Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In the early morning hours of April 22, 2015, several police officers, including Sergeant Joseph Blaze, were investigating a report of shots fired. The investigation lead Sergeant Blaze to the intersection of Frankstown Road and Robinson Boulevard. As the sergeant drove through that intersection with a green light, he heard tires squealing and observed a dark gray vehicle speeding directly at him. Appellant Bryan Hill was driving that vehicle; the vehicle entered the intersection in an uncontrolled skid and nearly hit Sergeant Blaze’s police car. The sergeant turned his vehicle around and pursued Appellant. Other officers soon joined in the pursuit. Sergeant Blaze and Officer Dustin Hess eventually observed Appellant walking away from his vehicle, which was parked in a residential driveway. As Appellant approached the front door of that residence, the officers noticed that he appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Hess ordered Appellant to stop so the officers could speak with him, but Appellant ignored the directive, choosing instead to pound on the front door of the home and to exclaim to the officers, inter alia, “I didn’t almost hit you . . . I wasn’t going too fast . . . I made it home.” The officers ultimately escorted Appellant to the police station for chemical testing. Appellant, however, was belligerent and uncooperative. He refused to take a breathalyzer test. Relevant to this appeal, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of DUI. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed whether Appellant raised a non-waivable federal double jeopardy challenge to the legality of his sentence imposed for two guilty verdicts of driving under the influence of alcohol stemming from one act of DUI, and if so, whether that claim had merit. The Supreme Court concluded Appellant's double jeopardy claim, solely as it related to his second sentence for DUI, implicated the legality of his sentence, rendering the claim immune from waiver. "Regarding the substance of that claim, we need not reach a definitive conclusion that Appellant’s sentence violates double jeopardy because his sentence is illegal on non-constitutional grounds." Accordingly, the Court vacated in part the trial court's judgment and Appellant's second DUI sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Democratic Party and several Democratic elected officials and congressional candidates, some in their official capacity and/or as private citizens (collectively, “Petitioner”), filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating primarily to five issues of statutory interpretation involving Act 77 of 2019 and the Election Code, 25 P.S. sections 2600-3591. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised Extraordinary Jurisdiction to address these issues and to clarify the law of the Commonwealth in time for the 2020 General Election. Petitioner requested: (1) declaratory relief to confirm Act 77 permitted local election boards “to provide secure, easily accessible locations ... where appropriate, mobile or temporary collection sites, and/or drop-boxes for the collection of mail-in ballots; (2) an injunction to “lift the deadline in the Election Code across the state to allow any ballot postmarked by 8:00 p.m. on Election Night to be counted if it is received by the Boards” by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 10, the deadline for ballots to be received under the Federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act or to allow boards discretion to extend deadlines to 21 days after the voter's ballot is mailed by the county; (3) an injunction requiring boards to contact electors whose mailed-in ballots are incomplete or incorrectly completed; (4) a declaration there was no no statutory authority to set aside an absentee or mail-in ballot solely for failure to place it into the "secrecy envelope"; and (5) a declaration that the “Election Code’s poll watcher residency requirement does not violate the United States Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments, its Equal Protection Clause, or the Equal Protection and Free and Equal Elections Clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” The Supreme Court granted relief on counts 1, 2 and 5 of the petition; the Court denied relief sought on counts 3 and 4. View "PA Dem Party. v. Boockvar, et al : Boockvar" on Justia Law

This case was one of several similarly situated capital appeals involving former Chief Justice Ronald Castille’s role as the elected District Attorney of Philadelphia. In 2017, the Honorable Leon Tucker, Supervising Judge of the Criminal Division, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (“PCRA court”), granted appellant Anthony Reid relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act in the form of nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his right to appeal the order denying his first timely PCRA petition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously affirmed the order denying appellant’s first PCRA petition; however, the PCRA court concluded the Supreme Court had to reconsider appellant’s PCRA appeal again, this time without the participation of Chief Justice Castille, pursuant to Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016). While the Pennsylvania Court agreed Chief Justice Castille’s participation in appellant’s prior PCRA appeal implicated the same due process concerns at issue in Williams, the Supreme Court concluded the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the PCRA to reinstate appellant’s nunc pro tunc right to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court also lacked jurisdiction, and was compelled to quash this serial appeal as untimely. View "Pennsylvania v. Reid" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration was whether the statute criminalizing retaliation against witnesses applied only to witnesses in civil litigation. In March 2014, Husband and Wife witnessed a fatal shooting outside their home. In their grand jury testimony about the incident, they implicated Theodore Smedley. In June 2015, shortly before Smedley’s trial was scheduled to begin, an arson fire occurred at the couple’s house, where they and their daughter were sleeping. Although the flames engulfed the home, all three occupants escaped, albeit with injuries. Appellant Charles Nevels, Smedley’s cousin, was eventually arrested in connection with the fire and charged with multiple counts of retaliation against a witness, attempted homicide, and aggravated arson. A jury convicted Appellant on all counts, and he was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for retaliation against a witness. Appellant argued that 18 Pa.C.S. 4953(a) required the retaliation to have been committed against a “witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.” He maintained that such language excluded Husband and Wife because they provided testimony in a criminal matter. A divided superior court affirmed Appellant's sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with Appellant's preferred reading of the statute, "there is little indication that that addition to the list of persons protected under Section 4953 was intended to affirmatively remove protections that already existed for victims and witnesses in criminal matters." Judgment was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Nevels III" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this case was whether the Mercer County, Pennsylvania District Attorney's Office, and later the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General, violated the due process rights of Appellant Michael Bagnall under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when it failed to disclose a cooperation agreement between the DA's Office and a key witness in Appellant's murder prosecution. The issue arose under circumstances where the OAG assumed the prosecution of Appellant prior to trial due to a conflict of interest between the DA’s Office and Appellant’s defense counsel, and the OAG was never made aware of the existence of the agreement. After review of the trial court record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the OAG was imputed with knowledge of the agreement between the DA’s Office and the key witness at Appellant’s trial, and that, having satisfied all of the requirements for establishing a Brady violation, Appellant was entitled to a new trial. Because the Superior Court reached a contrary result, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pennsylvania v. Bagnall" on Justia Law

In April 2015, Appellant James Byrd, a/k/a/ Al-Tariq Sharif Ali Byrd, moved in with Dana Heaps after being released on bail for charges filed in February, 2015 unrelated to this case. While residing with Heaps, Appellant learned she was taking Seroquel, a prescription anti-psychotic medication. Appellant told Heaps that he did not approve of her taking the medicine. He took the Seroquel away from her. Unbeknownst to Heaps, in mid-May 2015, Appellant apparently gave Heaps a larger dose than was prescribed, causing Heaps to become unconscious. Appellant later showed Heaps, and her friend, Carlos Dukes, a cell phone video of Heaps in her state of unconsciousness. Heaps testified the video showed Appellant removing her clothes, rubbing his penis on her face, inserting his penis in her mouth, and engaging in vaginal and anal intercourse with her, all while she remained unconscious. Heaps later told investigating officers that Appellant told her the video should serve as a warning to her on the dangers of taking Seroquel. A month later, Appellant was arrested on a parole violation warrant issued by the State of Ohio and recommitted to the Allegheny County Jail. Between June 2015 and February 2016, while incarcerated at the jail, Appellant received several visits from Heaps. At the time, all visits at the Allegheny County Jail were conducted over a closed-circuit system using telephone-like handsets. Before the parties were connected to speak, a verbal alert advised, “this call may be monitored or recorded.” Heaps, her boyfriend, and her family, contacted the the police to report that Appellant was threatening them through phone calls from the Allegheny County jail. In its investigation of these new allegations, the Commonwealth obtained the recordings of the conversations between Appellant and Heaps made during her jail visits. In one particular conversation, Appellant and Heaps discussed the May 2015 assault. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of rape of an unconscious victim, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse of an unconscious victim, two counts of aggravated indecent assault of an unconscious victim, two counts of terroristic threats, and one count each of stalking, indecent assault of an unconscious person, invasion of privacy, and persons not to possess firearms. Appellant moved to suppress the recordings of the jail-visit conversations, contending they were made in violation of the Wiretap Act. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the recording warning Appellant he “may be monitored or recorded,” and Appellant’s conduct in speaking after the warning, satisfies the mutual consent exception to the Wiretap Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) to the judicial branch of our tripartite form of government violated separation of powers principles. On April 3, 1989, the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) Office of Adult Probation hired Appellant Michael Renner as a Parole Officer. In July 2011, Appellant informed Lehigh County Chief Probation Officer John Sikora that he had been diagnosed with a serious mental health condition and was hospitalized; he was subsequently absent from work for 4 to 6 weeks. During Appellant’s absence, Sikora telephoned him numerous times to confirm the legitimacy of Appellant’s condition. Upon his return to work, Appellant alleged Sikora and Lehigh County Benefits Manager Mark Surovy, both of whom supervised Appellant, pressured Appellant to resign or take a leave of absence. Appellant confronted Sikora about his hostilities towards him, but Sikora refused to discuss the matter. Subsequently, in March 2014, Sikora terminated Appellant for failing to administer a urine test to an offender under his supervision. Appellant claimed the test was not required and that the reason for his termination was pretextual. Appellant protested his termination to then-President Judge of the CCP Carol McGinley, but Judge McGinley refused to take any action. As a result, Appellant claimed he could not obtain other employment in any other court system, and, in 2014, he filed a charge of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), against Lehigh County Adult Probation, Sikora, and Surovy. Thereafter, Appellant completed training as a municipal officer, and, subsequently, was offered a police officer position by Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs. Appellant alleged that the CCP and Lehigh County learned that Appellant was offered employment as a police officer, and caused an order to be issued banning Appellant from possessing a firearm or taser in the Lehigh County Courthouse, Old Courthouse, and Government Center. As a result, Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs rescinded their employment offers. Appellant eventually got his gun possession ban lifted, but as a condition, the CCP and Lehigh County required him to undergo a medical exam, which Appellant contended was a violation of the PHRA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that application of the PHRA to the judiciary would violate separation of powers principles, and thus, affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Renner v. CCP of Lehigh Co., et al" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Commonwealth challenged orders of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas relieving appellees, Claude Lacombe and Michael Witmayer, of their duty to comply with Subchapter I of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), based upon the court’s finding Subchapter I, as retroactively applied to appellees, was a punitive and unconstitutional ex post facto law. After review of the trial court records, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred, and found Subchapter I was nonpunitive and did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Pennsylvania v. Witmayer" on Justia Law

Appellant Darren Montgomery was charged with one count each of carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, and carrying a firearm without a license. The issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether the superior court erred in holding that a handgun partially tucked into one’s waistband, leaving the weapon’s handle visible, was “concealed” as a matter of law for purposes of Section 6106 of the Uniform Firearm’s Act, 18 Pa.C.S. 6106, which prohibited carrying a concealed firearm without a license. The Supreme Court rejected the superior court’s holding that any level of concealment of a firearm demonstrated concealment as a matter of law, and reaffirmed the well-settled principal that whether a defendant concealed a firearm pursuant to Section 6106 was an extremely fact-intensive question for a jury to determine based upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that a review of the totality of the circumstances established there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of concealment under Section 6106. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior Court’s judgment, which reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the Section 6106 charge. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the legality of Jimel King’s enhanced sentence for attempted murder resulting in serious bodily injury under 18 Pa.C.S. section 1102(c) when the Commonwealth failed to provide formal notice of its intent to seek the enhancement in the charging documents. Also for the Court's consideration was whether King’s consecutive sentences for the two inchoate crimes of attempted murder and conspiracy, arising out of the same incident, were precluded by 18 Pa.C.S. sections 903 and 906. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence as to the enhanced murder sentence, but vacated the judgment of sentence at the conspiracy count. "The traditional merger test has no application here because the ... merger statute would never apply to the inchoate crimes of conspiracy and criminal attempt. The plain language of the specific statute governing this scenario precludes multiple sentences because there is no possibility that the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault existed independently of any conspiracy to kill, nor does the Commonwealth allege any kind of temporal separation or other circumstances to suggest that two conspiratorial agreements could have existed. By enacting Section 906, the General Assembly declared that where a defendant tries to achieve a result – in this case, murder – but fails to do so, he may only be punished once in the absence of distinct criminal objectives." The matter was remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. King" on Justia Law