred Evans from obtaining a FOID card and that Evans had not established that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. The Appellate Court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. If a convicted felon can establish the requirements of section 10(c)(1)-(3), he has his civil rights restored and may be granted relief that is not contrary to federal law, which includes a “civil rights restored” exception. Evans failed to meet his burden of establishing that granting him relief would not be contrary to the public interest. The court noted that nothing in the statute precludes Evans from filing another petition to remove his firearm disability. Evans now knows why his previous submissions were found lacking and can bolster his submissions. View "Evans v. Cook County State's Attorney" on Justia Law

In 1999, Agpawa pleaded guilty to federal felony mail fraud. In 2002, he completed his sentence. Agpawa ran for mayor of the City of Markham in 2017. There were no preelection challenges to Agpawa’s nominating petitions, but Cook County State’s Attorney Foxx sent Agpawa a letter stating that he was ineligible to serve as mayor because of his felony conviction. Agpawa won the election. Foxx filed a complaint, alleging that Agpawa had been convicted of an “infamous crime” and was prohibited from holding municipal office unless he received a presidential pardon under the Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/29-15. The appellate court affirmed judgment for Foxx.Agpawa sought relief from then-Governor Rauner, who issued a document that purported to be a “RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP ROGER AGPAWA.” Agpawa took the oath of office as Markham's mayor. The court vacated its earlier order. No appeal was taken. In 2020, Agpawa sought reelection. Opponents objected. The Markham Municipal Officers Electoral Board ruled in favor of Agpawa. The appellate court reversed. A subsequent amendment to the Election Code specifically refers to a restoration of rights by the governor.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the Board ruling. While the governor has no constitutional authority to pardon a federal conviction, the governor has statutory authority to mitigate the collateral electoral consequences of such a conviction by issuing a restoration of rights. Governor Rauner’s untitled document restored Agpawa’s Illinois rights of citizenship, including the right to hold municipal office. The court rejected arguments that the Illinois legislature had no authority to alter the effect of a federal conviction and that the statutory amendment violated the special legislation clause, was “void for vagueness,” should not be applied retroactively, and violated first amendment rights, the equal protection clause, and separation of powers principles. View "Walker v. Agpawa" on Justia Law

In 1995, Beaman was convicted of the murder of his former girlfriend, a college student, and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment. After Beaman had served more than 13 years in prison, this court overturned his conviction because the trial was tainted by a Brady violation. The undisclosed evidence concerned, Murray, a drug dealer who had a sporadic sexual relationship with the victim, who failed to complete a polygraph examination, was charged with domestic battery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver prior to Beaman’s trial, physically abused his girlfriend on numerous occasions, and used steroids, which caused him to act erratically. The state declined to retry Beaman and dismissed the murder charge against him. Beaman subsequently sued Freesmeyer, Warner, and Zayas, former detectives of the Normal Police Department, asserting malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Beaman also requested damages from the municipality, under theories of respondeat superior and indemnification.On remand, the appellate court again affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment for defendants. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. While no court has ever deemed the evidence against Beaman insufficient to sustain his conviction, Beaman is entitled to have a jury determine whether the detectives acted with malice. Material issues of fact exist with respect to whether the defendants intentionally ignored, shaped, interpreted, or created evidence to support their conclusion that Beaman was guilty. View "Beaman v. Freesmeyer" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dorsey (age 14) kicked open a door to a Chicago takeout restaurant and began firing a gun at customers, killing a 16-year-old and severely injuring 13-year-old Williams and 16-year-old Sims. At the hospital, Williams told police that Dorsey, whom she knew from school, was the shooter. The juvenile court allowed Dorsey’s prosecution to proceed in adult criminal court. Dorsey was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. A presentence report detailed Dorsey’s troubled home life, gang involvement, and previous encounters with the law. While awaiting trial, Dorsey obtained an eleventh-grade education with “very good grades.” The court heard extensive evidence in aggravation and in mitigation then sentenced Dorsey to consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 76 years’ imprisonment.In 2014, Dorsey sought leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his aggregate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Miller v. Alabama holding, which forbids “a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” He argued that, although his sentence is not technically a natural life sentence, such a lengthy sentence imposed on a juvenile is sufficient to trigger Miller-type protections.The Illinois Supreme Court held that good-conduct credit is relevant and that a sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory scheme that affords a juvenile an opportunity to be released from prison after serving 40 years or less of the term imposed does not constitute a de facto life sentence. View "People v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

In filing mortgage foreclosure cases, the plaintiffs each paid a $50 “add on” filing fee under section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 and of sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Illinois Housing Development Act, 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31, which created foreclosure prevention and property rehabilitation programs funded by the fee.The trial court, following a remand, held that the fee violated the equal protection, due process, and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the fee violates the constitutional right to obtain justice freely. The $50 filing charge established under section 15-1504.1, although called a “fee,” is, in fact, a litigation tax; it has no direct relation to expenses of a petitioner’s litigation and no relation to the services rendered. The court determined that the plaintiffs paid the fee under duress; the voluntary payment doctrine did not apply. View "Walker v. Chasteen" on Justia Law

Hatter was charged with nine counts of criminal sexual assault based on three acts involving F.T., his live-in girlfriend’s 13-year-old daughter. In return for the recommendation of four-year consecutive sentences and an agreement to nol-pros the remaining charges, he pled guilty to counts alleging that he knowingly made contact between his penis and F.T.’s vagina and inserted his finger into F.T.’s vagina while she was a minor and Hatter was her “family member,” as the live-in boyfriend of her mother. The court stated that each charge was punishable by a sentence of four-15 years’ imprisonment, with the potential for an additional 30 years if there were aggravating factors. The court found that he understood the nature of the charges, the possible penalties, and his rights; he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and his guilty plea was supported by a factual basis. The court imposed two consecutive four-year prison terms. Hatter did not appeal. Because of an error with respect to supervised release, at a later hearing, Hatter had an opportunity to vacate his guilty plea. He instead agreed to an amendment of the sentence to provide for the correct mandatory supervised release term.A year later, Hatter filed the pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not argue that F.T. was not a family member. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as patently without merit. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hatter’s factual allegations do not establish an arguably reasonable probability that he would have decided to plead not guilty, absent counsel’s alleged errors in failing to discover and present the defense to three of the nine alternative charges. View "People v. Hatter" on Justia Law