Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children, challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 302 (S.B. 302) by filing suit against the State Treasurer. Petitioners, parents seeking to apply for the grant established by S.B. 302, moved to intervene as defendants. Petitioners argued that they satisfied the requirements for intervention of right under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b) or, alternatively, that they should be permitted to intervene under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The district court denied the motion. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant their application to intervene. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to intervene where Petitioners and the State shared the same goal of having the education grant program created by S.B. 302 declared constitutional. View "Hairr v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related felonies. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant filed a postconviction habeas proceeding but was denied relief. Defendant then filed a second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the ineffective assistance of the attorney who represented him in the first postconviction proceeding excused the procedural bars to claims raised in his second petition. The district court denied the petition as both untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied the petition as procedurally barred because, although Defendant filed his petition within a reasonable time after the postconviction-counsel claims became available, those claims lacked merit, and therefore, Defendant had not demonstrated good cause for an untimely petition or good cause and prejudice for a second petition. View "Rippo v. State" on Justia Law

The City of Fernley filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief arguing that the Local Government Tax Distribution Account under Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.660 violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the prohibition on special or local legislation under Nev. Const. art IV, 20. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly found the Local Government Tax Distribution Account to be general legislation because the system is a “general law that applies neutrally to local government entities and is based on classifications that are rationally related to achieving the Legislature’s legitimate government objective of promoting general-purpose governments that have public services.” View "City of Fernley v. State, Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

Respondents Dawn Stockman, an animal control officer for Clark County Animal Control, and Clark County obtained a warrant to search Appellant Judy Palmieri’s residence by relying in part on a tip from an informant who, Palmieri later alleged, provided a false identity when she filed a complaint against Palmieri. A search of Palmieri’s residence revealed several violations of the Clark County Code’s provisions for the health and welfare of animals. Palmieri later sued Respondents, asserting a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, a Monell claim, and several state law causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The primary issue on appeal was whether the district court appropriately granted Stockman summary judgment on Palmieri’s 1983 claim based on a finding that Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore, the district court appropriately granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. View "Palmieri v. Clark County" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes, was sentenced to serve fourteen consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of ninety-two years in prison. In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Graham v. Florida. The district court granted Defendant’s petition and ordered a new sentencing hearing, determining (1) Graham prohibited aggregate sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, and (2) Graham also provided good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar of Defendant’s untimely and successive petition. Although the Supreme Court agreed that Graham precludes aggregate sentences that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against nonhomicide juvenile offenders and that the decision in Graham provides good cause and actual prejudice for Defendant’s untimely and successive petition, the Court nonetheless vacated the district court’s order, holding that A.B. 267 remedies Defendant’s unconstitutional sentence. View "State v. Boston" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes for the death of a member of a motorcycle gang after a brawl between two motorcycle gangs. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to answer two questions from the jury during deliberations; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to bifurcate the gang-enhancement portion of the trial from the guilt phase; and (3) the cumulative effect of these and other errors deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of violating Carson City Municipal Code (CCMC) 3.04.050. CCMC 3.04.050(1) makes it “unlawful for any person to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay, molest or threaten to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay or molest any…member of the sheriff’s office…in the discharge of his official duties.” Petitioner appealed, arguing that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because it restricts constitutional speech. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overboard because is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words and is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks sufficient guidelines and gives the sheriff too much discretion in its enforcement. Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order reversing Petitioner’s conviction in part on the grounds that CCMC 8.04.050(1) is unconstitutional on its face and to determine whether Petitioner may properly be charged under the remainder of CCMC 8.04.050. View "Scott v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law