Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs the Missouri Municipal League, the City of Springfield, and Richard Sheets appealed a circuit court's judgment for the State on plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutional validity of two bills passed by the General Assembly. In 2013, the General Assembly passed House Bill 331 and House Bill 345, which repealed and enacted in lieu thereof numerous sections dealing with local government control over telecommunications infrastructure permitting and public right-of-way. Later that year, a circuit court ruled H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 were enacted in violation of procedural requirements of the Missouri Constitution. The State appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Missouri Supreme Court. With the State's appeal still pending, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 649 and Senate Bill 650 in early 2014. S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 repealed and enacted in lieu thereof some of the same sections as had H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 and, in doing so, set forth the text of H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 as the then-existing law for the relevant sections with proposed changes noted. Two days before S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 became effective (and two days before the Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal in the H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 case), plaintiffs brought suit challenging S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 under the Missouri Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming: (1) the contents of the bills violated article I, section 13's prohibition against retrospective laws; article III, section 40(28)'s prohibition on special laws, and article X, section 21's prohibition on unfunded mandates; and (2) the bills were enacted in violation of article III, section 28. The State moved to dismiss the substantive claims, and both sides moved for a judgment on the pleadings for the enactment claims. The circuit court sustained the State's motions, and plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State was entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this claim. View "Missouri Municipal League v. Missouri" on Justia Law

Ryan Amorine sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from holding a probation revocation hearing after Amorine’s term of probation expired. On May 4, 2011, Amorine pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and second-degree domestic assault. After accepting his guilty plea, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Amorine on supervised probation for five years. The trial court also imposed special conditions upon Amorine, which included community service and paying court costs. In 2013, a probation violation report was filed alleging that Amorine failed to pay his court costs or report any community service hours. Amorine admitted the violation in an attachment to the probation violation report. A second probation violation report was filed in 2014, again alleging Amorine failed to pay his court costs or perform his community service hours. The trial court suspended Amorine’s probation and set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, Amorine admitted to the violation. The court extended Amorine’s probation for an additional year. In early 2015, the Board of Probation and Parole filed a “Case Summary Report” and a “Field Violation Report.” Both documents informed the court that Amorine had an earned discharge date of July 13, 2015, and with continued supervision compliance, an optimal discharge date of April 1, 2015. Both reports also indicated that the only violation of Amorine’s probation was his failure to report any community service hours he performed and the failure to pay his court costs. However, the Field Violation Report recommended that the trial court revoke Amorine’s probation, place him on a new term of suspended execution of sentence probation, direct him to pay his court costs, and perform community service work. In 2015, the court issued an order suspending Amorine’s probation. The docket sheets reflected that the court continued and rescheduled the probation revocation hearing several times in 2015; both Amorine and the state appeared at every court date. By fall 2015, Amorine, his counsel, and the state all appeared for another probation revocation hearing, but the cause was passed again. The court continued to hold case reviews on December 15, 2015, and February 17, 2016, and scheduled the next case review for April 19, 2016. The Supreme Court concluded that the facts and circumstances in this case demonstrated "unequivocally" that it needed to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of prohibition to remedy an excess of authority. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded his authority in continuing Amorine’s probation revocation hearing indefinitely after Amorine should have been discharged. Therefore, the preliminary writ of prohibition was made permanent, and the trial court was directed to discharge Amorine from probation. View "Missouri ex rel. Ryan Amorine vs. Honorable Kelly Wayne Parker" on Justia Law

Peggy Stevens McGraw and Samuel C. Jones filed suit alleging the State erroneously implemented the 2010 compensation schedule adopted by the Missouri Citizens' Commission on Compensation for Elected Officials pursuant to Mo. Const. art. XIII, sec. 3. They claimed that as a result of this error they were underpaid for their services, which also resulted in underpaid retirement benefits. The trial court dismissed with prejudice all counts raised by the appellants, and the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal. The Supreme Court found the trial court correctly concluding that appellants' claims were based on an interpretation of art. XIII, sec. 3 that was incorrect as a matter of law and that retirement benefits were properly calculated. View "McGraw v. Missouri" on Justia Law

Rachel Johns sought the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76. She filed a declaration of candidacy with the Missouri Secretary of State, in which she stated under oath, that she “will qualify” to hold the office of state representative pursuant to the Missouri Constitution’s requirements for that office. Respondent Joshua Peters, another candidate for the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76, filed a petition pursuant to section 115.526, RSMo 2000, seeking to disqualify Johns as a candidate and have her name removed from any official election ballot. Peters argued that Johns could not meet the two-year durational voter registration requirement of article III, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution because she did not register to vote until February 4, 2015, which was less than two years before the general election date of November 8, 2016. Although Johns agreed that she did not meet the two-year voter registration requirement, she argued that such requirement is constitutionally invalid as applied to her. The circuit court determined that the voter registration requirement did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Johns appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The State’s justification for the durational voter registration requirement’s burden on voting rights is the same as the justification it offers for the burden on Johns herself. The State’s interests in regulating the fairness of its elections and ensuring that candidates for state representative demonstrate sufficient seriousness about the electoral systems and social and civic engagement are legitimate. The two-year durational voter registration requirement is rationally related to those interests and a reasonable method of furthering them. Accordingly, article III, section 4 does not violate the First Amendment voting rights of the voters of District 76." View "Peters v. Johns" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to verdict directors that allegedly violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and for failing to hire an expert to testify at the sentencing hearing. The motion court overruled Appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant established that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two insufficiently specific verdict directors, and therefore, the motion court clearly erred in denying post-conviction relief. Remanded. View "Hoeber v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and multiple counts of first-degree assault, forcible rape, and forcible sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15, raising a number of additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims and arguments related to suppression issues presented at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in overruling the entirety of Appellant’s rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of recklessly exposing another to HIV without that person’s knowledge and consent pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 191.677. Defendant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that, by compelling her to disclose to potential sexual partners that she has HIV, section 191.677 infringes on her constitutional rights to free speech and privacy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although section 191.677 may compel individuals with HIV to disclose that they have HIV under certain circumstances, the statute imposes only incidental burdens on speech and does not violate constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of speech; and (2) because section 191.677 does not criminalize consensual, non-harmful sexual conduct, Defendant’s right to privacy argument fails. View "State v. S.F." on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.070.1, which prohibits nonviolent felons from possessing firearms. Defendants had been convicted previously of nonviolent felonies. While the charges against Defendants were pending, voters approved Amendment 5 to Mo. Const. art. I, 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, alleging that amended article I, section 23 does not permit the State to criminalize a nonviolent felon’s possession of a firearm. The trial courts in both cases applied the amended version of article I, section 23, concluding that section 571.070.1 was unconstitutional as applied to Defendants, and dismissed the charges. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments in both cases, holding that article I, section 23, as in effect at the time of Defendant’s alleged crimes, did not prohibit the State from regulating the right of nonviolent felons to bear arms. View "State v. Lomax" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.070.1(1), which prohibits nonviolent felons from possessing firearms. Defendant had been convicted previously of the nonviolent felony of unlawful use of a weapon. Defendant moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, arguing that section 571.070.1 violates the right to bear arms set forth in Mo. Const. art. I, 23. The trial court agreed with Defendant and dismissed the firearms possession count. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Missouri Constitution does not prohibit the legislature from restricting nonviolent felons’ right to possess firearms and that the statutory bar is valid. Remanded. View "State v. Clay" on Justia Law

In 1973, Appellant pleaded guilty to felony forgery. In 1975, Appellant was discharged from probation pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 549.111.2, which provided that individuals discharged from probation were “restored all the rights and privileges of citizenship.” In 1977, the statute was repealed. In 2013, Appellant applied for a concealed carry permit. The county sheriff denied the application due to Appellant’s 1973 felony forgery conviction. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that Appellant’s prior guilty plea rendered him ineligible for a concealed carry permit pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.101, which expressly limits the availability of a concealed carry permit to individuals who have “not pled guilty to…a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 571.101 is not unconstitutionally retrospective and that Appellant had no vested right to a concealed weapon permit. View "Hill v. Boyer" on Justia Law