Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Henry Bullock, Jr. was convicted by a jury of theft of a furniture delivery truck, a third-degree felony. In his sole ground in his petition for discretionary review, appellant contended that the court of appeals erred by upholding the trial court’s decision that had declined his request for a lesser-included-offense jury instruction on attempted theft. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with appellant that there was more than a scintilla of evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder could have found that he was guilty only of attempted theft of the truck, rather than theft, and thus the court of appeals erred by concluding that the trial court properly declined to give the lesser-included-offense instruction. The Court reversed the court of appeals, and remanded this case to that court for it to consider in the first instance whether the trial court’s failure to give a lesser-included-offense instruction on attempted theft harmed appellant. View "Bullock v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant LaJuan Bailey of felony failure to appear/bail jumping because she failed to appear as required for a pretrial court setting. The jury assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, appellant claimed she received ineffective assistance by her trial counsel because he violated the attorney-client privilege by questioning her prior trial counsel about confidential communications with appellant without appellant’s consent. Appellant also alleged that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling her mistrial motion, which was based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for that violation of appellant’s attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals overruled her claims and affirmed the judgment and sentence. Upon reconsideration of its original opinion, it withdrew that opinion and issued an en banc opinion, which also affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review, which raised five grounds for review. After careful consideration of each of the grounds raised, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the assertions made in ground one were encompassed by the other grounds. The Court therefore dismissed ground one as improvidently granted. The court of appeals did not err in holding that appellant failed to prove that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by divulging privileged communications. View "Bailey v. Texas" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, Patrick Shay was convicted of improper photography or visual recording and sentenced to two years’ confinement, the maximum confinement permitted for the state-jail felony. In consideration for Shay’s guilty plea, the State agreed not to file aggravated sexual assault or child pornography charges surrounding the same criminal episode. Shay’s applied for habeas relief, using as grounds the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion in "Thompson v. Texas," which held that a portion of the former improper photography or visual recording statute—specifically, Texas Penal Code section 21.15(b)(1) - was facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. Section 21.15(b)(1) formed the basis of Shay’s conviction. The State and the habeas judge recommended that the Court of Criminal Appeals grant Shay relief under "Thompson." The Court, in turn, ordered Shay’s application be filed and set to determine whether an applicant, who negotiates a very favorable plea agreement resulting in a conviction for an offense later held to be unconstitutional, is estopped from challenging the conviction on the basis of its unconstitutionality. The Court held that estoppel does not bar an applicant for habeas relief from seeking habeas relief on a statute subsequently declared facially unconstitutional. The Court accordingly set aside Shay’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court to dismiss the indictment. View "Ex parte Patrick Taylor Shay" on Justia Law

Appellant Stacy Cary was convicted by a jury of six counts of bribery, one count of money laundering, and one count of engaging in organized criminal activity. Her sentence was probated, but she was ordered to serve 30 days’ confinement as a condition of her probation. A split panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions. She alleged on appeal that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her convictions, and that the trial court reversibly erred when it excluded certain evidence. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals sustained her first and fourth grounds (regarding insufficiency of the evidence), the Court will reversed and rendered an acquittal on each count and did not reach the other three grounds for review. View "Cary v. Texas" on Justia Law

David Cary was convicted by a jury of six counts of bribery, one count of money laundering, and one count of engaging in organized criminal activity. His punishment was given fourteen years’ confinement on each count to run concurrently with one day credit. He appealed the convictions, and a unanimous panel of the court of appeals found that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, entering an acquittal on each count. The issue in this case for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard for legal sufficiency. The Court concluded that it did not, and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Cary v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Alvin Henry Jr. of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. At the punishment stage of trial, the jury found that Henry was previously convicted of two felony offenses, resulting in an enhanced sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. Henry appealed, arguing that the State, during punishment, “failed to prove that he was the same person who had committed the extraneous offenses introduced during punishment, including the two prior felony offenses used to increase his range of punishment.” The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. And finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals. View "Henry v. Texas" on Justia Law

In July 2013, a jury convicted appellant Albert Love, Jr. of capital murder for the 2011 murders of Keenan Hubert and Tyus Sneed during the same criminal transaction. He received the death penalty. Appellant raised eleven points of error on automatic appeal. After reviewing those alleged errors, the Court of Criminal Appeals found appellant’s sixth point of error, regarding the warrantless seizure of his text messages, to have merit. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Love v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Alvin Peter Henry Jr. of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. At the punishment stage of trial, the jury found that Henry was previously convicted of two felony offenses, resulting in an enhanced sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. Henry appealed, arguing that the State, during punishment, “failed to prove that he was the same person who had committed the extraneous offenses introduced during punishment, including the two prior felony offenses used to increase his range of punishment.” The court of appeals found that the State had presented sufficient evidence to link Henry to the prior convictions used to enhance his punishment and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Henry challenged the sufficiency ruling to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding the evidence sufficient to support Henry's conviction, the Court affirmed the enhancement allegations. View "Henry v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Damon Asberry was charged with a murder that occurred in 2003, indicted in 2007, and convicted by a jury in 2008. In preparation for trial, some items of evidence had been subjected to DNA testing. Appellant argued on appeal to the court of appeals that the trial court had erred by failing to appoint an expert for an independent examination of the DNA evidence. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and life sentence in 2009. In his petition for discretionary appeal, appellant argued that the court of appeals had improperly required that he file an affidavit from an expert in order for the trial court to approve funds for an independent DNA examination. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals, saying that while “its opinion mentioned the lack of affidavits, expert or otherwise, it did not hold that an affidavit from an expert was required,” only that appellant must provide “some evidence in support of the motion” for appointment of an expert. In 2013, appellant filed a motion, pursuant to Chapter 64, for retesting of DNA evidence. The trial court ruled that, based on the entire record, the new testing would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Before ruling on the motion, the trial court had reviewed the entire record, including the testimony from the original trial, but because the earlier testimony was not formally entered into evidence, the court of appeals declined to consider it, citing to its own precedent and holding that “testimony from a previous trial cannot be considered by the trial judge at a subsequent trial unless it is admitted into evidence at the subsequent proceeding.” The Court of Criminal Appeals held that all of the evidence that was before the trial court before it made its ruling should have been made available to, and considered by, the reviewing court. The Court therefore remanded this case to the court of appeals for reconsideration. View "Asberry v. Texas" on Justia Law

Shirley Copeland was charged with possession of a dangerous drug after police searched the vehicle she was in and found prescription pain medication in a plastic bag. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search of the car was illegal. The trial court granted the motion and sua sponte issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State appealed the trial court's suppression order three times, initially focusing on whether the police had the consent of the driver and Copeland to search the vehicle. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on second remand, instructed the court of appeals to determine if there was an alternative theory of law upon which to uphold the ruling of the trial court. Specifically, the Court noted that, in her motion to suppress, Copeland argued that the length of her detention was unreasonable but that the State did not challenge that argument on appeal. On remand, the court of appeals held that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue, reasoning that because the State argued at trial that the length of Copeland’s detention was reasonable, the issue was a theory applicable to the case, and as a result, the State was obliged to make that argument on appeal or forfeit it through inaction. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals exercised its discretionary review power to determine: (1) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue; and (2) whether the court of appeals properly performed the analysis instructed by the Court. Because the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue on appeal, it affirmed the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Copeland" on Justia Law