Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, appellant Tam Le challenged the death sentence he received following his conviction by jury on two counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of conspiracy, and three counts each of kidnapping and robbery. The charges stemmed from the deaths of Vu “Kevin” Huynh and his younger brighter Viet Huynh. After a review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there was no reversible error such that appellant was entitled to relief, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Le" on Justia Law

A jury found that Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Joseph Lombardo was acting outside the scope of his employment based on his use of force in an incident following a routine traffic stop. Accordingly, Trooper Lombardo was unable to benefit from the protections of sovereign immunity and judgment was entered against him and in favor of Shiretta Justice. The trial court affirmed, denying Trooper Lombardo’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and a new trial. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, concluding that Trooper Lombardo’s conduct fell within the scope of his employment and remanded for the entry of JNOV in favor of Trooper Lombardo. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that because the jury’s determination was reasonably inferable from the facts, the Commonwealth Court erred in disturbing the verdict. The matter was remanded back to the Commonwealth Court to consider the trial court’s denial of Trooper Lombardo’s motion for a new trial. View "Justice v. Lombardo" on Justia Law

An en banc panel of the Superior Court ruled that Appellant Molly Hlubin’s stop and arrest at a sobriety checkpoint in Robinson Township, Pennsylvania, conducted by a task force that included police officers from a number of other municipalities operating outside of their primary jurisdictions, was lawful. According to the Superior Court, formation of the task force did not require compliance with the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (“ICA”), as the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (“MJPA”) contained exceptions to the general limitation on police activities outside of an officer’s primary jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed: the checkpoint at issue here equired compliance with the ICA, as none of the exceptions in the MPJA authorized the extraterritorial police activities performed here. View "Pennsylvania v. Hlubin" on Justia Law

In a case brought in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Petitioner Sands Bethworks Gaming, LLC, challenged a recent amendment to Pennsylvania gaming law in which casinos paid a supplemental assessment on slot-machine revenue, and the funds are then distributed primarily to underperforming slot-machine facilities to be used for marketing and capital development. Sands alleged that the amendment violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s requirement of uniform taxation, its mandate that all enactments have a public purpose, and its rule against special legislation. Sands also claimed the scheme violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court concluded the amendments were indeed unconstitutional, and the offending parts could be severed from the rest of the statute. Any assessment monies paid to the Commonwealth pursuant to the amended gaming law were ordered to be refunded. View "Sands Bethworks Gaming v. PA Dept of Revenue et al" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether, under Pennsylvania’s recidivist sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. 9714, a second-strike offender could receive separate mandatory minimum sentences for a conspiracy conviction and a conviction for the offense underlying that conspiracy, when both offenses were separately listed as “crimes of violence” subject to the sentencing enhancement. Appellant Tyrice Griffin and a cohort, Juan Garcia, committed three armed robberies of restaurants/bars over the span of approximately one month beginning in October 2013. The Supreme Court found that robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery were crimes of violence as defined in subsection 9714(g). Because all six of Appellant’s robbery and conspiracy convictions constituted crimes of violence, both the trial court and Superior Court correctly determined that Appellant, as a second-strike offender, was to receive a sentencing enhancement for each conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Griffin" on Justia Law

In a published opinion, a divided en banc panel of the Superior Court concluded that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S. 110(1)(ii), did not preclude the Philadelphia District Attorney (the “Commonwealth”) from prosecuting appellant Marc Perfetto on pending misdemeanor criminal charges that arose from the same criminal episode that resulted in Appellant also being charged with a summary traffic offense, despite the fact that the Commonwealth already had prosecuted Appellant for that summary traffic offense. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal and held that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute barred the Commonwealth from further prosecuting Appellant on his pending charges. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Superior Court, reinstated the trial court's order, which granted Appellant's motion to dismiss his pending charges. View "Pennsylvania v. Perfetto" on Justia Law

Appellant Eric Frein was sentenced to death after he was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, first-degree criminal homicide of a law enforcement officer, criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder and criminal homicide of a law enforcement officer, assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure, possessing instruments of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. These charges arose from the 2014 fatal shooting of one Blooming Grove (Pike County) state police corporal, and the injury of others when appellant opened fire upon the barracks and parking lot with a high-powered rifle. Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was automatic; finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Frein" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Pennsylvania General Assembly transferred regulatory authority over Philadelphia taxicabs to the Philadelphia Parking Authority (“Authority”) through Act 94. The Act also created a budget submission process for the Authority to follow, and prescribed a formula that the Authority uses to ascertain assessments imposed upon Philadelphia taxicabs. In 2013, the Commonwealth Court found certain portions of Act 94 to be unconstitutional. The General Assembly then enacted Act 64 to cure the constitutional shortcomings identified by the Commonwealth Court. Partial rights taxicab owners in Philadelphia challenged the new scheme on constitutional grounds. The Commonwealth Court granted relief, finding that Subsection 5707(c) of the Parking Authorities Law, 53 Pa.C.S. 5707(c), violated the substantive due process rights of partial rights taxicab owners. Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court found that the budget submission process prescribed in 53 Pa.C.S. sections 5707(a) and 5710 constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Upon review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court erred in both respects: (1) subsection 5707(c) did not impair the substantive due process rights of partial rights taxicab owners; (2) subsections 5707(a) and 5710 did not amount to unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. View "Germantown Cab Co., et al. v. P.P.A." on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Machicote argued his sentence was illegal because he was subject to a potential sentence of life without parole, and prior to imposing his sentence, the trial court did not consider the factors enumerated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), as adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I) and Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II), 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017). In 2003, Appellant was 17 years old and a resident at George Junior Republic, a residential treatment facility for at-risk youth. Appellant and a co-resident, Jeremy Melvin, devised a plan to subdue a night supervisor at the facility in order to escape. Appellant called the night supervisor, Wayne Urey, Jr., to his room. Melvin, who was hiding, attacked Urey from behind, put him in a chokehold, and brought him to the ground. Appellant and Melvin bound and gagged Urey, and proceeded to steal his keys, wallet, and truck. Appellant and Melvin escaped, and Urey ultimately died of suffocation. Appellant and Melvin turned themselves in later that same day. Appellant was charged with homicide, robbery, and related offenses. Appellant pled guilty to second-degree murder and the remaining charges were dismissed. Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Appellant did not appeal his sentence. The Superior Court concluded that Appellant’s challenge to his sentence was moot because he was ultimately not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court concluded the issue was not moot, and the trial court erred when it failed to consider the Miller factors on the record when it resentenced Appellant. View "Pennsylvania v. Machicote" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth Court dismissed appellant Bert Hudson's petition for review, in which he argued he was entitled to be considered for parole after having received a life sentence for second-degree murder. In 1978, Appellant burglarized a home and shot two individuals with a handgun, killing one of them. The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the murder conviction, and a separate, consecutive sentence of fifteen-to-thirty years on the other convictions, to be served first. Appellant completed this latter sentence in 2009, and was serving his life sentence for second-degree murder. In 2017, Appellant applied for parole. The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) denied his application on the basis that his life sentence had no minimum date. After exhausting administrative remedies, Appellant filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, contending that because the common pleas court had failed to specify a minimum sentence, he should be deemed to have an implied minimum of one day of confinement. Appellant thus asked the court to direct the Board to review him for parole. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Board lacked the power to release on parole an inmate servicing a mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder. That being the case, the Commonwealth Court correctly sustained the Board’s demurrer and dismissed the petition for review. View "Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole" on Justia Law