Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In a discretionary appeal, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether a home rule municipality could amend its home rule charter to eliminate mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act ("Act 111"), the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act ("PLRA"), and applicable case law. Appellant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 (“FOP”) was the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the police officers of Appellee, the City of Pittsburgh (“City”), pursuant to Act 111 and the PLRA. The City was subject to the Policemen’s Civil Service Act, which requires officer applicants be residents of the city at the time of application and throughout their term of employment. The General Assembly repealed the residency mandate in 2012. The parties met to bargain the residency issue, but were unable to reach an agreement. The matter went to arbitration, and pending those proceedings, the Pittsburgh City Council passed a resolution to place a referendum on the upcoming general election ballot asking the voters whether the City’s home rule charter should be amended to require all City employees and officials, including police and fire personnel, to maintain their domicile within the City. Voters approved the home rule charter amendment in 2013. The arbitration panel issued a Supplemental Interest Arbitration Award, which provided that the City-only residency requirement would immediately discontinue and be replaced with a different residency requirement: officers would be required to reside within a twenty-five air-mile radius from the Pittsburgh City-County Building. The City sought review with the court of common pleas, seeking to vacate the arbitration supplemental award. The Supreme Court found that to ensure that home rule municipalities would not abrogate the right of police and firefighters to collectively bargain, the General Assembly enacted Section 9 of Act 111, specifically providing that the act was applicable to every political subdivision in the Commonwealth, regardless of its adoption of a home rule charter. Because the home rule charter amendment changed or modified Act 111 by removing residency as a subject of collective bargaining, it violated Section 2962(e) of the Home Rule Charter law. Thus, based strictly on Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law, the FOP was entitled to relief. The trial court affirming the supplemental interest arbitration award directing officers be required to reside within a twenty-five mile radius from the City-County Building was reinstated. View "City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police Ft. Pitt Ldg. 1" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review in this case centered on whether the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) abused its discretion if it fails to consider whether to grant a convicted parole violator (“CPV”) credit for time spent at liberty on parole. Also for consideration was whether the Board had to provide a contemporaneous statement explaining the rationale behind its decision to grant or deny credit to a CPV. In 2010, following his guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), Appellant was sentenced to two to four years of imprisonment, with a maximum sentence date of December 9, 2013. On December 12, 2011, the Board released Appellant on parole. In 2013, while still on parole, Appellant was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses. He ultimately pled guilty to PWID and was sentenced to one to three years of imprisonment. Appellant subsequently waived his right to a parole revocation hearing and admitted that he violated his parole by committing a crime. The Board accepted Appellant’s admission and recommitted him in accord with his original 2011 sentence. The Supreme Court held that the Board abuses its discretion in failing to consider whether to grant CPVs credit for time spent at liberty on parole under the plain language of Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. sec. 6138(a)(2.1). Additionally, in order to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly in enacting Subsection 6138(a)(2.1), the Court held that the Board must provide a contemporaneous statement explaining its rationale for denying a CPV credit for time spent at liberty on parole. In this case, because the Board’s decision to deny Appellant such credit was based upon its erroneous belief that Appellant was automatically precluded from receiving credit under Subsection 6138(a)(2.1), the Board abused its discretion. View "Pittman v. PA Board of Prob. & Parole" on Justia Law

Appellant Raghunandan Yandamuri, acting pro se, appealed the two death sentences he received after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses for the kidnapping of a ten-month-old baby and the murders of the baby and her grandmother. After reviewing the trial court record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the sentence imposed was not the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, but rather was based on the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, the Court concluded the evidence supported at least one aggravating circumstance for each of the murders committed. The judgment of sentence was therefore affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Yandamuri" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Hicks was tried by jury and convicted of first-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse. For these convictions, he received the death penalty. He appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined there was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for first degree murder, and his claim regarding Rule 404(b) evidence did not warrant relief. "Our careful review of the record reveals the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. To the contrary, the sentence was based on properly admitted evidence showing appellant intentionally killed the victim by cutting her throat with a knife. We further conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of killing by means of torture as the Commonwealth expert witnesses testified the victim was severely beaten and strangled before being decapitated while she was still alive. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence." View "Pennsylvania v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal by the Commonwealth, the issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether the presumption that information of public record could not be considered “unknown” for purposes of proving newly-discovered facts exception to the time requirements of the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), applied to pro se petitioners who were incarcerated. The Supreme Court held that the presumption did not apply to pro se prisoner petitioners, and so it affirmed the Superior Court’s order remanding the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Burton" on Justia Law

Appellant Bernard Cousar appealed a Court of Common Pleas order denying, without a hearing, the guilt phase claims contained in his petition for relief from his death sentence under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). After review, the Supreme Court remanded this case back to the PCRA court for an evidentiary hearing limited to two issues pertaining to whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for: (1) failing to show the ballistics evidence purportedly tying appellant to a series of crimes and murders was inconsistent; and (2) impeach an eyewitness’s in-court identification of appellant with the witness’s inability to identify appellant at his preliminary hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. Cousar" on Justia Law

In 2007, Junius Burno was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder for which he was sentenced to death. In this direct appeal, Burno challenged the admissibility of his confession to the murders, the sufficiency of the evidence, the alleged denial of his right to a speedy trial, and the admissibility of certain evidence establishing an aggravating factor for purposes of the death penalty. The Supreme Court rejected all but one of these challenges on the merits. The Court found merit to Burno’s argument that one of his statements to police was inadmissible because it was obtained during the course of plea negotiations. However, the Court ultimately concluded that the erroneous admission of this statement at trial was harmless. Consequently, the Court affirmed Burno’s death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Burno" on Justia Law

This was a capital direct appeal arising out of Appellant Ricky Smyrnes' participation, with a group of five other individuals, in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Jennifer Lee Daugherty. The case was a companion one to that of co-perpetrator Melvin Knight. Appellant forced the victim to write a staged suicide note, after which Appellant and Knight dragged her to the bathroom; Knight repeatedly and fatally stabbed her; Appellant slit her wrists (albeit superficially); Appellant and Knight choked her as she lay dying; and her body was placed in a trash can. Appellant and Knight moved the can and body outside to a remote location, where these were discovered the next day. Apparently in light of developing evidence that a disturbance had occurred in Appellant’s apartment, police began to interview the co-perpetrators, and inculpatory statements were obtained. At the penalty hearing, the Commonwealth pursued, and the jury found present, the aggravating circumstances involving torture and a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of personal violence. One or more jurors also found mitigation in the form of “mental illness, childhood physical abuse, [and] childhood sexual abuse.” Upon balancing, however, the jurors unanimously agreed that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigation and, accordingly, returned the death verdict. This direct appeal followed, in which Appellant presented fifteen claims for relief. Finding no reversible error after review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Smyrnes" on Justia Law

Harrisburg Police Officer Darin Bates and Dauphin County Adult Probation Officer (APO) Richard Anglemeyer were traveling in an unmarked police vehicle in an area known for frequent drug activity when they observed two men conversing on a street corner; one of those men was Appellant Khiri Arter. Notwithstanding Appellant's objection, APO Anglemeyer performed a pat-down search of Appellant and felt a bulge in the right coin pocket of Appellant's pants. APO Anglemeyer reached into Appellant's pocket and retrieved what appeared to be crack cocaine. APO Anglemeyer then "turned the case over to Officer Bates," who arrested Appellant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether illegally-obtained evidence which was suppressed during criminal proceedings should likewise be suppressed during parole and probation revocation proceedings pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court concluded that it should, reversed the Superior Court's order affirming the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress, vacated the order revoking Appellant's parole, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Arter" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers executed a search warrant for a residence where appellant Kareem Barnes lived with his two younger brothers. The search of one of the bedrooms yielded a firearm, assorted drugs and drug paraphernalia. As a result, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession with intent to deliver ("PWID"), possession of a firearm prohibited, and other related charges. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Appellant's youngest brother testified that he, not Appellant, occupied the bedroom where the seized items were found and he, not Appellant, owned the contraband. The trial court, however, did not credit the brother's testimony, and instead, found Appellant guilty of the crimes charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 5 to 10 years' imprisonment on the PWID conviction, which included a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence based on the trial court's finding that Appellant was in constructive possession of drugs "in close proximity to" a firearm. No further penalty was imposed for the other convictions. This appeal presented the issue of whether a challenge, on direct appeal, alleging that a mandatory minimum sentence violated "Alleyne v. United States," (133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013)), implicating the "legality" of a sentence for issue preservation purposes, and thus was not waivable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an "Alleyne" challenge implicated legality of sentence, and that Appellant's sentence violated "Alleyne." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision, vacated Appellant's judgment of sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Barnes" on Justia Law