Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio

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The Supreme Court held that using a prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency for the commission of an offense that would have been felonious assault if committed by an adult as an element of the offense of having a weapon under disability, as set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2923.13(A)(2), does not violate due process under the Ohio or United States Constitutions. Appellant was indicted on one count of having a weapon while under a disability. The alleged disability stemmed from Appellant’s prior adjudication of delinquency as a juvenile for committing a felonious assault. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his juvenile adjudication could not be used as a predicate for criminal conduct under section 2923.13(A)(2). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a previous juvenile adjudication may be an element of the weapons-under-disability offense set forth in section 2923.13(A)(2) without violating due process. View "State v. Carnes" on Justia Law

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In this original action brought under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court sustained the challenge brought by Relators regarding an initiative petition to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the November 6, 2018 ballot, concluding that Relators showed that Ohio law required invalidation of the petition. The proposed constitutional amendment at issue was called the “Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment.” Relators - the Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Committee and its individual members and Secretary of State Jon Husted - argued in part that the petition must be invalidated because several circulation managers failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 3501.381(A). The Supreme Court invalidated the petition, holding that Relators demonstrated violations of section 3501.381(A) and that the constitutional challenges to that statute were without merit. View "Ohio Renal Ass’n v. Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Committee" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that an order appointing a guardian ad litem (GAL) for an adult is not a final, appealable order under Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B) and vacated the trial court’s order appointing a GAL to act on Appellant’s behalf in her divorce case. The court of common pleas, domestic relations division, issued an order appointing a GAL to represent Appellant in her divorce case without providing her with prior notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) because the order was issued during a special proceeding and affects a substantial right and because Appellant will not be provided adequate relief if she is not permitted immediately to appeal the order, the order is a final, appealable order under section 2505.02(B)(2); and (2) the order violated Appellant’s due process rights. View "Thomasson v. Thomasson" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether the trial court had authority to enjoin the state from enforcing new statutes as punishment for contempt of court. The court of common pleas found the state to be in contempt of a court order that permanently enjoined the state from enforcing several statutes that the court had declared unconstitutional. The contempt finding was based on the General Assembly’s enactment of new statutes that reduced funding to cities that were not acting in compliance with the statutes that were previously declared unconstitutional. As punishment for the contempt, the state was enjoined from enforcing the new laws. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, vacated the order of contempt, and dissolved the injunction against enforcing the spending provisions enacted by 2015 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 64 (H.B. 64), holding that the trial court lacked authority to enjoin enforcement of the spending provisions enacted in H.B. 64 because the statutes had not been declared unconstitutional. View "Toledo v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of aggravated murder with a death specification, felony-murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and other crimes and the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty. On appeal, Defendant presented eighteen propositions of law. The Supreme Court examined each of Defendant’s claims and found that none had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding that there was no reversible error committed in the proceedings below and that Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme does not violate the right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant was sentenced to death. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty-phase trial. On remand, Appellant moved to dismiss the capital specification from his indictment, arguing that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, __ U.S. __ (2016). Hurst invalidated Florida’s former capital-sentencing scheme because it “required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance.” The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Ohio law requires the critical jury findings that were not required by the law at issue in Hurst, Ohio’s death-penalty scheme does not violate a defendant’s right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Mason" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied Relator’s motion for leave to amend his complaint and denied the writ of mandamus he sought to compel Respondents, the City of Columbus and the Franklin County Board of Elections, to remove a proposal to amend the Columbus city charter from the May 8, 2018 ballot. On March 9, 2018, Relator filed a formal protest against the proposed charter amendment, arguing that it was substantively unconstitutional and that the summary language was false and deceptive. Three days later, the office of Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted approved the final ballot language. The board of elections then informed Relator it would not hold a hearing on his protest. Relator then filed this complaint against the city and the board of elections seeking a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court (1) denied the writ, holding that the language of the proposed Columbus charter conveyed enough information for voters to know what they were being asked to vote on; and (2) denied as moot the motion for leave to amend the complaint to name Husted as a respondent. View "State ex rel. Schuck v. Columbus" on Justia Law

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Preterm, a state licensed ambulatory surgical facility that provides abortion services, sued asserting that provisions of H.B. 59 (R.C. 3702.30, 3702.302-3702.308, 3727.60; 2317.56, 2919.19-2919.193, 4731.22, 5101.80, 5101.801, 5101.804) are unrelated to the state budget and should be declared void as violating the Single Subject Clause of Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The Written Transfer Agreement Provisions require that an ambulatory surgical facility “shall have a written transfer agreement with a local hospital" and prohibit a “public hospital” from entering into such an agreement with a facility “in which nontherapeutic abortions are performed or induced.” The Heartbeat Provisions provide that unless there is a medical emergency, no person shall perform or induce an abortion before “determining if the unborn human individual has a detectable fetal heartbeat” and notifying the pregnant woman of the results. The Parenting and Pregnancy Provisions permit the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services to offer TANF (federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) block grant funds to certain entities “not involved in or associated with any abortion activities.” The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Preterm lacked standing to bring the challenge. Preterm has not proven it suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete injury from the passage of the 2013 state budget bill. View "Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich" on Justia Law

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Preterm, a state licensed ambulatory surgical facility that provides abortion services, sued asserting that provisions of H.B. 59 (R.C. 3702.30, 3702.302-3702.308, 3727.60; 2317.56, 2919.19-2919.193, 4731.22, 5101.80, 5101.801, 5101.804) are unrelated to the state budget and should be declared void as violating the Single Subject Clause of Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The Written Transfer Agreement Provisions require that an ambulatory surgical facility “shall have a written transfer agreement with a local hospital" and prohibit a “public hospital” from entering into such an agreement with a facility “in which nontherapeutic abortions are performed or induced.” The Heartbeat Provisions provide that unless there is a medical emergency, no person shall perform or induce an abortion before “determining if the unborn human individual has a detectable fetal heartbeat” and notifying the pregnant woman of the results. The Parenting and Pregnancy Provisions permit the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services to offer TANF (federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) block grant funds to certain entities “not involved in or associated with any abortion activities.” The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Preterm lacked standing to bring the challenge. Preterm has not proven it suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete injury from the passage of the 2013 state budget bill. View "Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich" on Justia Law

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Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law