Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On September 20, 2010, at age of 13 appellant, H.R., was adjudicated delinquent for indecent assault of a complainant less than 13 years of age. Appellant was placed on official probation and, pursuant to Section 6352 of the Juvenile Act, was ordered to undergo inpatient treatment at a sex offender residential treatment facility. Appellant remained in treatment when he turned 20 in February 2017 and he was assessed pursuant to Section 6352, the results of which found that involuntary treatment at a sex offender residential treatment facility pursuant to the Court-Ordered Involuntary Treatment of Certain Sexually Violent Persons Statute (Act 21) was still necessary. On January 4, 2018, following a hearing, a trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and granted the petition for involuntary treatment, determining appellant was an sexually violent delinquent child (SVDC) and committing him to one year of mental health treatment. On appeal, appeal, appellant argued: (1) Act 21 was punitive in nature, and this its procedure for determining whether an individual was an SVDC was unconstitutional; and (2) retroactive application of amendments to Act 21 made effective in 2011, was also unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the superior court correctly determined the relevant provisions of Act 21 were not punitive, were constitutional, thus, affirming the trial court's order. View "In re: H.R." on Justia Law

Appellee William Housman petitioned for post-conviction relief, and appealed when that relief was denied. Housman was accused of murdering Leslie White in 2000. He was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, kidnapping, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, unlawful restraint, abuse of a corpse, and criminal conspiracy. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty for Housman and his co-defendant, his former girlfriend, Beth Ann Markman. The Commonwealth appealed the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty-phase trial, and Housman cross-appealed the court’s denial of guilt-phase relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the record supported the PCRA court’s determination that Housman’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at his penalty phase had arguable merit; that trial counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and that Housman suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, with respect to the Commonwealth’s appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty trial. In light of the Court's affirmance of the PCRA court’s grant of a new penalty trial, the Court did not address Housman’s remaining penalty-phase claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Housman" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenged a superior court's application of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.s. 648 (1984) to find that trial counsel's failure to secure a Spanish language interpreter for appellee Miguel Diaz on the first day of his trial for charges relating to rape, rape of a child, endangering the welfare of children, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and conspiracy. The argument was that failure in not securing a translator was prejudice per se because Diaz was not a native English speaker, and could not fully understand the proceedings. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that where the absence of a needed interpreter at a critical stage of trial obstructs his ability to communicate with counsel, Cronic applies such that the defendant need not prove he or she was prejudiced by a Sixth Amendment violation. Based on the record, the Supreme Court found the Superior Court correctly concluded that Cronic was applicable and that no specific showing of prejudice was required because of the absence of an interpreter on the first day of trial during critical stages of the proceeding. View "Pennsylvania v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether the procedure used to designate certain individuals convicted of sexual offenses as sexually violent predators (SVPs), codified at 42 Pa.C.S. section 9799.24(e)(3), was constitutionally permissible in light of the Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). The Superior Court extrapolated from our decision in Muniz to hold the lifetime registration, notification, and counseling requirements (RNC requirements) applicable to SVPs pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. sections 9799.15, 9799.16, 9799.26, 9799.27, and 9799.36 were increased criminal punishment such that the procedure for conducting SVP determinations violated the requirements of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held RNC requirements did not constitute criminal punishment and therefore the procedure for designating individuals as SVPs under 9799.24(e)(3) was not subject the requirements of Apprendi and Alleyne, and remained constitutional. View "Pennsylvania v. Butler" on Justia Law

Thirty years ago, Appellee Otto Young was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison after he was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, terroristic threats, and conspiracy. He was repeatedly released on parole and his parole was repeatedly revoked. On three occasions, the revocations were due to crimes that Young committed while at liberty on parole. This case presented a straightforward issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review, namely whether the Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) had the statutory authority to rescind a previous grant of credit for time spent at liberty on parole. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the Board lacked any such statutory authority and thus affirmed its order. View "Young v. PA Board of Probation & Parole" on Justia Law

On the night of May 29, 2012, appellant Patrick Tighe, then 58 years old, sexually assaulted a minor female victim, J.E., then 15 years old. In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined whether the trial court improperly limited appellant’s right to self-representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when, during appellant’s jury trial, the court prohibited appellant, who was proceeding pro se, from personally conducting cross-examination of the victim-witness, and instead required stand-by counsel to cross-examine the witness using questions prepared by appellant. The Supreme Court concluded there was no constitutional violation and affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Tighe" on Justia Law

Appellant Harold Cost was arrested for various firearms offenses and filed a motion to suppress. At a hearing, the lead investigating officer initially explained that he was patrolling a high crime area in Philadelphia in an unmarked vehicle at approximately 9 p.m., when his partner observed Appellant and three other individuals in an alley. The officer suspected "there might be something going on," circled the block and stoped his vehicle in front of the alleyway to investigate. The officer did not activate the vehicle's emergency sirens or lights, however, he announced "police" when exiting the vehicle. The issue this case presented was whether the officer's retention of an individual's identification card was a seizure in terms of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the issue reduced to whether a reasonable person would feel free to ignore the police presence and proceed about his business while, amongst the other circumstances presented, the person is questioned by police as an officer continues to hold his identification and conducts a warrant check. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concurred with the suppression court that appellant was indeed seized. View "Pennsylvania v. Cost" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to challenge the public release of the investigating grand jury report of Grand Jury Investigation No. 18 (“Report”). Petitioner initially claimed the supervising judge of the investigating grand jury erred by ordering the public release of the Report because the Report was not statutorily authorized by the Investigating Grand Jury Act, 42 Pa.C.S. secs. 4541-4553. In the alternative, Petitioner contended the supervising judge erred by ordering the public release of the Report because the Act was unconstitutionally applied in this case. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Petitioner relief based on the statutory claim and, thus, did not reach the merits of the constitutional claim. The matter was remanded with instructions to seal the Report permanently. View "In Re: Grand Jury Investigation" on Justia Law

Appellant Michelle Starry was charged, inter alia, with a Pennsylvania Vehicle Code Section 3802(c) offense. She claimed the Commonwealth failed, prior to trial, to establish a prima facie case that her blood alcohol level was 0.16 percent or greater within two hours after driving. Appellant’s arrest occurred after she was involved in a single-car accident. The common pleas court conducted a hearing on the motion, and allowed the Commonwealth to supplement the preliminary hearing evidence. Applying Section 3802(g)(1), the court opined that the prosecution offered no good reason for failing to attempt to secure a more prompt blood test, other than stating that law enforcement policy in cases of serious accidents was to obtain a search warrant for the results of medical blood tests. "And the court suggested that there should have been some elevated concern about the two-hour window, given that the time of the accident was unknown." On the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal, the Superior Court reversed. The Supreme Court concurred with the Superior Court, finding the Commonwealth established probable cause that Appellant committed the Section 3802(c) offense and that a jury would be within its province to determine that her blood alcohol content was at least 0.16 percent within two hours after driving. View "Pennsylvania v. Starry" on Justia Law

Appellant Harold Cost was arrested for various firearms offenses and filed a motion to suppress. At an ensuing hearing, the lead investigating officer initially explained that he was patrolling a high crime area in Philadelphia in an unmarked vehicle at approximately 9 p.m., when his partner observed Appellant and three other individuals in an alley. The officer suspected "there might be something going on back there," and circled back around the block to stop in front of the alleyway. The officer did not activate his vehicle's sirens or lights, but did announce "police" when exiting the vehicle. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether a seizure occurred during this police-citizen encounter, specifically the officer’s retention of appellant's identification card. The question reduced to whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the police presence and proceed about his business while, amongst the other circumstances presented, the person was questioned by police as an officer continued to hold his identification and conduct a warrant check. The Court concluded, as did the suppression court, appellant was indeed seized. View "Pennsylvania v. Cost" on Justia Law