Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eleven counts of aggravated murder, each containing death-penalty specifications. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death on each of the eleven counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) courtroom closures did not deny Defendant his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; (2) pretrial publicity did not deny Defendant a fair trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s requests for a change of venue; (3) the trial court did not impermissibly restrict voir dire of prospective jurors or abuse its discretion in denying challenges for cause to a number of prospective jurors; (3) the trial court did not act arbitrarily by permitting jurors to use their initials to signify assent to verdicts; (4) Defendant’s arguments regarding the manner in which the death specifications were alleged in the indictment and with the instructions submitted to the jury were unavailing; (5) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury during the penalty phase; (6) Defendant’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel; (7) Defendant’s constitutional challenges to death penalty statutes failed; and (8) the death sentences in this case were appropriate and proportionate when compared with similar capital cases. View "State v. Sowell" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the Supreme Court considered Newegg, Inc.’s appeal from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from sales of computer-related products that it shipped into the state of Ohio. Newegg contested its CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. In Crutchfield, the Supreme Court held that, under the Commerce Clause, the physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales receipts threshold adequately assures that the taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio is substantial. After applying Crutchfield’s holding in this case, the Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Newegg. View "Newegg, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The tax commissioner issued commercial-activity tax (CAT) assessments against the Crutchfield Corporation on revenue it earned from sales of electronic products that it shipped from the state of Ohio. Crutchfield, whose business in Ohio consisted solely of shipping goods from outside the state to its consumers in Ohio using the United States Postal Service or common-carrier delivery services, challenged the issuance of CAT assessments against it, arguing that Ohio may not impose a tax on the gross receipts associated with its sales to Ohio consumers because Crutchfield lacks a “substantial nexus” with Ohio. Citing case law interpreting this substantial-nexus requirement, Crutchfield argued that its nexus to Ohio was not sufficiently substantial because it lacked a “physical presence” in Ohio. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the assessments issued by the tax commissioner. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA and upheld the CAT assessments against Crutchfield, holding (1) the physical presence requirement recognized by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of use-tax collection does not extend to business-privileges taxes such as the CAT; and (2) the statutory threshold of $500,000 of Ohio sales constitutes a sufficient guarantee of the substantiality of an Ohio nexus for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Cleveland granted a production company a permit to close a portion of a street in downtown Cleveland for sixteen consecutive days so that the company could film scenes for a movie. The street’s closure cut off access to one of two entrances to a parking lot owned by Cuyahoga Lakefront Land, LLC (“Lakefront”) during the permit period. Lakefront brought this original action in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which found that Cleveland had taken Lakefront’s property without just compensation and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Cleveland to commence appropriation proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no writ should issue because Lakefront failed to show that the temporary loss of access to one of the two entrances to the parking lot was a compensable taking of its property. View "State ex rel. Cuyahoga Lakefront, L.L.C. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 2016, Defendant was indicted of several offenses. Before trial, the prosecuting attorney obtained a second indictment. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the first indictment. Defendant then pleaded guilty to five counts of gross sexual imposition charged in the second indictment. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the doctrine of res judicata precluded his convictions because his first indictment was dismissed with prejudice and included the same charges and was based on the same facts and circumstances as the second indictment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Defendant’s argument was a double jeopardy claim and that double jeopardy claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the first indictment was dismissed not on the merits but to prevent a double jeopardy violation, the doctrine of res judicata did not preclude Defendant’s convictions. View "State ex rel. Steele v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was indicted for murder. After a series of mistrials that were declared in Defendant’s case during the fourteen years since his arrest, Defendant moved to dismiss his indictment, alleging a violation of the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a mistrial or hung jury does not bar retrial or retrials. Defendant appealed, arguing that yet another trial would violate the “fair play” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a double jeopardy challenge to the retrial of a defendant following a mistrial is analyzed under the Double Jeopardy Clause rather than the Due Process Clause; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a defendant’s retrial after several mistrials have been properly declared. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated murder. After the mitigation phase and the jury recommendation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the aggravated murder. Defendant appealed, raising twenty-one propositions of law. The Supreme Court rejected each of Defendant’s propositions and affirmed his convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the pretrial phase; (2) there was no prejudicial error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings; (3) the jury instructions and verdict forms did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights; (4) cumulative prosecutorial conduct did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; (5) trial counsel provided effective assistance; (6) nothing in the record supported Defendant’s claim of trial court bias; and (7) Defendant’s death sentence was proportionate and appropriate. View "State v. McKelton" on Justia Law

Relators filed petitions proposing the adoption of county charters in Athens, Meigs, and Portage Counties. Each of the boards of elections reviewed the petitions and, while determining that the petitions contained sufficient signatures, rejected the petitions as invalid. Secretary of State Jon Husted denied Relators’ protests and instructed the boards not to place the proposed charters on the ballot. Relators then initiated this action seeking a writ of mandamus requiring Husted and the boards of elections to place the proposed charters on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the secretary of state and boards of elections did not abuse their discretion in determining that the proposed county charters failed to satisfy the requirements under Ohio Const. art. X, 3 for a valid charter initiative. View "State ex rel. Coover v. Husted" on Justia Law

Victoria Ullman filed an action requesting a declaration that the JobsOhio Act, which authorized the creation of a nonprofit corporation for the purposes of promoting economic development, was unconstitutional. Ullman, who was counsel and then amicus curiae in previous cases involving the same issue, filed this action on her own behalf. Respondents filed motions to dismiss the complaint. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, finding that Ullman lacked standing to proceed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ullman lacked standing under the public-right doctrine as articulated in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward and State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash. View "State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted" on Justia Law

Hand entered no-contest pleas in Montgomery County to first-degree felonies (aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping) and two second-degree counts of felonious assault. Each count had a three-year firearm specification attached, to which Hand also entered no-contest pleas. During the plea hearing, the parties agreed to a total six-year prison term with three of the years being mandatory because they are related to the merged firearm specifications, R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145. The parties disputed whether the three years for the other offenses was also a mandatory term, based on whether Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) should operate as a first-degree felony conviction to enhance his sentence. The court ruled that Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication required imposition of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.13(F). The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. Treating a juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction to enhance a sentence for a later crime is inconsistent with Ohio’s system for juveniles, which is predicated on the fact that children are not as culpable for their acts as adults and should be rehabilitated rather than punished. In addition, juveniles are not afforded the right to a jury trial. View "State v. Hand" on Justia Law