Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After being arrested in connection with several shootings, the defendant was informed of the charges against him at his initial municipal court appearance, where he was appointed counsel and bail was set. Later that day, police detectives interrogated him, reading him his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged and waived by answering questions. During the interrogation, he confessed to involvement in one shooting and a separate theft. About 45 minutes into the interrogation, after being pressed about another crime, he asked, “Like, I can’t talk to a lawyer?” The detective replied that anyone could talk to a lawyer, and the defendant made a statement that was interpreted by the trial court as an invocation of his right to counsel. The interrogation continued, and he made further statements.The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendant’s motion to suppress all statements made during the interrogation. The trial court ruled that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides a broader right to counsel than the Sixth Amendment, and found that the defendant’s state constitutional right was violated by the interrogation without counsel present. Alternatively, it held that the defendant unambiguously invoked his federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the interrogation, requiring suppression of all subsequent statements. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying solely on the Ohio Constitution and interpreting it to provide a broader right to counsel than the federal Constitution.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. It held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the right to counsel only at “trial,” not at preindictment investigatory interviews, and therefore was not implicated by the interrogation. The court further held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance, but he did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke that right during the interrogation. The court remanded the case to the trial court, instructing it to vacate its suppression order. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

A private company specializing in the disposal of wastewater from oil and gas fracking leased land in an urban area and constructed two saltwater-injection wells. After two earthquakes were recorded near the wells, the State of Ohio determined the company’s activities caused the seismic events and temporarily suspended operations at both wells. One well was later permitted to resume limited operations, but the suspension of the second well remained until 2021. The company had been aware of seismicity risks before acquiring its leasehold and warned investors of possible regulatory shutdowns.After the suspension, the company pursued administrative and judicial challenges, including an appeal to the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission and the Tenth District Court of Appeals, both of which upheld the State’s actions. The company then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, claiming a regulatory taking of its property. The Eleventh District initially denied relief, but following multiple remands from the Supreme Court of Ohio, it ultimately found no total taking but did find a compensable partial regulatory taking under the Penn Central analysis, ordering the State to initiate eminent-domain proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the suspension order constituted a total or partial regulatory taking. The court held that the company failed to prove it was deprived of all economically beneficial use, rejecting the total taking claim. The court further held that, under a proper balancing of the Penn Central factors, the State’s actions did not amount to a compensable partial taking. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eleventh District’s denial of the total takings claim, reversed its partial takings finding, and denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle after observing what appeared to be a nonfunctional headlight. During the stop, the officer asked the driver for his license, but the driver stated he did not have it and instead provided his name, date of birth, and Social Security number. Soon after, the officers realized the headlight was actually working, but the stop continued so the officer could verify the driver’s information. Dispatch reported that the driver had failed to reinstate his license and had an outstanding warrant. The driver was then arrested, and a search of the vehicle uncovered drugs and a scale, leading to felony charges.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied. The defendant then entered a no-contest plea and was convicted. On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the officer should have ended the stop once it became clear the headlight was operational. The appellate court held that continuing to detain the defendant after the original reason for the stop was dispelled rendered the subsequent search and evidence unlawful.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that, under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may verify a driver’s license status as part of the mission of a lawfully initiated traffic stop, even if the suspicion that justified the stop is later dispelled. The court further held that the driver’s failure to produce a license provided new reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and investigate whether he was unlicensed. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Fips" on Justia Law

A group of anonymous individuals from Franklin and Delaware counties challenged two firearm-related ordinances enacted by the Columbus City Council in December 2022 and February 2023. The ordinances imposed restrictions on magazine capacity and required safe storage of firearms, among other provisions. The challengers argued that these ordinances violated Ohio’s firearm regulation preemption law and state constitutional protections for the right to keep and bear arms.The challengers filed suit in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of certain provisions of the ordinances. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, thereby barring the city from enforcing the contested provisions. The City of Columbus, along with city officials, appealed the trial court’s order to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The challengers moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the preliminary injunction was not a final, appealable order under Ohio law. The Fifth District agreed, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether state and municipal governments may immediately appeal orders that preliminarily enjoin enforcement of their laws. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), such a preliminary injunction constitutes a final order because it inflicts irreparable harm on the sovereign interests of the government, which cannot be remedied by appeal after a final judgment. Therefore, the order is immediately appealable. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Fifth District’s dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the city’s appeal. View "Doe v. Columbus" on Justia Law

VVF Intervest, L.L.C., a contract manufacturer based in Kansas, produced bar soap for High Ridge Brands (HRB), the brand owner. HRB, an "asset light" entity, directed VVF to ship the soap from Kansas to a third-party distribution center in Columbus, Ohio. Subsequently, HRB resold most of the product to national retailers, and the soap was shipped out of Ohio to various locations. Between 2010 and 2014, VVF paid Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on its gross receipts from these sales to HRB.After making these payments, VVF sought a refund from the Ohio tax commissioner, arguing that its gross receipts should not be sitused to Ohio since the products left the state soon after arrival. The tax commissioner denied the refund, emphasizing that the relevant sale for tax purposes was VVF’s sale to HRB, not HRB’s subsequent sales to retailers. VVF appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which held that the Columbus distribution center was merely an interim stop and that the gross receipts should not be sitused to Ohio. The board also found that VVF had not adequately preserved an alternative statutory argument regarding services and declined to rule on constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the appeal and reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision. The court held that under R.C. 5751.033(E), VVF’s gross receipts from sales to HRB are properly sitused to Ohio because HRB, as the purchaser, received the goods in Ohio. The court dismissed VVF’s alternative statutory argument for lack of jurisdiction and rejected VVF’s constitutional challenges under the Due Process, Commerce, and Equal Protection Clauses. Thus, VVF is not entitled to a refund of the CAT paid on these transactions. View "VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

In this case, two police officers responded to a robbery at a car dealership and pursued the suspects on the highway. During the chase, one officer was shot multiple times by a hidden suspect, and both officers exchanged gunfire with the perpetrator, who was ultimately killed. One officer suffered serious injuries and required extensive medical care. Following the incident, a newspaper reporter requested public records from the Columbus Police Department, including body camera and dash camera footage of the shootout. The police department denied the request for unredacted video footage, citing statutory provisions that protect the privacy of crime victims, specifically Marsy's Law and related Ohio statutes.The Columbus Police Department eventually released redacted versions of the body camera footage, concealing the identities of the two officers and ending the video before the shooting. The newspaper maintained that, as public officials acting in the line of duty, the officers could not be considered "victims" under Marsy's Law and filed an original action in the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production of the unredacted footage.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the officers were "victims" under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution (Marsy's Law), and thus entitled to privacy protections under the Victim Privacy Law and the Public Records Act. The court held that police officers are "persons against whom crimes can be committed" and therefore qualify as victims under Marsy's Law. As a result, the statutory provisions apply, and the redaction of identifying information from the footage was proper. The court denied the newspaper's request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the newspaper was not entitled to unredacted body camera and dash camera footage identifying the officers. View "State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept." on Justia Law

Susan Boggs and Fouad Rachid reside in a home owned by Fouad, Inc., located in Olmsted Township near the Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport. Boggs alleges that increased air traffic and airport operations, particularly following a runway expansion project, have caused significant noise, vibrations, and emissions, rendering the property unsuitable for residential use and amounting to a governmental taking. Boggs declined Cleveland’s offer to purchase an avigation easement and subsequently filed a mandamus action against the City of Cleveland, seeking to compel the city to initiate appropriation proceedings to determine compensation for the alleged taking.The case was initially removed to federal court, where Boggs pursued administrative remedies with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but her claims were rejected. After further federal litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Cleveland on federal claims and remanded the state-law claims to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In state court, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cleveland, finding that Boggs lacked standing because Cleveland, as a municipality, lacked authority to appropriate property outside its boundaries. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Boggs’s injury was not redressable since Cleveland could not be compelled to initiate appropriation proceedings for property outside its jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The court held that under Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, a landowner whose property has been taken by a foreign municipality has standing to pursue a mandamus action to force the municipality to institute appropriation proceedings for compensation, regardless of whether the property is located within the municipality’s boundaries. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the statute-of-limitations issue. View "State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses, including rape, against his young daughter. The central issue on appeal relates to the jury selection process, specifically whether the defendant’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge a particular juror, referred to as Juror McCarthy, for cause. During voir dire, Juror McCarthy expressed some initial uncertainty about his ability to be impartial in a case involving a child witness and indicated discomfort with the presumption of innocence, but also participated in group responses affirming his willingness to be fair and follow the law.After conviction, the defendant appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his counsel’s failure to challenge Juror McCarthy deprived him of a fair trial. The appellate court reviewed the voir dire transcript and concluded that Juror McCarthy’s statements reflected an internal struggle common to many jurors faced with difficult subject matter, rather than actual bias against the defendant. The court also noted that Juror McCarthy, through group responses and direct questioning, indicated he could be fair and impartial. The appellate court therefore rejected the ineffective assistance claim and affirmed the convictions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, focusing on whether a reviewing court may consider group answers during voir dire when determining actual juror bias, and whether a juror who expresses partiality can be rehabilitated through such group responses. The court held that, in assessing actual bias, the entire voir dire record—including group answers—must be considered. The court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate that Juror McCarthy was actually biased, and thus did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

A city filed a criminal complaint against a property owner, alleging that his property was in violation of certain provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), which the city had adopted by ordinance. The complaint stated that the property’s residence lacked water service, had holes in the roof, and that a break wall was collapsing into a river. It also alleged the presence of various items described as “debris,” such as barrels, lawn mowers, boats, trailers, propane tanks, and overgrown vegetation. The city claimed these conditions violated IPMC sections requiring properties to be maintained in a “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” condition.The property owner moved to dismiss the charges in the Huron Municipal Court, arguing that the IPMC provisions were unconstitutionally vague because the terms “clean,” “safe,” and “sanitary” were undefined. The trial court agreed, relying on a prior decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, State v. ACV Realty, which had found similar IPMC language void for vagueness. As a result, the trial court dismissed the relevant counts. The city appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the terms in question should be given their ordinary meanings and were sufficiently clear to inform property owners of the prohibited conduct.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to resolve a conflict between appellate districts. The court held that a defendant cannot successfully challenge a law as void for vagueness if his conduct clearly falls within the activities the law prohibits. Because the alleged conditions of the property—such as lack of water, structural decay, and accumulation of debris—clearly violated the IPMC provisions, the property owner’s vagueness challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "Huron v. Kisil" on Justia Law

K.W. agreed to buy a MacBook Pro laptop from a seller on the Letgo app, who was later identified as Mamadou Diaw. When K.W. met Diaw to complete the transaction, Diaw and an accomplice stole K.W.'s iPhone and money, assaulted him, and threatened him with a gun. Detective Michael Sturgill subpoenaed Letgo for information about the seller, obtaining an IP address, an email address, and a single location data point.The trial court granted Diaw's motion to suppress the information obtained from Letgo, finding that the police acquired it in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Diaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location data because it was a single, voluntarily communicated data point that was historical in nature.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's judgment. The court held that a person generally has no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with third parties. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement to obtain a search warrant before securing a single historical location data point from a third-party online-marketplace app. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Diaw" on Justia Law