Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Francisco De la Rosa was tried by jury for the non-consensual sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The body of Appellant’s indictment charged him with three counts of sexual assault for non-consensual contact between his sexual organ and that of "LAM," and the abstract portion of the jury charge defined “sexual assault of a child” in terms of non-consensual sexual contact. The indictment’s caption called the counts sexual assault of a child, its application paragraph authorized conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the case was tried as if it were such a case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold the convictions. To this, the Court concluded the appellate court did, reversed the lower court’s judgments and entered a judgment of acquittal for each count of sexual assault. View "De La Rosa v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant DeSean McPherson was convicted of tampering, but the court of appeals agreed with him that the evidence of concealment was legally insufficient. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard of review. To this, the Court found that it did: it re-weighed the evidence, rationalized its result by hypothesizing a weaker case than that presented in the record, and overlooked dispositive distinctions between this case and Stahmann v. Texas, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The Court therefore reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed that of the trial court. View "McPherson v. Texas" on Justia Law

The United States Supreme Court remanded this case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider Applicant Areli Escobar’s false-testimony claim in light of the State’s confession of error. After receiving a motion suggesting that the parties had evidence not previously considered in these habeas proceedings, the Texas Court held the case for 30 days to allow supplementation of the record. Applicant filed supplemental materials with a cover sheet that listed five items. He failed to comply with the applicable appellate rule because he did not explain the significance of any of these items or why they could not have been filed earlier, but the Court nevertheless considered the new material. Upon consideration, the Court concluded the new material did not change its original assessment of Applicant’s false-testimony claim. View "Ex parte Areli Escobar" on Justia Law

In July 2021, Appellant Lucas Vieira was indicted for aggravated assault by threat while acting as a public servant. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred on or about July 7, 2019. Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming the indictment was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the date of the offense. The trial court denied Appellant’s habeas application, and Appellant appealed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the indictment was not brought within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and reversed judgments of the courts below. View "Ex parte Lucas Vieira" on Justia Law

Appellant Noel Huggins pled pro se guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced by the trial court to 18 years in prison. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeal granted review to decide whether his right to counsel was violated. Appellant’s state-jail, possession charge was enhanced with two prior felonies. Appellant doubted the validity of the enhancement allegations, and that doubt helped fuel his on-again/off-again self-representation. He represented himself at the beginning and the end of his case, but he was otherwise represented by two attorneys appointed in succession during most of the approximately 22 months that his case was pending in the trial court. After his trial date was reached during his second period of self- representation and while a venire was standing by, he announced that he would plead guilty and asked for representation again, but the trial court refused to appoint a third attorney. Appellant argued that his two waivers of counsel were not made knowingly and intelligently because the trial court did not admonish him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and the trial court denied him his statutory right to withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.051(h). The court of appeals said the trial court was not required to admonish Appellant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation because he did not contest his guilt. The court then looked at whether Appellant’s waiver of counsel was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that it was. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant's right to counsel was not violated. View "Huggins v. Texas" on Justia Law

In an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, Applicant Danny Lane challenged his 2007 conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender-registration requirements on five grounds: (1) actual innocence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) involuntary plea; (4) due process violation; and (5) no evidence. Though Applicant raised several grounds for relief, the underlying basis for all of his claims was the same: that, unbeknownst to him at the time of his guilty plea, he was not actually required to register as a sex offender because, although he was convicted of aggravated rape in 1982, that conviction was later “set aside” by the convicting court upon his successful completion of probation through a “judicial clemency” order. In support of his position, Applicant relied on a decision from the Sixth Court of Appeals, issued after his guilty plea in this case, interpreting the relevant statutes to mean that a similarly situated individual had no duty to register and thus could not be guilty of failing to register as a sex offender. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the habeas court's recommendation to grant relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel resulting in an involuntary plea, or under a theory of actual innocence / no evidence. The Court concluded that the law was unsettled as to whether Applicant had a duty to register as a sex offender following the trial court’s grant of judicial clemency. Thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to further investigate that issue when further investigation would not have yielded any clear answer under the law. The Court concluded the governing statutes in Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 62 meant that Applicant’s 1982 aggravated rape conviction obligated him to register as a sex offender, notwithstanding the trial court’s order granting him judicial clemency under former Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, Section 7. Relief was denied on all claims. View "Ex parte Danny Lane" on Justia Law

In 1998, applicant Rodney Reed was convicted by jury of the capital murder of nineteen-year-old Stacey Lee Stites. The indictment alleged that in April 1996, Reed strangled Stacey to death in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. In the years that followed, continuing through this proceeding, Reed has made multiple efforts to have his capital murder conviction overturned. He primarily advanced the theory that he was innocent of Stacey’s murder —specifically, that the biological evidence linking him to Stacey’s body was deposited there because he and Stacey were in a consensual sexual relationship and that Stacey was actually killed by her jealous and domineering fiance, Jimmy Fennell. After review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found Reed's latest attempts to overturn his conviction failed under Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and procedurally under Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the Court denied relief and dismissed any remaining claims as abuses of the writ. View "Ex parte Rodney Reed" on Justia Law

On April 19, 2018 in Forth Worth, Appellant Terry King assaulted a twelve-year-old girl who was on her way to the school bus. At all times relevant to this case, Appellant was working as a truck driver, operating a semi-tractor trailor (hereinafter, “truck”) owned by his employer, John Feltman. Due to the nature of his work as a long-haul truck driver, Appellant lived out of the truck while working on the road. In July 2018, Appellant was arrested in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma near the truck he drove. On the same day, the Oklahoma police searched the truck pursuant to a warrant. During the search, detectives found Appellant’s cell phone and intended to seize it, but inadvertently left the cell phone in the truck. The gathered evidence, minus the cell phone, was transported to the Fort Worth Police Department. Upon realizing the cell phone was missing, Fort Worth Police Detective Pat Henz contacted the truck owner, Feltman, and asked him to retrieve the phone and send it to the police department. Upon receipt on August 9, 2018, a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone was issued and executed. Child pornography was found on the cell phone. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether an employee retained standing to contest a search or seizure in his work vehicle several days after he was arrested and after the vehicle was returned to his employer. To this, the Court responded "possibly." But based on the facts of this case, the Court found Appellant did not meet his burden to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy as would confer standing. View "King v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2017, after Maria Delcarman Sosa-Esparza was indicted for a felony offense, she entered into a bail bond agreement with Appellant Maxie Green, doing business as A to Z Bail Bonds. Appellant paid a $25,000 bond so that Sosa-Esparza could be released from jail. A condition of the trial court in setting a bond amount was an assurance that Sosa-Esparza would appear for all of her court settings. But on March 1, 2019, Sosa-Esparza failed to appear for her pretrial conference. The trial court then signed a judgment nisi that provisionally forfeited the $25,000 bond. The judgment nisi stated that Sosa-Esparza’s name was “distinctly called at the courtroom door. Defendant was given reasonable time to appear after her name was called, but she did not appear.” The judgment nisi also provided that the judgment would be made final unless good cause could be shown for why Sosa-Esparza failed to appear. Appellant argued, among other things, that because the judgment nisi stated that the defendant’s name was called at the courtROOM door, the State’s evidence failed to conclusively establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her name was properly called at the courtHOUSE door. (emphasis added). The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether, for purposes of summary judgment in a bond forfeiture case, providing conclusive proof that the name of the defendant on bond was distinctly called at the door of the courtROOM establishes the element that “[t]he name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door[.]” To this, the Court held that it did: "This holding is founded on well-established precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals recognizing that calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02." View "Green v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Kevin Sheffield couldn't make bond and was placed into custody August 2019. While there, Appellant filed several pro se documents with the trial court even though he had appointed counsel. In his first letter, Appellant requested an examining trial and a personal recognizance (PR) bond until the examining trial could take place. Appellant also filed a pro se motion September 19 for a speedy trial and for discharge under article 28.061. Appellant followed the motion September 20 with another pro se letter, reasserting his requests for a speedy trial, a speedy examining trial, and a PR bond until the examining trial. On September 26, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment alleging possession, with intent to deliver, first degree felony amounts of methamphetamine and heroin; possession of a first degree felony amount of cocaine; evading arrest in a vehicle; and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On September 30, the trial court entered its pre-trial scheduling order, setting jury trial for January 23, 2020. In January, although represented by counsel, Appellant sent a pro se letter seeking a hearing on a motion for discovery and a motion for speedy trial. Proceedings were briefly paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic. By May 12, a hearing was held in which the trial court allowed Appellant to represent himself but keep standby counsel. By May 18, Appellant filed a pro se motion seeking release. This motion was ultimately denied, leading to Appellant's request for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant's speedy trial claim was not cognizable under Texas law in pretrial proceedings: "because pretrial habeas corpus litigation would not vindicate the speedy trial right and would effectively undermine that right instead. Vindication of the speedy trial right must be had through a motion to dismiss followed by appeal after trial if the motion is wrongly denied. If trial and appeal are indefinitely postponed, mandamus, not pretrial habeas, is available." View "Ex parte Sheffield" on Justia Law