Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Jefferson City annexed property on which a fireworks retailer's business was located. The City had an ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits. The retailer filed suit seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. 13-7-208(b), which allows pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a "zoning change," permitted it to continue to sell fireworks. The trial court dismissed the retailer's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the City's ordinance banning the sale of fireworks was not a "zoning change" or "zoning restriction" under the test announced in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, the retailer did not qualify for relief under section 13-7-208(b)(1).

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for burglary, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping for robbing a restaurant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping as violative of due process, relying on State v. Anthony. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to an effective twenty-five year term. The court of criminal appeals reversed and dismissed the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping on due process grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend for the kidnapping statutes to apply to the removal or confinement of a victim that is essentially incidental to an accompanying felony, such as rape or robbery; (2) this inquiry is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard; (3) Defendant was entitled to a new trial with specific instructions as to the specially aggravated kidnapping charge. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse after killing a thirteen-month-old by deliberately striking the child's head against a wall. The court of criminal appeals determined on its own motion that Defendant's dual convictions violated the double jeopardy protections of the federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, the court merged the reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of criminal appeals' judgment merging the convictions and reinstated the reckless homicide conviction, (1) abandoning the four-factor set forth in State v. Denton; (2) adopting the elements test enunciated in Blockburger v. U.S. as the test for determining whether multiple convictions under different statutes constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause of the Tennessee Constitution; and (3) concluding that reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse are not the same offense because their elements differ, and thus, Defendant's dual convictions did not violate either the federal or the state constitutional double jeopardy prohibition.

A grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against a motorist (Defendant) that was involved in a high speed chase while attempting to avoid arrest for driving on a revoked license. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five of the offenses. The court of criminal appeals upheld four of Defendant's convictions but, on its own motion, vacated the remaining conviction after determining that it violated the double jeopardy protections in the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) in accordance with State v. Watkins, released contemporaneously with this opinion, Defendant's convictions did not run afoul of constitutional double jeopardy protections; (2) Defendant's conviction under count one of the indictment must be vacated because the trial court committed plain error in its instruction regarding the lesser-included offenses of that charge; and (3) the evidence supported Defendant's remaining convictions, and the sentences imposed by the trial court were not excessive. Remanded.

Petitioner, charged with first degree premeditated murder and other crimes, entered best interest guilty pleas and received an effective sentence of life without parole. After an unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered, exculpatory ballistic evidence. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of criminal appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a petitioner who has entered guilty pleas may challenge his convictions by writ of error coram nobis pursuant to the terms of Tenn. Code Ann. 40-26-105(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while Petitioner did not forfeit the procedural remedy of writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence by entering the guilty pleas, the evidence in this instance did not qualify as newly discovered.

A victim of alleged child sexual abuse purportedly perpetrated by one of the priests of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the 1970s filed suit against the Bishop of the Diocese, seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject mater jurisdiction and that the victim's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese's motion. The court of appeals held (1) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim's negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims; and (2) the statute of limitations had run on the victim's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the state courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the victim's claims; and (2) the victim's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Remanded.

The Supreme Court granted an appeal in these two consolidated cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant's petition for pretrial diversion, and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The court of criminal appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant's pretrial diversion application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a prosecutor has abused his discretion by failing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor's ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Remanded.

The Supreme Court granted an appeal in these two consolidated cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant's petition for pretrial diversion, and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The court of criminal appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant's pretrial diversion application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a prosecutor has abused his discretion by failing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor's ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Remanded.

Defendant pled guilty to theft, and the trial court imposed a three-year sentence in the community corrections program. Defendant violated a condition of his release shortly after September 30, 2003, and the trial court entered an order of revocation, directing Defendant to serve the duration of his sentence in prison and giving credit for time served from the date of his sentence until September 30, 2003. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have awarded credit for time served in the program through July 27, 2004, the date the revocation warrant was signed. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that the credit should have extended until the issuance of the revocation warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the filing date of the revocation warrants begins the tolling of sentence credits. Remanded.

A jury convicted Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and imposed a sentence of death. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Petitioner filed a motion asking the trial court to limit any cross-examination of Petitioner, asserting his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The post-conviction trial court denied the request, and Petitioner did not testify. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner's right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context, but a petitioner who elects to testify is bound to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether and in what manner the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context and instead resolved the appeal on non-constitutional grounds. The Court vacated the trial court and court of criminal appeals, holding (1) the scope of cross-examination of a post-conviction petitioner is governed by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, 8(C)(1)(d); and (2) the lower courts deprived Petitioner of the limited scope cross-examination provided in Rule 28. Remanded for a new post-conviction hearing.