Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Virginia
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In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and breach-of-contract rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that Vlaming's complaint sufficiently alleged that the School Board substantially burdened his right to free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution and that his claims under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act should not have been dismissed. Moreover, the Court held that Vlaming has alleged a viable compelled speech claim under the free speech provision of the Virginia Constitution. The Court rejected the School Board's argument that it could compel Vlaming's speech as part of his official duties as a teacher. The Court concluded that Vlaming's refusal to use certain pronouns did not interfere with his duties as a French teacher or disrupt the school's operations.The Court's decision reaffirmed the fundamental right to free speech and the free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution, emphasizing that these rights extend to public school teachers in their interactions with students. It clarified that although the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring non-discrimination and respect for all students, this interest must be balanced against individual rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. The Court also clarified that a public school teacher's speech in the classroom is not entirely within the control of the school board and that teachers cannot be compelled to express views that conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

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In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that International Paper Co. had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.In 2017, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing an "economic development retention grant program" that would benefit certain taxpayers. International Paper filed a refund action alleging that the County's tax and retention grant scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of International Paper, concluding that the County's tax scheme created an unconstitutional non-uniform tax. View "County of Isle of Wight v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, holding that Defendant did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecution violated his right to confrontation by failing to produce as a witness a police officer who translated for a police detective at the crime scene. At trial, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of a different police officer who, separately, translated the exchange between Defendant and the detective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no constitutional requirement for the officer at issue to be confronted at trial. View "Cortez-Rivas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's misdemeanor conviction for attempting to purchase a firearm while subject to a protective order, holding that the admission of certain evidence did not violate Defendant's confrontation right.At issue was whether a return of service on a preliminary protective order, which included the serving deputy's signature and the time and date of service, was testimonial evidence subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court of appeals concluded that the signing and dating of the return of service was a ministerial duty on the part of the deputy sheriff that was functionally distinct from the delivery of live testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the return of service was intended to serve a primarily administrative purpose, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and therefore, the admission of the evidence did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. View "Logan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and distribution of oxycodone, third or subsequent offense, holding that Defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel during a critical stage of a criminal prosecution.On appeal, Defendant alleged that at a hearing, at which Defendant appeared without counsel, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The reason for the hearing was to advise Defendant as to the status of his case and to ascertain what his wishes were with respect to having counsel of his choice after his attorney was suspended. Defendant argued that he should have been afforded the assistance of counsel before being required to make a decision about whether to proceed with the scheduled trial without the assistance of his then-suspended counsel. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing did not require Defendant to have the assistance of counsel to formulate his response, and thus, this was not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice as a result of Defendant not having counsel at that time. View "Weatherholt v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting the motion to strike the evidence of Monica Cromartie's claims against Brian Billings, a former police officer, for an unlawful search based on Va. Code 19.2-59, for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for false arrest under section 1983, holding that the circuit court erred by granting Billings' motion to strike the three claims based on sovereign immunity and qualified immunity.At the close of Cromartie's case-in-chief the circuit court granted Billings' motion to strike the section 1983 and section 19.2-59 claims on the grounds of qualified immunity and sovereign immunity, respectively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Billings' search was performed contrary to well-established law and violated Cromartie's Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore, the circuit court erred by granting the motion to strike based on sovereign immunity for the section 19.2-59 claim for unlawful search; (2) the circuit court erred by striking the section 1983 claim for false arrest based upon qualified immunity; and (3) Billings' use of force was unreasonable under the circumstances, and therefore, the section 1983 excessive force claim failed both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis at the motion to strike stage. View "Cromartie v. Billings" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second offense, upon Defendant's conditional guilty plea, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress.At issue in this case was whether, at the time Defendant was seized by detectives, the detectives had reasonable suspicion to believe that they were about to be assaulted with a weapon. Defendant argued on appeal that the detectives seized him in violation of the reasonable suspicion standard adopted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the detectives in this case had the same practical, experience-based concern for their safety as the police officer had in Terry, and therefore, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. View "Hill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and set aside the award of the condemnation commissioners to the Helmick Family Farm, LLC for a taking of slightly more than two acres of land along with some easements, holding that the reasonable probability of rezoning of property taken through condemnation may be relevant to the property's fair market value and that Helmick presented sufficient concrete facts to warrant submission of the question of reasonable probability of rezoning to a jury.On appeal, Helmick argued that exclusion of certain evidence prevented the commissioners from considering probative evidence concerning the fair market value of the land at issue. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) ample authority supports the admissibility of evidence that the property taken has a reasonable probability of rezoning; (2) nothing in prior cases forecloses the admissibility of such evidence; (3) there are certain parameters concerning such evidence; and (4) Helmick presented sufficient concrete facts to warrant submission of the question of reasonable probability of rezoning to a jury. View "Helmick Family Farm v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law