Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012 Appellant Natalie Reynolds worked as an investigative supervisor for the Greenville office of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter referred to as “the Department” or “CPS”). In 2015, she was convicted of official oppression. The charge was based on an allegedly unlawful search and/or seizure of a cell phone belonging to a fifteen-year-old girl who was in lawful emergency custody of the Department. Reynolds’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Reynolds’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals correctly held that the evidence was sufficient to support Reynolds’s conviction. Based upon its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court held the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Reynolds knew her conduct was unlawful, which was an essential element of the offense of official oppression. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Reynolds v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2012 Appellant Natalie Reynolds worked as an investigative supervisor for the Greenville office of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter referred to as “the Department” or “CPS”). In 2015, she was convicted of official oppression. The charge was based on an allegedly unlawful search and/or seizure of a cell phone belonging to a fifteen-year-old girl who was in lawful emergency custody of the Department. Reynolds’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Reynolds’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals correctly held that the evidence was sufficient to support Reynolds’s conviction. Based upon its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court held the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Reynolds knew her conduct was unlawful, which was an essential element of the offense of official oppression. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Reynolds v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant Rebekah Ross worked as an investigator for the Greenville office of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter referred to as “the Department” or “CPS”). In 2015, she was convicted of official oppression. The charge was based on an allegedly unlawful search that Ross conducted pursuant to her duties as a CPS investigator. Ross’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Ross’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals correctly held that the evidence was sufficient to support Ross’s conviction. Based upon its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross knew her conduct was unlawful, which was an essential element of the offense of official oppression. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Ross v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant Rebekah Ross worked as an investigator for the Greenville office of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter referred to as “the Department” or “CPS”). In 2015, she was convicted of official oppression. The charge was based on an allegedly unlawful search that Ross conducted pursuant to her duties as a CPS investigator. Ross’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Ross’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals correctly held that the evidence was sufficient to support Ross’s conviction. Based upon its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross knew her conduct was unlawful, which was an essential element of the offense of official oppression. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Ross v. Texas" on Justia Law

At issue for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in this case was whether, in a prosecution for aggravated assault by threat in which it was alleged that the defendant used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon, the defendant was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on deadly conduct. The trial court rejected the request by appellant Anthony Safian for such an instruction, and the court of appeals upheld that ruling by determining that, as a matter of law, deadly conduct was not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense under these circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed: Texas case law from Bell v. Texas, 693 S.W.2d 434 (1985), deadly conduct, as a matter of law, was a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by threat when it was alleged that the defendant used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. In this case, the Court reached the same holding. Accordingly, the court of appeals was reversed. Because the court of appeals analyzed only the first step of the two-step analysis for determining whether appellant was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, the case was remanded for that court to conduct the second step of that analysis. View "Safian v. Texas" on Justia Law

At issue for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in this case was whether, in a prosecution for aggravated assault by threat in which it was alleged that the defendant used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon, the defendant was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on deadly conduct. The trial court rejected the request by appellant Anthony Safian for such an instruction, and the court of appeals upheld that ruling by determining that, as a matter of law, deadly conduct was not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense under these circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed: Texas case law from Bell v. Texas, 693 S.W.2d 434 (1985), deadly conduct, as a matter of law, was a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by threat when it was alleged that the defendant used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. In this case, the Court reached the same holding. Accordingly, the court of appeals was reversed. Because the court of appeals analyzed only the first step of the two-step analysis for determining whether appellant was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, the case was remanded for that court to conduct the second step of that analysis. View "Safian v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2008, Applicant Jeremy Pue was convicted by a jury of third degree felony evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. He was sentenced as a habitual offender because his sentence was enhanced by two California felony convictions: one from 2002 and the other from 2007. The trial court sentenced Applicant to thirty years in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Applicant applied for habeas relief, claiming his sentence was illegal because it was improperly enhanced by the 2007 California conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined Applicant had only two prior felony convictions, and both of them occurred in California. There were no other felony convictions the State could have used to enhance Applicant’s sentence. Therefore, the Court agreed that Applicant’s sentence was improperly enhanced by the 2007 California conviction, and granted relief. View "Ex parte Jeremy Pue" on Justia Law

Appellant Albert Febus was a registered sex offender. He voluntarily signed a change-of-address form listing his new address as an apartment at “6110 Glenmont” even though he never intended to live there. Months later, when police went to that apartment at “6110 Glenmont” to check on Appellant, Appellant was not living there. At his trial for failure to comply with his duty to register, Appellant claimed he had actually told the police he was moving to an apartment at “6100 Glenmont.” According to Appellant, the police had gotten the apartment number correct, but they had placed the wrong street address in their registry. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Appellant failed to notify the local police regarding his change of address in violation of his duty to register as a sex offender. Finding the evidence was legally sufficient, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ opinion. View "Febus v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Albert Febus was a registered sex offender. He voluntarily signed a change-of-address form listing his new address as an apartment at “6110 Glenmont” even though he never intended to live there. Months later, when police went to that apartment at “6110 Glenmont” to check on Appellant, Appellant was not living there. At his trial for failure to comply with his duty to register, Appellant claimed he had actually told the police he was moving to an apartment at “6100 Glenmont.” According to Appellant, the police had gotten the apartment number correct, but they had placed the wrong street address in their registry. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Appellant failed to notify the local police regarding his change of address in violation of his duty to register as a sex offender. Finding the evidence was legally sufficient, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ opinion. View "Febus v. Texas" on Justia Law

Under Penal Code Section 25.07(a)(2)(A), the State may prosecute an individual who has intentionally or knowingly communicated in a “threatening or harassing manner” with another person in violation of a judicially issued protective order or bond condition. Appellant Paul Wagner was charged and convicted under that statute after a jury determined that he communicated with his estranged wife, Laura, in a harassing manner in violation of a protective order that had been issued against him for her protection due to a history of family violence. The court of appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction on direct appeal over his challenge to the statute’s constitutionality on overbreadth and vagueness grounds under the First and Fourteenth amendments to the federal Constitution. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of Section 25.07(a)(2)(A). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the court of court of appeals that the statute, if interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, was not overbroad because it did not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, in that it applied only to a limited number of people whose communications have been restricted by a judge through a bond or protective order, and it prohibits only communications that are intentionally or knowingly made in a threatening or harassing manner towards particular protected individuals. Similarly, the Court concluded the statute, as applied to appellant’s conduct, was not impermissibly vague because the plain statutory terms were such that they would afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know that his course of conduct would be prohibited. View "Wagner v. Texas" on Justia Law