Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was entered a guilty plea to charges of murder, domestic violence, and aggravated murder with capital specifications for the murders of his former girlfriend, their two-year-old son, and his girlfriend’s nine-year-old daughter. A three-judge panel unanimously sentenced Defendant to death of the aggravated murders of the two children and to fifteen years to life for his girlfriend’s murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) the panel did not err by failing sua sponte to order Defendant to undergo a competency evaluation; (2) the evidence presented during the plea hearing was sufficient to convict Defendant of the escaping detection specification attached to an aggravated murder, and defendant’s conviction of that specification was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) defense counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance during the plea and mitigation hearings; (4) Defendant was not denied due process of law and a fair trial when the panel admitted and considered graphic photographs during the plea and mitigation hearings; and (5) Defendant’s death sentence was appropriate and proportionate. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Defendant, a police officer, was charged with one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and one count of sexual battery. A bench trial resulted in Defendant’s conviction for sexual battery under Ohio Rev. Code 2907.03(A)(13), which makes peace officers strictly liable for sexual conduct with anyone under the age of eighteen when the offender is more than two years older. The appellate court reversed, concluding that section 2907.03(A)(13) violated equal protection and was facially unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute is an arbitrarily disparate treatment of peace officers that violates equal protection principles under the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Mole" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with rape and kidnapping. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on unconstitutional preindictment delay. The court of common pleas dismissed the charges, concluding that the State’s indictment of Appellee one day before the expiration of the applicable twenty-year statute of limitations prejudiced Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Appellee suffered actual prejudice as a result of the nearly twenty-year delay between the alleged offenses and the indictment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard in its analysis of Appellee’s preindictment-delay claim. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging that A.G. was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated robbery and kidnapping, with firearms specifications as to each. A.G. admitted to the allegations in the complaint. The juvenile court found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered that A.G. be committed to the Department of Youth Services for minimum terms of one year for each of the aggravated robbery and kidnapping adjudications. A.G. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in failing to merge his adjudications for aggravated robbery and kidnapping as “allied offenses of similar import” and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the allied-offenses issue. The Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that the aggravated robbery and kidnapping would constituted allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 if committed by an adult but that criminal statutes do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that juvenile courts must conduct the same double-jeopardy analysis in delinquency proceedings that other courts apply in adult criminal proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Under the prior version of R.C. 3519.01(A), if the attorney general certified the summary of a proposal to change the law or amend the constitution as fair and truthful, that proposal would be filed with the secretary of state and supporters could begin circulating petitions. The section now provides that a petition is transferred to the Ballot Board, not to the secretary of state, for review after certification, and that “[o]nly one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to be proposed by initiative petition shall be contained in an initiative petition to enable the voters to vote on that proposal separately.” If the Board determines that the petition contains more than one proposed law or constitutional amendment, it must divide the petition into individual petitions and certify its approval to the attorney general; supporters must submit separate summaries for approval. The Board divided Ethics First’s submission into three separate proposed amendments. Ethics First brought a mandamus petition. After holding that it had jurisdiction, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The modest imposition posed by requiring new summaries does not unduly restrict the right of initiative, The “separate petitions” requirement is not content-based. It applies to all petitions. View "Ethics First-You Decide Ohio Political Action Comm.. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Relators, the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association and others, filed this original petition challenging the petition signatures submitted in support of the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act (Act). The committee responsible for the Act petition (committee) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that a challenge to the specific part-petitions at issue did not fall within the scope of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected the committee’s jurisdictional arguments and denied the committee’s alternative arguments for partial judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) the Court has original jurisdiction over this petition challenge pursuant to Ohio Const. art. II, 1g; and (2) the committee’s alternative arguments were unavailing. View "Ohio Manufacturers' Ass’n v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act" on Justia Law

Several school districts filed complaints seeking reimbursement for retroactive reductions in school foundation funding. The State Board of Education of Ohio (the department) moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that it was insulated from liability. The trial court held that the General Assembly did not have the constitutional authority to adjust local school funding retrospectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly had constitutional authority to retroactively reduce the amount of state funding allocated to local school districts and to immunize the department against the school districts’ legal claims. Remanded. View "Toledo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to the common pleas court and indicted on four counts of aggravated murder, among related crimes. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntary. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant subsequently pled no contest to four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all with firearm specifications. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that where, as in this case, the interrogation of the defendant is recorded electronically, the statements made are presumed to have been made voluntarily pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.81(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2933.81(B) does not affect the analysis of whether a suspect intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and therefore, the State retains the burden to prove a valid waiver; and (2) as applied to statements a juvenile makes during a custodial interrogation, the section 2933.81(B) presumption that such statements are voluntary is unconstitutional. Remanded. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic violence, a misdemeanor in the first-degree. During trial, the victim asserted the privilege against self-incrimination at least eight times in response to questions posed to him about Defendant’s assault. Defendant appealed, raising four claims of error. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s inquiry into the victim’s claim of privilege nor by the trial court’s instruction to the victim to read his prior statement during his examination; (2) Defendant failed to establish that an impermissible judicial bias deprived him of a fair trial; and (3) assuming the trial court erred in allowing the victim to read his prior statement at trial, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the rape and murder of his grandmother and the murder of her husband. Defendant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not improperly deny Defendant’s request for self-representation; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right against self-incrimination when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements he made; (3) Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were unavailing; (4) Defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance; (5) any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor was not prejudicial; (6) there were no prejudicial errors in the sentencing opinion; and (7) the imposition of the death sentences was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Obermiller" on Justia Law