Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant Robert Goodwin guilty of second-degree insurance fraud. In doing so, the jury concluded that defendant knowingly made or caused to be made false statements of material fact concerning an insurance claim for damage to his girlfriend's sport utility vehicle (SUV). The heart of the State's case was that defendant falsely reported the theft of the vehicle, which was found severely damaged as the result of arson. The insurance company discovered the lie during an investigation when defendant recanted his earlier story that the SUV had been stolen. As a result, the carrier did not reimburse the loss. The Appellate Division overturned defendant's conviction because the jury was not told that a finding of insurance fraud could be returned only if the carrier actually relied on defendant's false statements. In the Appellate Division's view, the trial court erred by charging a relaxed standard: that guilt could be found if the false statements had the capacity to influence the insurance company s decision to pay the claim. The Supreme Court reversed: a person violates the insurance fraud statute even if he does not succeed in duping an insurance carrier into paying a fraudulent claim. Because the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its charge to the jury, defendant's conviction was reinstated. View "New Jersey v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Defendant Howard Jones was charged with third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, arising from events that took place one morning in the spring of 2009 involving C.W., a fourteen-year-old girl. According to C.W.'s testimony, she was on her way to school when she saw a man standing there with his penis out. C.W. ran toward her school, and quickly encountered Leonard Wimbush. According to Wimbush, he saw a man emerge from the bushes and followed after him, but was unable to continue his pursuit after the man jumped a fence. Wimbush returned to the front of the building and waited for the police. When officers arrived, Wimbush joined police to search for the suspect. During the search, the responding officer came upon an individual wearing a gray sweatshirt, and asked the man (later identified as defendant) if he had seen anyone suspicious in the area. The man responded, "The gentleman who was exposing himself is on the track bed." Because the officer had not mentioned that he was looking for an individual who had exposed himself, he became interested. Defendant started to walk toward the back of the house to obtain his identification, and then ran away. Wimbush tackled the man, and the officer placed defendant under arrest. Following the close of the State's case, defendant moved to strike C.W.'s identification, arguing that it was tainted. Defense counsel noted that C.W. did not see defendant's face, that she recognized defendant only once the jacket was placed on him, that the officers never showed her any other suspects, and that Wimbush and the officer were standing next to defendant when he was identified. The trial court denied the motion, noting that, although one-on-one showup identifications are inherently suggestive, C.W.'s testimony was reliable because it was corroborated by Wimbush, who identified defendant and who provided a description that was essentially the same as the one provided by C.W. Defendant appealed, contending that [b]y placing the incriminating jacket on defendant after C.W. failed to identify defendant without the jacket, the police violated defendant's [due process] right to be free from suggestive police identification procedures that create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Defendant also challenged his sentence and the trail court's failure to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the State's argument that what occurred at this showup was an identification of an inanimate object. Here, C.W. was not simply identifying a jacket being shown to her by the police because it had been found near where defendant was located. "Placing a jacket on a person after his arrest and using that item of clothing during the eyewitness identification procedure when a witness is having difficulty identifying the suspect raises due process concerns." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law

While driving from his residence to his mother's home one night in 2006, defendant Eugene Baum struck and killed two teenage girls who were walking in a bike lane of a major thoroughfare in Kinnelon. The responding officers found two beverage containers in defendant's car, one of which contained a liquid that was 7.7 percent ethyl alcohol (15 proof). Defendant could not maintain his balance, his speech was slurred, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. He told the police that he thought he had hit a deer, but was not sure. At the time of the incident, defendant's blood alcohol level was determined to be between .327 and .377, four times the legal limit. Defendant had taken a prescribed anti-depressant the night before, and Librium that morning to control his symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. Although he knew that Librium would intensify his intoxication, defendant stated that he consumed more than two alcoholic beverages, but did not know how much he actually consumed, before driving. Defendant stated that he drank because he was an alcoholic, and has struggled with alcoholism for approximately seven years. Defendant argued at trial that he lacked the mental capacity to act recklessly because of his intoxication, which he claimed was involuntary due to his mental diseases or defects of alcoholism and depression. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree death by auto. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-year prison terms subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on a reevaluation of the aggravating factors relied on by the sentencing court. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging errors at trial constituted reversible error. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Baum" on Justia Law

During an encounter that lasted ten seconds, a woman was robbed at gunpoint. She surrendered her purse with her cell phone inside it, and the robber drove away in a car. She later identified defendant Julius Smith as her assailant. Six weeks after the robbery, the State Police recovered the victim's cell phone when they arrested a third person. Law enforcement officers contacted the victim, but the prosecutor and local police did not learn about the discovery of the phone until the middle of defendant s trial -- fifteen months later. Defense counsel twice moved for a mistrial to investigate this critical information. The trial court took alternate measures to try to remedy the belated disclosure but denied defendant's motion. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court found that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a mistrial, particularly in light of the materiality of the evidence that surfaced mid-trial, defendant's inability to investigate it while the short trial proceeded, and the nature and strength of the evidence against defendant. The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing the issuance of $6,300,000 in bonds to finance a redevelopment project in the Township of West Orange. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs claiming that the Township failed to secure the statutorily required approval for the bond ordinance from the Local Finance Board, which is a part of the Division of Local Government Services within New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs. As a result, plaintiffs claim the bond ordinance was invalid. The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiffs filed their complaint fifty-three days after final publication of the bond ordinance (well outside the twenty-day period permitted by Rule 4:69-6(b)(11)). The Appellate Division affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs did not present any extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial and appellate courts to consider their claims, those courts properly dismissed plaintiffs' petition. View "In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of W. Orange" on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant Duquene Pierre was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and several other offenses, arising from a fatal shooting in Elizabeth. Defendant was one of several suspects arrested for the shooting. He maintained that when the crime occurred at 3:19 a.m. on March 20, 1994, he and one of his codefendants were not in New Jersey, but on their way to Florida to visit defendant's relatives. This appeal stems from the denial of defendant's application for post-conviction relief (PCR), based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In evidentiary hearings before the PCR court, defendant presented evidence that, if called to testify, his brother Kirby Pierre and sister Astrid Pierre would have stated that in March 1994, Kirby did not know how to drive and did not travel to Florida. Defendant also presented evidence that the remainder of Reid s telephone bill, not offered into evidence at trial, would have supported his contention that he was in Florida in the days that followed the Elizabeth shooting. Finally, three of defendant's relatives testified that defendant visited each of them in Florida in March 1994, but defendant's trial counsel did not contact them to ascertain their knowledge of those visits. The PCR court denied defendant's PCR application, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. By virtue of the combined errors of his trial counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR and the appellate courts' decisions denying relief, finding that defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Pierre" on Justia Law

In June 2005, O.M. disclosed that her stepfather, defendant R.P., sexually abused her beginning when she was twelve years old. The abuse resulted in two pregnancies, one of which was terminated and one of which resulted in the birth of M.M. when O.M. was sixteen or seventeen years old. Following DNA testing of O.M., M.M., and defendant, M.M.'s DNA profile was consistent with that of an offspring of O.M. and defendant. A Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was less than thirteen years old; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least thirteen but less than sixteen years old, and defendant was related to O.M. by affinity; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while using physical force or coercion, and O.M. sustained severe personal injury; and second-degree sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years old. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count two), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three), and second-degree sexual assault (count four); the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one, first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-six-year aggregate term of imprisonment with a thirteen-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on second-degree sexual assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three). The appellate panel determined that because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault, the trial court's failure to issue such an instruction on count three was plain error. The panel reversed the conviction on count three, remanded for a new trial on that charge, and vacated defendant's sentence. The panel did not comment on the State's request that the verdict be molded to reflect a conviction for second-degree sexual assault as to count three. The State then moved for reconsideration and clarification as to whether the Appellate Division considered the State's contention that the verdict on count three should be molded to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The Appellate Division denied reconsideration without explanation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that defendant was "given his day in court," that all the elements of sexual assault were included in the crime of aggravated sexual assault, and that there was no prejudice to defendant. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. R.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Corey Morris appealed an order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of armed robbery, weapons offenses and eluding the police. At his first trial, defendant was convicted of eluding, but the jury deadlocked on all other charges. Prior to retrial, defendant and the State reached a plea agreement where defendant pled guilty to three armed robbery charges, and received three sentences of twenty years (to run concurrent to the twenty-year sentence for eluding), subject to the No Early Release Act. Defendant was permitted to represent himself on appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that “defendant’s arguments [were] without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.” View "New Jersey v. Morris" on Justia Law