Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide and other crimes arising from a single-vehicle accident that killed two occupants of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence derived from a blood sample obtained from her without a warrant the night of the accident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had orally consented to the blood draw. Defendant then filed a second motion to suppress. The trial court granted Defendant’s second motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had not actually consented to the blood draw and that the police lacked reasonable grounds to believe Defendant was driving under the influence, which was required under the implied consent statute to justify the warrantless blood draw. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of the accident, and thus, the implied consent statute was triggered. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Defendant’s two convictions of first degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right against self-incrimination or Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by admitting into evidence certain incriminating statements Defendant made to his ex-wife; (2) the searches of Defendant’s home and storage unit did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude certain photographs of the victims and in denying Defendant’s ex parte motions for a crime scene expert and a false confession expert; (4) the sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion and were neither excessive of disproportionate; and (5) the evidence supported the jury’s findings as to each first degree murder conviction. View "State v. Willis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault committed by violating a protective order, and evading arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s failure to compel the State to elect an offense as to the aggravated assault charge resulted in plain error. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that, based upon the indictment and the State’s closing argument, Defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for evading arrest but reversed Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and remanded the matter for a new trial on that charge, holding that the failure to elect in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Davis was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The jury imposed death sentences for both counts of premeditated first degree murder after finding that evidence of three aggravating circumstances. In addition, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions to run consecutively to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated robbery convictions. After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, the case was automatically docketed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reason to disturb the lower courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentences. View "Tennessee v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1986, petitioner Torian Benson, a.k.a Marcus Terry, a.k.a Marcus Benson, pled guilty in to four counts of larceny and six counts of robbery, for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment for each larceny count and five years for each robbery count. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of five years. In 1989, petitioner entered guilty pleas to two counts of larceny and one count of aggravated assault, for which he was sentenced to three years for each count, all to be served concurrently, for an effective total sentence of three years. In 1993: petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of theft of property over $10,000 and was sentenced to four years imprisonment; petitioner pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell and was sentenced to a term of eight years; and petitioner pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance and received an eight-year sentence for one count and a four-year sentence for the other. All of the 1993 convictions were ordered to be served concurrently. In 1997, petitioner was found guilty of two counts of vehicular homicide and sentenced to a term of fifteen years for each count. Based upon the petitioner’s prior convictions, the trial court found the petitioner to be a “career offender.” Under the sentencing guidelines, this designation required the court to impose the maximum sentence for felony offenses, which in the case of vehicular homicide was fifteen years. The trial court ordered both fifteen-year sentences to be served consecutively, not only with each other but also with another four-year sentence. In 2002, acting pro se, petitioner filed three separate petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging the validity of the 1986, 1989 and 1993 convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. Along with affirming the trial court’s initial findings, the intermediate court also held that habeas corpus relief was not available because the petitioner was not eligible for immediate release as he then-currently incarcerated on charges unrelated to those challenged in the petitions. Finding no reversible error as to the denial of habeas relief, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. View "Benson v. Tennessee" on Justia Law

Defendant Delawrence Williams was indicted for possession of over one-half gram of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that probable cause had not been shown for the issuance of a search warrant. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court granted this interlocutory appeal to review: (1) whether the information used to obtain a search warrant to search the defendant’s residence was provided by a “citizen informant” and presumptively reliable; and (2) whether the information, if not provided by a “citizen informant,” nonetheless established probable cause under "Tennessee v. Jacumin," (778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989)). After reviewing the record and applicable authority, the Supreme Court held: (1) that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly granted the interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure; and (2) that although the information used to obtain the search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not provided by a “citizen informant,” it established probable cause under the two-prong analysis in Jacumin. The judgment was therefore affirmed. View "Tennessee v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first offense driving under the influence. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress on the grounds that the warrantless seizure of his parked vehicle and the ensuing field sobriety tests were not supported by reasonable suspicion. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the arresting officer’s activation of his patrol car’s rear blue lights was an exercise of the community caretaking function and not a seizure.The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court’s decision in State v. Moats, which held that the community caretaking doctrine is not an exception to the federal and state constitutional warrant requirements, was wrongly decided and is hearby overruled; (2) the community caretaking exception is an exception to the state and federal constitutional warrant requirements that may be invoked to validate as reasonable a warrantless seizure of an automobile; and (3) the community caretaking exception applies in this case. View "State v. McCormick" on Justia Law

Four university football players were indicted for criminal charges arising out of the alleged rape of a university student. Petitioners, a group of media organizations and a citizens group, made a Public Records Act request to inspect the police department’s files regarding its investigation of the football players. The police department denied the request. Petitioners filed a petition against the police department seeking access to the requested records under the Tennessee Public Records Act. The Court of Appeals concluded that all of the requested materials were relevant to a pending or contemplated criminal action and were therefore exempt from public disclosure under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) during the pendency of a criminal case and any collateral challenges to any conviction, Rule 16 governs the disclosure of information, and only the defendants, not the public, may receive information contained in the police investigative files; and (2) based on Rule 16, Petitioners have no right to the requested information during the pendency of the criminal cases and any collateral challenges to any convictions. View "The Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of an autopsy report through the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy was not testimonial, so its admission into evidence did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause; (2) the responding officer’s initial entry into Defendant’s home was justified by exigent circumstances, and the subsequent entry into the home by other officers was a continuation of the responding officer’s entry into the home, and therefore, the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was in plain view and within the scope of the search; and (3) even if the trial court erred in admitting into evidence items that were not in plain view during the warrantless search, the error was harmless. View "State v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped after a police officer observed him cross the double yellow center lane lines with the two left wheels of his car. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Thereafter, Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arresting officer’s seizure of Defendant did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law