Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the General Assembly-district plan (the plan) adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2021 to be effective for the next four years was invalid under Ohio Const. art. XI, 6(A) and 6(B).The complaints in these three cases alleged that the plan was invalid because the Commission did not attempt to draw it to meet the standards of partisan fairness and proportionality. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the plan was invalid because the Commission did not attempt to draw it to meet the proportionality standard in article XI, section 6(B) and did not attempt to draw it to met the standard in section 6(A) that no plan shall be drawn primarily to favor a political party. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Committee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that a municipality does not violate Ohio Const. art. XVIII, 6 by selling a surplus of electricity to customers outside the municipality's boundaries, holding that the court of appeals did not err.The City of Cleveland sold outside its boundaries approximately four percent of the electricity it sold inside its boundaries. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) brought this complaint arguing that the electricity the City sold extraterritorially as surplus violated this Court's decision in Toledo Edison Co. v. Bryan, 737 N.E.2d 529 (2000) and the Ohio Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals reversed, determining (1) Article XVIII, Section 6 does not require a municipality to buy the precise amount of electricity required by its inhabitants at any given time, and (2) questions of material fact existed as to whether the City obtained surplus electricity for the sole purpose of selling it to a neighboring city. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while a municipality may not acquire excess capacity for the sole purpose of reselling it outside the municipality's territorial boundaries, the municipality is not required to purchase the exact amount of electricity necessary to satisfy the current needs of its territorial customers. View "Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Appellees - Judge Dale A. Crawford and the Hocking County Common Pleas Court - but affirmed the denial of her motion for disqualification of attorney Randall L. Lambert, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a police officer. At a sentencing hearing at which Appellant appeared without counsel, Appellant refused to sign a waiver-of-counsel form. Judge Crawford conducted the sentencing hearing, at the end of which he imposed a six-month sentence in the county jail and ordered Defendant to pay a fine, restitution, and court costs. Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that Judge Crawford lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing because she had not waived her right to counsel. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint and denied the motion to disqualify Lambert. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellant stated a colorable claim that Judge Crawford violated her Sixth Amendment rights when he ordered her to not communicate with any lawyer and then sentenced her and that this error rendered the sentencing entry void. View "State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that neither a showing of exigent circumstances nor a showing of the impracticability of obtaining an arrest warrant is necessary to sustain the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest under either the Ohio Constitution or the United States Constitution.Defendant was convicted of multiple drug offenses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest was unlawful because there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a warrantless arrest based on probable cause and conducted in public is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; (2) neither exigent circumstances nor the impracticability of obtaining a warrant is required to justify a warrantless felony arrest that is supported by probable cause and that is conducted in public; and (3) the arrest in this case was constitutionally valid. View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the state from applying "Sierah's Law," Ohio Rev. Code 2903.41 through 2903.44, to an offender whose criminal conduct occurred prior to the legislation's effective date, holding that this Court's determination in State v. Hubbard, __ N.E.3d __ (Ohio 2021), was dispositive of this case.Sierah's Law, which created a violent offender database, became effective March 20, 2019. Appellant in this case pleaded guilty on March 4, 2019 to several crimes. At a sentencing hearing on April 1, 2019, Appellant was notified of his duty to register as a violent offender. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Retroactivity Clause prohibited the state from applying Sierah's Law to Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, adhering to this Court's determination in Hubbard, the application of Sierah's Law to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of Ohio Const. art. II, 28. View "State v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the application of "Sierah's Law," Ohio Rev. Code 2903.41 through 2903.44, to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date, does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of Ohio Const. art. II, 28.Seirah's Law presumptively requires offenders who are convicted of certain crimes to enroll in Ohio's "Violent Offender Database" for a period of ten years and presumptively requires an offender to enroll if he was convicted of any of those offenses or was serving a termination of confinement for the offense on or after the provisions' effective date. The court of appeals in this case determined that Sierah's Law does not affect a substantive right because it does not "impose a new burden in the constitutional sense" and therefore may be applied to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the application of Sierah's Law to violent offenders who committed their offenses prior to its effective date does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. View "State v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a tax imposed solely upon a small number of billboard operators is a discriminatory tax that violates the rights to freedom of speech and a free press protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.The City of Cincinnati imposed a tax on outdoor advertising signs, but through definitions and exemptions within the city's municipal code, the tax burdens feel predominantly on two billboard operators only. The two billboard operators (Appellants) sought a declaration that the tax violated their constitutional rights to free speech and a free press and requesting an injunction against the tax's enforcement. The trial court permanently enjoined the City from enforcing the tax. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the injunction, holding that the billboard tax did not survive strict scrutiny and therefore impermissibly infringed on Appellants' rights to free speech and a free press. View "Lamar Advantage GP Co. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions of murder with capital specifications, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse, holding that because the trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea without first strictly complying with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), Defendant's guilty plea was invalid.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court failed strictly to comply with the requirements for a valid plea colloquy under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), and neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel brought the omitted constitutional rights to the court's attention at the time of the initial plea colloquy. Because this inattention was impermissible, especially in a case where a potential death sentence was at issue, the Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and sentences and remanded the cause to the common pleas court for new proceedings. View "State v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated murder with an escaping-detection specification, kidnapping, felonious assault, possessing criminal tools, tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under a disability and Defendant's sentence of death, holding that there was no error in proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the offenses of aggravated murder and kidnapping; (2) the trial court did not deny Defendant's right to a fair trial by denying his motion for a new venire; (3) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts; (5) there was no error in the sentencing opinion; and (6) there was no other error in Defendant's sentencing. View "State v. Worley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the order of the municipal court granting Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the police officer's investigatory stop of Defendant was reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment.At issue was whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Defendant in order to confirm or dispel an unidentified witness's claim that Defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate a lawful investigatory stop because the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and because there was no evidence of erratic driving by Defendant prior to the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Defendant was driving while drunk based on the unidentified customer's tip and the officer's own partial corroboration of that tip. View "State v. Tidwell" on Justia Law