Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, a jury convicted Raymond Solano of first-degree murder for the shooting death of his victim, who was playing basketball in a crowded park. After shooting victim repeatedly, Solano fled, but then turned around and shot toward the crowded park where victim lay; several casings were recovered from adjacent streets, and one bullet entered a nearby home. The Commonwealth appealed the order granting Solano relief post-conviction relief in the form of a new penalty phase, based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to present sufficient mitigating evidence. Solano cross-appealed the portion of the same order denying him guilt-phase relief. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Pennsylvania v. Solano" on Justia Law

This case presented the issue of whether Governor Tom Wolf exceeded his constitutional authority pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution when he issued a temporary reprieve to death row inmate Terrance Williams pending receipt of the forthcoming report of the Pennsylvania Task Force and Advisory Committee on Capital Punishment (Task Force) and until the concerns raised by the Task Force are addressed. Respondent Terrance Williams was convicted of first degree murder after he robbed and beat Amos Norwood to death with a tire iron in 1984. He was subsequently sentenced to death. On January 13, 2015, Governor Tom Corbett signed a death warrant scheduling Williams’ execution for March 4, 2015. Shortly after the death warrant was signed, Governor Tom Wolf assumed office and, on February 13, 2015, issued a reprieve of Williams’ death sentence. On the same day, Governor Wolf issued a Memorandum, explaining that he granted Williams’ reprieve because he believed that “the capital punishment system has significant and widely recognized defects.” Five days later, on February 18, 2015, the District Attorney of Philadelphia (Commonwealth) filed an Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief Under King’s Bench Jurisdiction, naming Respondent Williams as the opposing party, arguing that Governor Wolf was attempting to negate a criminal penalty applicable to an entire class of cases (i.e., first degree murder cases where the death penalty was imposed) based on his personal belief that Pennsylvania’s death penalty apparatus is flawed. The Commonwealth argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not permit the Governor to grant the purported reprieve for purposes of establishing a moratorium on the death penalty. The Supreme Court indeed exercised its King’s Bench authority to review the issue presented and concluded that Governor Wolf acted within his constitutional authority in granting the reprieve. View "Pennsylvania v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Superior Court’s order finding appellee Raymond Farabaugh was not required to register as a sexual offender. In 2011, appellee pled guilty to indecent assault, graded as a second-degree misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to two years probation; at the time of sentencing, the law did not require appellee to register as a sexual offender. Later that year, amendments to Megan’s Law added crimes to the list defined as sexually violent offenses, and established a three-tiered system for classifying such offenses and their corresponding registration periods. The 2011 amendments became effective December 20, 2012; they applied to individuals who, as of that date, were convicted of a sexually violent offense and were incarcerated, on probation or parole, or subject to intermediate punishment. Appellee was subject to the reporting and registration requirements, and, as a Tier-II sexual offender, was required to register for 25 years. After Megan’s Law IV went into effect, appellee filed a “Petition to Enforce Plea Bargain/Habeas Corpus,” arguing that ordering him to comply with the new registration and reporting requirements violated his plea agreement and various state and federal constitutional provisions. The trial court denied the petition, and appellee appealed to the Superior Court. On March 14, 2014, while the appeal was pending and after the parties had submitted their briefs, the governor signed Act 19 into law, amending the provisions of Megan’s Law again; the Act was effective immediately and made retroactive to December 20, 2012. The Superior Court panel sua sponte addressed Act 19, holding the above language exempted appellee from the requirements of Megan’s Law. Finding that the Superior Court's holding was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Farabaugh" on Justia Law

The case centered Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. Although a Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, subsection (a.1)(1) elevated the offense grade to a felony of the second degree where the defendant was “convicted” of any felony offense enumerated in subsection (b). In 2011, Appellee was convicted, among other things, of a Section 6105 offense, apparently based upon his possession of a firearm and the fact of a previous juvenile adjudication in 2005 for conduct which would give rise to an aggravated assault conviction if committed by an adult. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution apparently took the position that the finding of delinquency should be considered a “conviction” for purposes of the subsection (a.1)(1) enhancement. On appeal, however, the Superior Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The intermediate court explained that the term “conviction” carried a discrete legal connotation that is not generally understood to encompass juvenile adjudications. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether juvenile adjudications of delinquency qualify as “convictions” for purposes of grading within a particularized sentencing regime. The Court held that the concept of convictions, as embodied in Section 6105, did not encompass juvenile adjudications. View "Pennsylvania. v. Hale" on Justia Law

Appellee Stevenson Rose and Shawn Sadik brutally attacked Mary Mitchell in a park in the East Liberty neighborhood of Pittsburgh. During the attack, the men kicked the victim in the head approximately 60 times, stabbed her in the throat, and inserted a piece of aluminum framing into her vagina, causing serious internal injuries. The victim was left naked and bleeding until she was discovered by two individuals. The attack left the victim in a vegetative state. Rose provided police with a statement in which he admitted that he and Sadik attacked the victim after drinking and doing drugs. The issue in this discretionary appeal before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant convicted of third-degree murder had to be sentenced under the sentencing statute in effect at the time the defendant committed the ultimately deadly assault upon the victim, or whether the defendant was subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to a subsequently-enacted sentencing statute which was in effect at the time of the victim’s death 14 years later. After review, the Court concluded that imposition of a sentence in excess of that prescribed by statute at the time the defendant committed the deadly assault violated and was prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. As such, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order vacating appellee’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Rose" on Justia Law

Appellee-Defendant Jose Luis Olivo was arrested in 2012, and charged with two counts of rape and involuntary deviant sexual intercourse and one count each of indecent assault, indecent exposure, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors. The charges arose from allegations that he sexually abused his paramour’s daughter, starting in January 2009 when the victim was four and continuing until February 2012, when she was seven. Four days prior to the scheduled start of trial, Olivo presented a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from presenting expert testimony pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. 5920 regarding child victim responses to sexual violence. Section 5920 applied to Olivo’s September 2012 criminal complaint because the Legislature made it effective for prosecutions filed on or after August 28, 2012. The court continued the trial to allow the presentation of argument regarding the motion in limine. The trial court suspended as unconstitutional Section 5920, concluding that the statute violated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exclusive control over judicial procedures pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 5920 did not violate its authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and reversed the trial court’s decision suspending it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Olivo" on Justia Law

While arguing with his wife, appellant struck her, knocked her to the ground, and attempted to force her back into their home; she escaped and drove to the police station. Police charged appellant with harassment and simple assault. While in prison awaiting his preliminary hearing, appellant tried to call his wife multiple times; she did not answer because the calls upset her. On time, appellant called his father, who called appellant’s wife on a separate phone and relayed appellant’s statements to her, establishing a three-way call on the two phones. Appellant insisted his wife tell the magistrate she would not testify, that she made a mistake, and that she caused her own injuries. If she failed to do so, appellant stated he would go to jail for two years, starve, and lose everything. He also told her that she must comply for the sake of their marriage, which he repeatedly described as “priceless.” Appellant stated that if his wife was charged with making false statements, he would pay her fines. Two days later, she told police she no longer wished to press charges. In light of the phone call, the Commonwealth charged appellant with intimidation of a witness under 18 Pa.C.S. 4952. A jury convicted appellant of simple assault and intimidation of a witness, and the trial court convicted him of harassment. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 33 to 66 months imprisonment. Appellant appealed the Superior Court order affirming his conviction, requesting that the Supreme Court overrule or clarify “Commonwealth v. Brachbill,” (555 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1989)). “‘Brachbill’ did not abolish the Commonwealth’s need to prove intimidation. Whether an offer of a pecuniary or other benefit contains sufficient indicia of intimidation is to be determined by the fact finder and assessed under the totality of the circumstances, cognizant that proof of manifest threats is not required. Insofar as Brachbill is read to mean pecuniary inducement alone will suffice without proof of intimidation, it is disapproved. While understandable, to the extent the Superior Court relied on ‘Brachbill’ to find intimidation is not needed to satisfy a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. 4952,” the Supreme Court held the court erred. Despite clarifying Brachbill, the Court did not remand to the Superior Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence; as “the jury was properly instructed and found intimidation, additional fact finding is unnecessary.” View "Pennsylvania v. Doughty" on Justia Law

An equally divided en banc panel of the Superior Court resulted in affirmance of appellant Jacob Christine's judgment of sentence for aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person. Appellant was alleged to have slashed a fellow inmate's throat. Corrections officer searched appellant's cell and found a shank. Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude the shank from evidence, arguing it was irrelevant and would cause undue prejudice by confusing the jury, because the Commonwealth agreed the shank was not used in the attack. The trial court ruled the shank admissible under multiple theories. The divided Superior Court held that the shank was properly admitted, but that the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to question the victim of the attack about his own conviction for simple assault. Appellant appealed admission of the shank. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Christine" on Justia Law

On April 6, 2011, Shaun Warrick appeared in the Philadelphia Municipal Court for his preliminary hearing on two homicide charges. Appellees were relatives of the victims, and were seated in the courtroom gallery. Before testimony began, Warrick advised the court his mother had retained private counsel for him and requested a continuance. At the court’s request, his mother, escorted by court officer Richard Brandt, came forward to testify. Appellees thereupon verbally and physically assailed Ms. Warrick, and a general melee erupted in the courtroom. Warrick tried to defend his mother, which led to an expanded struggle that required deputy sheriffs and police reinforcements from outside the courtroom to restore order. The courtroom was locked down for three hours. When court reconvened, the trial court did make an “initial finding” of direct criminal contempt but deferred “final determination as to what the sentence should be” until appellees could meet with counsel. Appellees returned to court and sought to present their own witnesses and cross-examine other witnesses. The court denied the requests, finding that appellees were not entitled to call or cross-examine witnesses, particularly as the contemptuous acts took place “in the presence of the [c]ourt.” Appellees appealed, and the three cases were consolidated. Because the Superior Court erroneously determined the summary-contempt proceedings were improper, it also erred in concluding appellees “should have been permitted to cross-examine the court crier, and to present their own witnesses, in an adversary hearing with full due process protections.” The Supreme Court found the trial court appropriately conducted summary proceedings and appellees were sufficiently represented by counsel prior to sentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Moody" on Justia Law

On January 13, 2015, as his term was ending, out-going Governor Tom Corbett appointed appellee Erik Arneson as the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records (OOR) for a term of six years, with an optional reappointment for an additional six years. On January 20, 2015, the first day of Governor Wolf’s term, he terminated Appellee’s employment. Appellee filed a complaint for mandamus and declaratory relief in the Commonwealth Court, arguing that Governor Wolf’s termination of his employment violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Right to Know Law (RTKL). The Commonwealth Court accepted this argument and reinstated Appellee. The Governor appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after review, adopted and supplemented the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, and affirmed. View "Arneson v. Wolf" on Justia Law